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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores functional malware classification using running window
entropy and machine learning classifiers. This topic was under researched in the prior literature,
but the implications are important for malware defense. This dissertation will present six new
design science artifacts. The first artifact was a generalized machine learning based malware
classifier model. This model was used to categorize and explain the gaps in the prior literature.
This artifact was also used to compare the prior literature to the classifiers created in this
dissertation, herein referred to as “Malgazer” classifiers.
Running window entropy data was required, but the algorithm was too slow to compute
at scale. This dissertation presents an optimized version of the algorithm that requires less than
2% of the time of the original algorithm. Next, the classifications for the malware samples were
required, but there was no one unified and consistent source for this information. One of the
design science artifacts was the method to determine the classifications from publicly available
resources.
Once the running window entropy data was computed and the functional classifications
were collected, the machine learning algorithms were trained at scale so that one individual
could complete over 200 computationally intensive experiments for this dissertation. The
method to scale the computations was an instantiation design science artifact. The trained
classifiers were another design science artifact. Lastly, a web application was developed so that
the classifiers could be utilized by those without a programming background. This was the last
design science artifact created by this research.
Once the classifiers were developed, they were compared to prior literature theoretically
and empirically. A malware classification method from prior literature was chosen (referred to
herein as “GIST”) for an empirical comparison to the Malgazer classifiers. The best Malgazer
classifier produced an accuracy of approximately 95%, which was around 0.76% more accurate
than the GIST method on the same data sets. Then, the Malgazer classifier was compared to the
prior literature theoretically, based upon the empirical analysis with GIST, and Malgazer
performed at least as well as the prior literature. While the data, methods, and source code are
open sourced from this research, most prior literature did not provide enough information or data
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to replicate and verify each method. This prevented a full and true comparison to prior literature,
but it did not prevent recommending the Malgazer classifier for some use cases.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Motivation
There were on average 200,000+ new malware threats released into the internet each day
in 2017, and that number generally grows each year (Panda Security, 2017). Some commercial
malware detection tools claimed 95% efficacy rates for malware detection (Saxe & Berlin, 2015)
or beyond (Cylance Inc., 2016). Unfortunately, malware detection and classification are often
used interchangeably in prior literature and in industry. Malware detection determines if a
sample was malware or not, while malware classification determines what type of behavior,
function and family the malware exhibited. Operationally, detection and classification
algorithms can be separated to provide critical real-time sensitive information for the detection,
and then deliver more time tolerant, richer information to the classifier. In most real-world
scenarios, the classification information comes well after the sample was caught and blocked
prior to execution by the detector. As detection efficacy continues to improve in practice,
classification efficacy is a more complex, interesting, and richer problem that requires more
research.
As shown in Figure 1, malware detection is a subset1 of the overall malware classification
problem, and it is the classification problem this dissertation will examine. This dissertation will
present an automated machine-learning based method of malware classification that could be
applied independently after the detection method, thereby relaxing the time sensitivity
requirement that the overall classification of the sample must occur at the same time it was
detected and blocked. The additional time between detection and classification would allow for
the computation of additional rich data from the sample, such as running window entropy
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With detection, there are only two classes in a classification problem. One class is “malware” and the
other is “not malware” (or “benign”).
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Figure 1. The malware classification and detection problems
(RWE). RWE would normally not be available during the time sensitive detection phase
because of the additional time required for more complex computations.
For simplicity, the classifier and design science artifacts developed in this dissertation
will be collectively referred to as “Malgazer”. Malgazer’s source code is open source and can be
downloaded at (Jones, 2017b).

Running Window Entropy
As a basis for Malgazer, running window entropy, sometimes applied with slight
modifications and called “structural entropy” in prior literature (Baysa, 2013; Lyda & Hamrock,
2007; Sorokin, 2011; Wojnowicz, Chisholm, & Wolff, 2016; Wojnowicz, Chisholm, Wolff, &
Zhao, 2016; Wolff & Chisholm, 2015), provides a localized view of entropy data near a
particular offset within the file. Running window entropy, a series of values, is different than
full file entropy, a scalar value. Full file entropy can be easily manipulated by malware authors
by appending a set of chosen bytes to the malware sample. For example, adding many zeros to
the end of a malware sample will trend the overall file entropy downward, while it would not
change the previous values in the running window entropy series or modify the malware
sample’s execution behavior.
While the example above applies to the full sample’s entropy, the same method could be
applied to sections within an executable file and achieve the same effect if the scalar entropy
value of a section is calculated. A “section” could be a Windows PE file section, or it could be a
section of an ELF file, as most binary executable files use sections. Therefore, simply
computing the entropy of certain sections or the whole file may not lead to accurate results
because the malware author could have easily manipulated the entropy in this manner.
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Entropy, as originally defined by Shannon for information theory (Shannon, 1948),
measures the amount of useful information in data. It is important to know that a higher entropy
value equates to more relevant information in the data while a lower entropy value equates to
less relevant information. A lower entropy value indicates the data was predictable while a high
entropy value indicates the data was more random and contained more useful, unpredictable,
information. This type of additional data, if applied appropriately, could increase automated
classification accuracy. As discussed in later chapters, Malgazer classified running window
entropy data with approximately 95% accuracy. 95% accuracy was a slight improvement over
the GIST method, a prior malware classification algorithm discussed in the next chapter.
Improved accuracy of automated malware classifiers would allow for reductions of
intervening human effort and costs during this compulsory malware analysis stage. This
dissertation examines running window entropy as a means for classification in an effort to reduce
the costs associated with malware analysis. More information about the use of entropy for
malware analysis is presented in the second half of this chapter.
The computation of running window entropy required a computationally expensive
double “for” loop that depended on the running window size and the malware sample size. To
calculate the running window entropy of 200,000+ new malware variants each day, this
algorithm must be implemented efficiently for use in practice. This dissertation will explore one
such algorithm, developed by this author, that included optimizations to reduce the time required
for this computation. The optimized algorithm will be presented in chapter 4.

The Malware Classification Problem
Before any classifier can be developed, the generalized concepts of machine learning
based malware classification must be understood and agreed upon. The literature review for this
dissertation did not uncover a consistent, unified, and generalized model for the machine
learning based malware classification problem. Articles that attempted, such as (Shabtai,
Moskovitch, Elovici, & Glezer, 2009), did not present a model using mathematical concepts that
could be useful for future research. In order for different methods to be compared, the individual
components must be organized into a generalized model so that the methods can be compared in
a one to one fashion at the component level.
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In Figure 2, a generalized model of the machine learning based classification system is
presented with each component clearly identified in the model. This generalized machine
learning classification model will be used for the remainder of this dissertation. The model
introduced in Figure 2 is applied to the prior research in chapter 2, thereby demonstrating the
validity and need of such model.
The model in Figure 2 will be referred to as the “generalized machine learning
classification model” and is not to be confused with the machine learning model inside a specific
classifier (“MLM” in Figure 2). The classifier developed in this dissertation will be referred to
as “Malgazer” and will be based on running window entropy using the framework of the
generalized machine learning classification model. Methods from prior literature will be
referenced by its type as appropriate, such as “GIST” (Laks, 2013, 2014; Lakshmanan Nataraj,
Karthikeyan, Jacob, & Manjunath, 2011) or the method number. The method number
identifications will be made in chapter 2.
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Figure 2. A generalized machine learning based malware classifier
A description of the generalized model in Figure 2 follows. The malware is represented
by the vector “M”, where the vector is of size “n” to correspond to the number of bytes in the
malware sample. This vector is the input to a transformation function “T”. It is also assumed
file metadata is captured within “T”. “T” is a function that computes outputs based upon the
malware input. An example of “T” may be the representation of the malware executable in
memory after it uncompressed itself. Another example of “T” could be the calculation of the
running window entropy series from the malware input. The output of the function “T” is of size
“t”. The next node is the function “P”, which represents pre-processing operations on the data.
An example of “P” could be the normalization and standardization of the running window
entropy features for the ML model so that the intensive computations are much smaller
(Eremenko & de Ponteves, 2017). The output of this node is of size “f”, which is the number of
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features fed into the machine learning model “MLM”. Machine learning model will be
discussed more in depth later in this in chapter.
The machine learning model provides an output of classifications or predictions that is of
size “c”. The classifications or predictions (CorP) could be measured in order to provide error
measurements using the function “E”, of output size “e”, for the model’s performance. The error
measurements could be provided to a tuning function, identified as “TU”, that modifies the
machine learning model’s behavior. As an example, the “TU” function could tune parameters of
“MLM” based upon the area under the curve (AUC) for the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve (Hanley & McNeil, 1982), a measurement that is often used as to determine the
accuracy of a classifier.
The classifications or predictions could also be post-processed, identified as the function
“PP”. An example of “PP” could be preparation of the classifications as input to another neural
network or machine learning algorithm. In all cases, the choice of function dictates the output
size from a given input size.
This mathematically based, generalized machine learning based malware classification
model will be used throughout this dissertation. Formally, a generalized machine learning based
malware classifier is defined as:

7

Definition 1. A generalized machine learning based malware classifier
A generalized machine learning based malware classifier is constructed from a set C, containing
the following functions from Figure 2: T(), P(), MLM(), E(), TU(), and PP().
T() is the transformation function. P() is the pre-processing function. MLM() is the machine
learning model. E() is the error measurement function. TU() is the machine learning model
tuning function and PP() is the post processing function.
Based upon the conceptual model presented previously, the answer to the problem of
automated machine learning malware classification is a search problem for adequate parameters
of the set “C” according to a given set of requirements for a specific use case. Note that the
requirements could be defined based upon the error measurements in the right most square of
Figure 2.
Malgazer will use running window entropy as features for classification, but the length of
the running window entropy series of a file will depend on the size of the malware sample. Most
machine learning based classifiers use a fixed number of features, so the input vector must be
normalized to the same size for any malware sample regardless of the size. This is another
example of the preprocessing function “P” in Figure 2. For example, a large running window
entropy series from each sample could be normalized, using interpolation and down sampling, to
an array of 1,024 values. This is similar to reducing the size of input images when machine
learning based classifiers are applied for the purposes of handwriting recognition (Eremenko &
de Ponteves, 2017).

Input Data Sets
The efficacy of most machine learning classification algorithms depends heavily upon the
training phase. The training phase for supervised machine learning classification algorithms,
further discussed in chapter 3, simply requires a set of features that are already classified.
During the training phase, the machine learning algorithm (“MLM” in Figure 2 and Definition 1)
“learns the best” internal parameters of the models based upon the input training data set and the
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already known classifications. This type of machine learning is called supervised learning, since
the classifications of the training data sets are already known. Supervised machine learning is
different than unsupervised machine learning such that unsupervised learning does not require
the training data to be labeled and the unsupervised algorithm decides the classifications for sets
of input features on its own. Since this dissertation will focus on the functional classification of
malware samples rather than allowing an algorithm to determine clusters of samples, supervised
machine learning algorithms are more relevant to this research problem.
Additionally, the training data quality also effects the overall classifier accuracy. The
training data is separated into two smaller sets for training purposes: the training data set and a
testing data set. A testing data set is used to measure the accuracy of a classifier that was created
with the corresponding training data set. Therefore, a testing data set that does not accurately
reflect the training data set will drive the classifier’s testing accuracy downward. On the other
hand, a testing data set that matches the training data set too closely could artificially inflate the
classifier’s testing accuracy and cause the accuracy in real world applications to be lower than
expected. Therefore, in addition to Figure 2 and Definition 1, the input data sets must be
declared in order for validation and reproducibility of any proposed classifier. The input data
sets will be discussed for prior research in chapter 2. The input data set used to develop
Malgazer will be discussed further in chapter 3.

Classifier Training And Implementation
Malgazer was implemented using the concepts presented in Figure 3. The large upper
box encapsulates the training and testing phases. The training phase uses the training data set
and the testing phase uses the testing data set as discussed previously2. The training phase forces
the classifier to learn the internal “best” parameters for the data set while the testing phase
measures the accuracy of the classifier on new samples for which the user already knows the
correct classifications. In the lower half of Figure 3, the prediction phase box represents the
implementation of the classifier on unknown malware samples. The prediction phase occurs
when the Malgazer classifier is in production.

2

Technically, the training data set is also tested for accuracy during the training phase, but it can be
optionally tested again in the testing phase. Doing so would lead to the same results for deterministic classifiers.
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Statement Of The Research Problem
The problem investigated in this dissertation is to develop an automated machine learning
based classifier (Malgazer) using running window entropy as the feature space that will classify
new malware samples functionally. This problem will be solved using a design science research
methodology (Arnould, Hevner, March, & Park, 2004). The classifier will be built with the
generalized machine learning malware classifier outlined in Figure 2 and Definition 1 by
selecting the appropriate parameters in the classifier set “C” and using running window entropy
as the input feature space. The accuracy of the classifier will be measured by the area under the
curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and using a confusion matrix (CM)
to compute the classification accuracy. Using these measurements, and other appropriate
statistical measurements as needed, the parameters of set “C” will be determined using an
organized searching methodology. The efficacy of Malgazer will then be compared to prior
research theoretically and empirically. The detailed methodology for the proposed solution to
this problem will be presented in chapter 3.
The Hypothesis
The null hypothesis for this research problem is if the Malgazer classifier cannot be
constructed from the running window entropy feature space. In this case, all instances of trained
Malgazer classifiers would perform worse than random guessing. The hypothesis in this
dissertation that a Malgazer classifier can be developed will be proven by the existence of a
classifier that can perform better than random guessing. It is the existence of such a classifier
that this dissertation presents using a programmatic searching methodology.
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Figure 3. The classifier implementation

Comparison To Prior Methods
The classifier developed in this dissertation will be compared to the reported accuracies
of classifiers from prior literature in chapter 7. However, it is important to keep in mind that the
reported accuracies from prior literature are highly dependent on the input training malware data
set, among other numerous factors, that are difficult to discern, source and replicate from such
literature alone. To remove the variable of input data training sets as a factor, the Malgazer
classifier developed in this dissertation will be closely compared empirically to a malware
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classifier using GIST features (Laks, 2013, 2014; Lakshmanan Nataraj et al., 2011). Contact
with an author of the GIST paper, for which this author is very grateful, allowed for replication
of their methods using the Malgazer training data. Authors of other similar works were
contacted as well, but the GIST authors provided the details required to fully implement their
methodology while authors of other methods did not reply or replied well after the GIST
methodology was implemented for this research.
The empirical comparison will allow for the GIST method to be directly compared to
Malgazer using the same training and testing malware samples. This comparison will remove
the input data set variable between the GIST method and the Malgazer classifier. Since the input
set of malware samples influences the accuracy of a machine learning based classifier, this
comparison will more accurately reflect the efficacy of Malgazer versus the GIST malware
classifier rather than a simple, and very problematic, comparison of best accuracies from
different training data sets.

Objectives and Contributions
The research problem will be solved through several newly developed design science
artifacts (Arnould et al., 2004). Each artifact and the type of artifact will be discussed in its own
sub-section that follows.
A Generalized Machine Learning Based Malware Classifier Model
The first design science artifact is the model presented in Figure 2 and Definition 1. This
model will be applied to prior research in chapter 2, for each publication reviewed. The
definition of this model for each publication facilitated the one to one component comparisons to
Malgazer. By using this generalized classification model, the strengths, weaknesses, and
differences of each method’s component can be categorized and compared. By associating prior
literature with the generalized classification model for comparison purposes, the usefulness of
this design science artifact will become apparent. This model is a design science model artifact.
An Optimized Running Window Entropy Algorithm
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As mentioned previously, the computation of running window entropy can be minimized
by optimizing the algorithm with respect to time. In chapter 4, an algorithm developed by this
author minimizing the computation time of running window entropy is presented. This
algorithm is a design science method artifact. This algorithm was published at a peer reviewed
technical conference (Jones & Wang, 2018) and the associated source code is available to
everyone at (Jones, 2017b, 2017a).
A Method To Collect And Normalize Functional Classification Information From
Publicly Available Resources
As it will be discussed in depth in chapter 3, supervised machine learning classifiers must
be trained on known classified samples. Therefore, classifications and samples must be sourced
for the classifier’s training phase in Figure 3. Publicly available data from resources such as
VirusTotal (“VirusTotal,” n.d.-a) generally contain classifications developed by the authors of
those anti-virus tools and is usually not consistent between vendors. For example, Microsoft
may classify a malware sample by the functional characteristics, such as “Ransomware”, rather
than another vendor that may classify the same sample by the family name, such as “Locky”.
This dissertation will present a method to collect and normalize publicly available malware
classifications so that the information can be used to train Malgazer. The classification
information used by Malgazer will be the functional classification, such as “Ransom”, but other
classification methods could be studied in the future, such as family name. The method of
collecting and normalizing the functional classification information is a design science method
artifact and the associated source code is available to everyone at (Jones, 2017b). The entropy
data sets are available through instructions at the same repository. Users looking for more
information about the repositories may find the tour in the appendix useful.
A Method To Scale The Training Of Machine Learning Based Classifiers Using
Cloud Resources
Since this dissertation was developed by a single individual with limited time, computing,
and financial resources; a method was developed to scale training computations for the machine
learning classifiers given those constraints. Scaling these computationally intensive processes
across cloud resources was one way to reduce the cost and time involved with computationally
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intensive batch jobs, such as training classifiers. While not novel in a general sense, this
dissertation will present a programmatic method to create Malgazer training resources on
demand, and those resources were used to create the Malgazer classifiers later in this
dissertation. The method of scaling computations is presented because it is specific to the
malware classification problem, and the method was not clearly mentioned in prior literature.
The scaling method was developed such that a single individual can perform the same
calculations discussed in this dissertation with minimal costs. Scaling the development of
malware classifiers in the cloud is a design science instantiation artifact, and was the sole reason
one individual could complete the research described in this dissertation within a year. The
process of scaling computations is discussed further in chapter 6.
An Optimized Machine Learning Based Malware Classifier
The values of set “C” will be determined using industry accepted machine learning
algorithms to programmatically search for the best parameters for set “C” given the input feature
set and error requirements. In machine learning, this process is named “grid searching” for the
parameters (“Scikit Learn GridSearchCV,” n.d.). Once the candidates for “C” based on running
window entropy are selected, Malgazer will be instantiated, in design science terminology.
Malgazer will be instantiated using standard Python classes designed to be portable across
different types of platforms. The trained classifier is a design science instantiation artifact and is
available to everyone at (Jones, 2017b).
A User Application To Automate The Machine Learning Based Malware Classifier
A classifier alone will still require human intervention within the Python interpreter, so
another design science artifact will be created as an application so that the user can easily submit
malware samples to Malgazer. The application will be developed with Python and function as a
web application, complete with programmatic API access. This application will be developed so
little human intervention or understanding is required to use the classifier. With this application,
the user can interact with Malgazer through a standard web browser or standard command line
tools without requiring deep programming knowledge. With one command line, the user is able
to instantiate the Malgazer web application on any platform using the open source Docker
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application (Docker Inc., n.d.). The user application is a design science instantiation artifact and
is available to everyone at (Jones, 2017b).

Assumptions, Scope, And Limitations
There are assumptions made with regard to Malgazer’s development. First, it is assumed
that the samples presented to Malgazer are already proven to be malware. It would not make
sense to pass a benign sample to a malware classifier, as the output would be an unpredictable
malware classification while the sample was truly benign. Second, it is assumed that only
Microsoft Windows PE files are examined. Each file format could be represented differently as
running window entropy, therefore this study could be applied to each of the possible malware
executable file types, including weaponized documents, in the same manner as it is applied to
Microsoft Windows PE files here.
There are also limitations to Malgazer. First, the biggest limitation is the depth and
veracity of the training data set. A classifier built upon bad or biased training data may have
unpredictable effects on the classification of unknown samples. Since only one individual
worked on this data with limited time, financial, and computing resources instead of a larger data
science organization, a manageable number of 60,000 malware samples were collected. In
addition, the number of functional classifications were limited to six to make this research
project feasible for a single individual. The six functional classifications of Virus, Worm,
Backdoor, Trojan, Ransom, and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) were determined by
selecting the top functional categories represented by a VirusTotal Intelligence stream in the
month of June 2018, as discussed in the qualitative data exploration chapter 5. To prevent a
classifier bias, the six groups were represented equally in the training data set using a series of
filters at VirusTotal. These filters will be discussed further in chapter 3, research methodology.
From the 60,000 samples collected, there were 10,000 samples in each of the six categories.
This may not accurately reflect the composition of each classification in the real world overall,
but it eliminated the complexity inherent to machine learning based classifiers when using
unbalanced training data sets.
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Background
This rest of this chapter will explain the background necessary to fully appreciate the
concepts this dissertation will examine. A reader already versed in malware analysis and
machine learning may wish to skip to the next chapter. This chapter will continue with a section
about the use of entropy during malware analysis. The basis of the Malgazer classifier is running
window entropy (RWE) data, so it is necessary to understand why entropy is important in the
context of malware analysis. Next, this chapter will examine how to perform classification with
machine learning, at a generic level. Understanding components of machine learning
classification at a generic level is a requirement before applying classification algorithms to
malware samples. The concepts introduced in this chapter will be used to help explain additional
concepts presented in the literature review chapter, next.

Entropy and Malware Analysis
Basically, entropy is a measure of information encoded in a series of values based upon
the probability of those values appearing. Another way to look at entropy is that it is a measure
of randomness. Values with higher variance will increase the entropy. Values with no variance
will have the minimum entropy of zero. Therefore, entropy can be used to locate more
interesting data based upon the magnitude of the entropy value.
“Interesting data” is a subjective description of the data one is looking for. Here,
“interesting” is with respect to malware analysis. There are two cases where higher entropy data
may be interesting to a malware analyst. First, it is well known that encrypted data is usually
higher in entropy than plain text data, and cryptographic keys are usually random-like so they
will have high entropy (Stallings, 2017). Calculating the entropy of a file encrypted with strong
encryption will lead to a higher entropy value than the same calculation for a plain text version
of the same file. If an analyst wanted to locate all of the encrypted files out of a set that were not
encrypted, one method they could use is to calculate the entropy of each file and rank them in
descending order.
However, this method would not guarantee that only the encrypted files are at the top of
the order. Entropy also increases when compression is applied to data. Since compression
reduces the data’s size, it must reencode the original file differently such that each compressed
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value contains more information than the original values it replaced. This will allow the same
data to occupy less space, which leads to compression. This information gain per byte from
compression leads to more random-like data, therefore the entropy value for compressed data
also increases.
Luckily, encrypted and compressed data are two types of data that are of interest to the
malware analyst. For example, a malware analyst may want to examine a compressed
executable file. These types of executable files typically decompress their payload into memory
and run additional commands from there. In this example, the analyst would be looking for areas
of the malware sample that were compressed, and those areas could have been identified by the
higher entropy.
In another example, a malware analyst may be interested in a section of malware that has
been encrypted. Malware authors often employ encryption to slow down analysis and
identification of their malware. Encrypted data, like compressed data, will have a higher entropy
value. Locating sections within malware samples with higher entropy values is highly likely to
lead to sections that are compressed, encrypted, or even a cryptographic key. Even if the
sections are not compressed or encrypted, the sections of a sample with higher entropy will still
contain more relevant data per byte, in information theory terms. High entropy areas of a
malware sample could be the first place an analyst may wish to analyze.
Notice that the examples began with entropy of full files and finished with sections of a
malware sample. While malware analysts can measure the entropy of the full malware sample,
this information is not always useful. For example, a malware author may measure the entropy
of their malware sample and it calculates to “0.9” out of a zero to one scale. The malware author
may decide that this entropy value is too high for the malware sample because most security
products know of entropy and may use it to detect this new malware sample. The malware
author can easily reduce the malware sample’s entropy by appending bytes containing the value
zero to the sample. The repetition of the zero value will begin to decrease the full file entropy of
the malware sample towards zero. Once enough zero bytes have been appended to lower the
entropy to the threshold the author desires, they can stop adding additional bytes. Now, in
theory, this malware sample will be less detectable if the detection product factors full file
entropy heavily.
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Figure 4. Running window entropy
To combat this entropy manipulation, the security product could examine the last bytes of
the file and if they are of low entropy, ignore them. However, the malware author could improve
their technique by appending these low entropy bytes to the end of the sections within the
executable instead of the file’s end. For this malware defense, security products cannot not rely
on full file entropy alone to make a malware detection decision. At this point, security products
need to examine the entropy from a window of data within the file to make entropy-based
decisions. This is where running window entropy can be useful to security products, researchers,
and malware analysis.
Running window entropy is entropy of a window within the data stream, and the window
is moved to the next byte and calculated again for each value in the stream. The graphical
depiction of running window entropy with a window size of six and a malware sample size of
one hundred values can be found in Figure 4. Notice that for each byte the window is
recalculated for the new values until the window touches the end of the file or data stream. The
last entropy data point is “Entropy95”, when the right side of the window touches the end of the
stream. If the size of the stream is !, and the size of the entropy window is ", the running
window entropy vector will contain ! − " + 1 values. When ! and " are equal, there will be only
one entropy data point because the entropy window is the same size as the data stream. In this
case, it is the same as the full file entropy example previously presented.
For large values of ! (the malware size) and " (the entropy window size), there will many
calculations taking place. Since the running entropy window moves to the right through the
malware data, there will be replicated computations occurring in a double “for” loop. It is
possible to reduce the number of replicated computations from this double “for” loop, and
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chapter 4 will present one such way to do so. This computation is slow because of the inner &'(
function within Shannon’s entropy equation (Shannon, 1948):
) = −+ ∑/.01 -. &'(-.

(1)

Here, 2 is the number of symbols, or 256 since each value within a malware file is a byte,
and a byte can have 256 values from zero to 255. Recalculating the &'( within nested “for”
loops becomes a very slow process. Reducing the number of times the &'( function is called
will reduce the overall time it takes to compute the running window entropy data. An optimized,
drop-in replacement for the original running window entropy algorithm will be presented in
chapter 4. For now, it is important to know that running window entropy is a localized view of
an entropy window of size " in the malware file of size !. In the last example of the malware
author adding constant bytes to the end of executable sections to lower the entropy of the file,
analysis of the running window entropy data could have been used to detect this method.
In Figure 5 and Figure 6, the running window entropy has been plotted for two malware
samples. The malware sample A has a SHA256 hash of 00050F30FF95C69F92F
8C32338C4F3473B4F653FF2A1B65375AAC32596A225B4. The malware sample B has a
SHA256 hash of 00018690F0A5E684190A95B911E6502658D434249B43EAD719E
49405EB9B9EE7. Without knowing anything else about these two malware samples, it is
possible to tell that they must have differences because their entropy graphs are greatly different.
The plateaus and valleys in each of the graphs demonstrate structure to the running window
entropy data. The structure in one malware sample is not the same structure in the other. It is
this running window entropy data that will be used to answer the research question posed
previously.
This running window entropy structure could be exploited for machine learning
classifications if similarities in the running window entropy data between samples of the same
class can be located. To use the running window entropy structure for machine learning
classification, the general concepts of machine learning classification must be understood. The
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Figure 5. Running window entropy for sample A

Figure 6. Running window entropy for sample B
next section will discuss how machine learning classification works so that it can be applied to
the malware classification problem in this research.

Machine Learning Based Classification
There are numerous uses for machine learning algorithms such as classification,
regression, clustering, dimensionality reduction, model selection, and preprocessing. This
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research will only focus on aspects related to malware classification, so irrelevant concepts such
as machine learning regression algorithms will not be covered here. More information on topics
not covered here can be found at SciKit Learn’s informative website (“scikit-learn,” n.d.).
Recall that a classifier is built and operated using the diagram in Figure 3. The input data
will be segregated into two groups: a training data set and a testing data set. The training and
testing data sets will have the classification information, so Figure 3 represents a supervised
machine learning based approach.
There will be a number of machine learning algorithms used throughout this research.
Some of the algorithms presented will be used for data preprocessing, while others will be used
to select the best machine learning models for a given data set. For preprocessing, algorithms
can be used to scale and encode data so that the resulting computations are more manageable.
For model selection, there are algorithms that can compare the results of one machine learning
model against another and provide the parameters for the model with the best accuracy.
Classification algorithms contain parameters that are “learned” from the input training
data set. These parameters constitute the classifier and are fixed after the learning phase so that
they can be used to predict the classifications of future malware samples. Hyper-parameters of
machine learning classification models are parameters that are not learned from the data but can
be tuned by the user. Hyper-parameters can be programmatically determined by the user through
the grid searching algorithm, which is an example model selection algorithm mentioned
previously.
The core of the classification algorithms within Malgazer will be the following six types
of supervised classifiers:
•

Decision Trees (DT)

•

Random Forests (RF)

•

Support Vector Machines (SVM)

•

Naïve Bayes (NB)

•

K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)

•

Nearest Centroid (NC)
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Other algorithms can improve the classification algorithms listed above by “boosting”
them. For example, AdaBoost and OneVRest (OvR) both use a series of underlying classifiers
chosen from the list above and improves the overall accuracy of the original classifier with a
series of smaller classifiers. The boosting algorithms will be considered during this research
project.
Artificial intelligence has provided a collection of classification algorithms called “neural
networks” that mimic a brain by providing pseudo-neurons that learn classifications based upon
the training data. There are two main types of neural networks examined in this research:
artificial neural networks (ANN) and convolutional neural networks (CNN). Each of the
machine learning classification algorithms will be presented in a subsection below after feature
scaling, encoding data, and grid searching are discussed first.
Features Scaling
Features are numerical input values to the classifier. In this research, features will be
values from the running window entropy calculations. Since features can contain very large
numbers and the machine learning algorithms contain intensive mathematical calculations, it is
common to scale the input feature data to make the mathematics more manageable. Scikit learn
includes a features scaling algorithm that fits to a training data set (“Scikit Learn
StandardScalar,” n.d.). Malgazer will use this algorithm to scale the features before inputting
them into a model. It is also important to note that there is also an inverse transform available
for scaling.
Encoding Data
Classifications, as humans know them, are a description in the form of a string. To take
this string and make it something a computer can comprehend, the data can be encoded as a
number. For example, the first classification could be “Bot” and the second classification could
be “Ransomware”. The first classification could be encoded as a zero and the second
classification could be encoded as a one. If there were additional classifications, they would be
encoded as the next available integer (two, three, four, …). A classification label encoder that
transforms the label into a number is implemented in Scikit Learn (“SciKit Learn
LabelEncoder,” n.d.).
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Although a computer can understand an integer more readily than it can understand a
string, a computer does not know if that value represents a floating-point continuous value or it is
an integer representing a classification. In the example above, it would not make sense to
classify a malware sample as “0.7”, because it is neither a “Bot” (a zero) or a “Ransomware”
sample (a one). To properly represent the classification label data, it can be further encoded as
categorical, or sometimes referred to as “one hot”, to contain only discrete binary data. After
encoding, each value will be transformed from an integer into a binary vector, where the “1” in
the binary vector full of zeroes is in the index represented by integer’s number. For example, a
category of zero would be “0001”. A category of one would be “0010”. A category of two
would be “0100”, and so on. It is called “one hot” encoding because the one is enabled in the
index represented by the integer value, so one category is represented by one index (or column)
in the encoding. A one hot encoder is provided by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn OneHotEncoder,”
n.d.). A similar function is provided as “to_categorical” in the Keras machine learning library
(“Keras,” n.d.). Both methods achieve the same results. The inverse of this encoding simply
locates the index where there is a “1” and reports that index number.
Cross Fold Validation (CFV)/Cross Validation (CV)
Cross fold validation, sometimes called k-fold validation or cross validation, is the
process of segmenting the training data set into ! equal sized groups and training the classifier
on the first ! − 1 groups of the training data, then test the classifier on group !. After that
accuracy is computed, the ! groups of data will be shifted such that each subset ends up in the
testing group once. Once the ! calculations have been performed, each accuracy will be
averaged to produce the cross validated accuracy for ! groups. This process performs ! tests on
the input data to more accurately reflect the potential real-world performance rather than just one
classifier implementation that may have luckily chosen the right samples for training. Cross
validation can be performed using functionality from Scikit Learn, or it can be manually
implemented and customized with additional features as in Malgazer’s case.
Grid Searching
Each of the classification algorithms presented in this chapter have hyper-parameters.
Hyper-parameters are parameters that are not automatically learned by the machine learning
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Figure 7. A decision tree classifier
classification model, but they can still be modified by the user. Well-tuned hyper-parameters can
increase a model’s accuracy, and conversely a hyper-parameter that is not tuned correctly can
lead to lower accuracy. It is possible to search through a list of candidate values for each hyperparameter and select the most performant model through a process called “grid searching”. Grid
searching has been implemented in Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn GridSearchCV,” n.d.).
Decision Trees (DT)
Decision trees (DT) are a type of classifier. Decision trees involve a series of “if”
statements, connected from the top down like a tree, as shown in Figure 7. The “if” statements
in the tree are “learned” from the training data to produce the most accurate classifications.
Decision trees are implemented in Python through the Scikit Learn package (“Scikit Learn
DecisionTreeClassifier,” n.d.). There is one main hyper-parameter for this algorithm called
“criterion”. This parameter is used to measure the quality of the splits in the tree. “Criterion”
will be used as a hyper-parameter for the grid searching model selection algorithm later in this
research.
Random Forests (RF)
A random forest (RF) classifier is an ensemble of decision tree classifiers that are created
from portions of the training data. The individual decision tree classifiers are averaged to
provide higher accuracy for the forest. Random forests are implemented in Python through the
Scikit Learn package (“Scikit Learn RandomForestClassifier,” n.d.). There are two main hyperparameters for this algorithm called “criterion” and “n_estimators”. The first is the criteria for
the decision tree classifier, discussed previously. “n_estimators” is the number of decision trees
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used in the forest. Both hyper-parameters will be used in the grid searching model selection
algorithm later in this research.
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Support vector machines (SVM) can provide classification by fitting a kernel around the
classes in multi-dimensional space. This algorithm is one of the more complex machine learning
algorithms and contains many hyperparameters such as kernel, degree, gamma, etc. Scikit Learn
has an implementation of the SVM classifier (“Scikit Learn SVC,” n.d.) and presents all
available hyper-parameters. These hyper-parameters will be used in the grid searching model
selection algorithm later in this research.
Naïve Bayes (NB)
The Naïve Bayes (NB) classifier uses the Bayes theorem and the dependence between
features to determine classifications. Scikit Learn has an implementation of the Naïve Bayes
classifier (“Scikit Learn GaussianNB,” n.d.).
K-Nearest neighbors (KNN)
The k-nearest neighbors (KNN) classifier places each training data point in a multidimensional space and determines the class of the k-nearest neighbors. Scikit Learn has an
implementation of k-nearest neighbors (“Scikit Learn KNeighborsClassifier,” n.d.). The most
useful hyper-parameter for this algorithm is “n_neighbors”, the number of neighbors to use for
new classification predictions. This hyper-parameter will be used in the grid searching model
selection algorithm later in this research.
Nearest Centroid (NC)
The nearest centroid (NC) algorithm is similar to the KNN algorithm in that it plots the
data points in a multi-dimensional space, but it also calculates the “center” of each class and
classifies new data based upon the smallest distance to the class’s center. Scikit Learn has an
implementation of nearest centroid (“Scikit Learn NearestCentroid,” n.d.). The nearest centroid
algorithm has two hyper-parameters: a metric for calculating distances and a shrink threshold
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value. These hyper-parameters will be used in the grid searching model selection algorithm later
in this research.
AdaBoost
AdaBoost is not a classifier directly, it is an algorithm that constructs multiple classifiers
from a base classifier type. The ensemble of classifiers is created with concentration on the more
difficult classifications until the best accuracy is reached. The base classifier could be any of the
classifiers discussed previously, such as DT, RF, SVM, and so on. AdaBoost is implemented in
Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn AdaBoostClassifier,” n.d.). The important hyper-parameters to
AdaBoost are the number of estimators, the learning rate, the algorithm used, and the base
estimator type. These hyper-parameters will be used with the grid searching model selection
algorithm later in this research.
OneVRest (OVR)
The OneVRest (OVR) classifier is also not a classifier directly, it is an algorithm that
constructs multiple classifiers from a base classifier to singly classify each class. As an example,
if the classes were “Bot”, “Ransom” and “Worm”, the OVR classifier would construct a
classifier to predict the “Bot” class or not, then it will construct a classifier to predict the
“Ransom” class or not, then it will construct a classifier to predict the “Worm” class or not.
Each classifier becomes a “this class versus all else” classifier. This is also known as “one vs.
rest” or “one vs. all”. The OVR classifier is implemented in Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
OneVsRestClassifier,” n.d.). The important hyper-parameter to OVR is the base estimator type.
This hyper-parameter will be used with the grid searching model selection algorithm later in this
research.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are layered networks of units where all units in a layer
are connected to units in the layer to the left and the right of the layer. A unit creates an output
depending on the unit’s inputs and parameters. The connections between units are sometimes
called “weights”. An example ANN is presented in Figure 8. The larger arrows represent

26

Figure 8. A generic artificial neural network
information flowing forward, and all layers are connected to the layers on the left and right side
of that layer. The layers do not all have to be the same size. In Figure 8, each layer has eight
units, but each of the hidden layers could have any number of units, making infinitely possible
configurations of a neural network. The input layer has the same number of units as the input
feature data. The output layer has the same number of units as the number of classifications in
the classifier.
When ANNs are trained, as discussed previously in Figure 3, the feature information is
fed into the leftmost input layer one observation at a time. With supervised learning,
classifications are available in the training data so that the true classification information can be
compared to the predicted classification at the rightmost output layer. Since the classification
data has been preprocessed using label and one hot encoding, each classification is represented
by one output node in the output layer. The learning process for an ANN is to supply a feature
observation at the input layer and compare the predicted classification with the known
classification on the output layer, noting the error in the prediction to the true classification. This
process is repeated for all observations in the training data. Then, through a process known as
gradient descent, the parameters for each of the units in the network are modified in an attempt to
reduce the overall classification error. Each time the training set is calculated, it is called an
epoch. After numerous epochs the classification error should begin to converge. It is at this
point that the network has “learned” the classifications of the training data. If the error does not
converge, the network did not “learn” the classifications adequately.
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ANNs have many hyper-parameters if the structure of the network is considered. Other
hyper-parameters exist in the form of metadata such as activation functions or how the descent is
optimized. There are many different methods available for ANN implementation, but the one
used for this dissertation was the Python Keras library running with a Tensorflow backend
(“Keras,” n.d.; “Tensorflow,” n.d.).
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are a neural network because of the layers and
connections, but there are different types of layers available in addition to the ANN units.
Instead of simple connections between layers, layers can perform convolutions and pooling.
Convolutions can be thought of as filters while pooling is similar to down sampling. CNNs are
more complex than ANNs and therefore require more time for processing. However, the tradeoff
is that CNNs can classify interdependent multi-dimensional data typically better than ANNs.
CNNs are regularly used in handwriting recognition in two-dimensional image data, for example.
A one-dimensional array representing the running window entropy of a malware sample is
similar to a one-dimensional array of audio signal. Since CNNs are used to classify audio
signals as speech, the same type of approach could be used to match the structures within the
running window entropy of malware samples to their respective classifications.
CNNs have similar hyper-parameters to ANNs with respect to the structure and types of
units used in the network. There are many different methods available for CNN implementation,
but the one used for this dissertation is the Python Keras library running with a Tensorflow
backend (“Keras,” n.d.; “Tensorflow,” n.d.).

Summary
In summary, the reader should expect this dissertation to examine automated machine
learning based malware classifiers built from the running window entropy feature space. This
classifier, named herein as Malgazer, will not only be compared to other malware classifiers
from prior research theoretically, but it will also be compared empirically to a method from prior
research using GIST features. In order to complete this comparison, the prior literature will be
categorized and compared at the component level in the literature review chapter using the
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generalized malware classification model presented in Figure 2 and Definition 1. Malgazer will
be developed using the model in Figure 2 and Definition 1 using a methodical searching
algorithm to find the appropriate values for the set “C”. The searching and training of Malgazer
classifiers will be performed programmatically and at scale using cloud resources that any
individual can execute. Once the Malgazer classifier has been instantiated, the classifier will be
available to users through a web application that can run on nearly any type of platform locally
or in the cloud for users without deep programming knowledge.
This chapter also presented the background of the use of entropy for malware analysis
and machine learning classification. First, this chapter presented that entropy is a measure of
information and running window entropy can be used to locate entropy variations within a data
stream. Second, this chapter presented a short introduction to some of the algorithms to
preprocess input features and train supervised machine learning classifiers on the training data
set. Both of these topics will be used to explain and categorize the prior research in the literature
review chapter, next.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
In this chapter, the prior research on machine learning based malware classifiers is
explored. The prior research was first clustered into categories. Next, a chronological overview
identifies the components of each prior method using the generalized machine learning based
malware classifier model presented in Figure 2 and Definition 1. It was during the literature
review phase of this dissertation that the need for this model became apparent so that the prior
literature could be compared and explained in an organized fashion. Presenting the prior
literature using this model allowed for the comparison of components within prior research, plus
it allowed for the comparison of components from prior research to the components of Malgazer.
Demonstrating that a substantial amount of prior literature can be described using the generalized
machine learning based malware classifier model validates the utility of this design science
model artifact.
This chapter begins with an introduction to malware classification method categories and
a chronological overview of each prior method surveyed. This chapter concludes with prior
literature that was relevant to this dissertation but did not properly fit into the categories because
it contained foundational concepts rather than malware classification methods. Based upon the
prior literature, Malgazer’s contribution to science will be identified in the last section of this
chapter.
As noted in the introduction chapter in Figure 1, malware detection is a subset of
malware classification. In other words, a malware detector is also a malware classifier in that it
only classifies two classes: malware and benign. Therefore, relevant machine learning based
malware detection research is included in this chapter for the sake of completeness and detectors
are identified as such in the overview.
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Malware Classification Method Categories
Several categories were used to cluster the prior research. After a thorough survey of the
literature, the classification method categories identified here consist of the method type
(detector or classifier), followed by a dash, then the data the method used to make predictions,
such as “dynamic analysis” and “images from bytes”. These are the input features. Each method
belongs to only one category. Each of the categories developed from the prior literature are
identified and briefly described next.
Malware Detector - Boot Sectors
This category represents a malware detection method that uses boot sectors as the input
features to a machine learning model.
Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis
This category represents a malware detection method that uses dynamic analysis data as
input features to a machine learning model. Dynamic analysis includes features such as API
calls, running time, memory usage, CPU usage, etc.
Malware Detector – Entropy Statistics
This category represents a malware detection method that uses entropy statistical
information as input features to a machine learning model.
Malware Detector – Images From Bytes And n-grams
This category represents a malware detection method that uses images created from the
sample’s bytes and n-grams of the bytes as input features to a machine learning model. In this
category, images are calculated from the raw byte values of the malware sample. n-grams are ntuple representations of the bytes.
Malware Detector – Opcode Statistics
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This category represents a malware detection method that uses statistical information
about opcodes from the sample as input features to a machine learning model. Opcodes are the
machine codes the processor executes.
Malware Detector – PDF Streams
This category represents a malware detection method that uses PDF streams as input
features to a machine learning model. PDF streams are only found in PDF files.
Malware Detector – Static Analysis
This category represents a malware detection method that uses static analysis as input
features to a machine learning model. Static analysis includes features such as file length,
number of sections, names of sections, etc.
Malware Detector – Static Analysis And Opcodes
This category represents a malware detection method that uses static analysis and
opcodes as input features to a machine learning model. Static analysis includes features such as
file length, number of sections, names of sections, etc. Opcodes are the machine codes the
processor executes.
Malware Detector – Static Analysis And n-grams
This category represents a malware detection method that uses static analysis and n-gram
representation of the byte code as input features to a machine learning model. Static analysis
includes features such as file length, number of sections, names of sections, etc. n-grams are ntuple representations of the bytes.
Malware Detector – Static And Dynamic Analysis
This category represents a malware detection method that uses static and dynamic
analysis data as input features to a machine learning model. Static analysis includes features
such as file length, number of sections, names of sections, etc. Dynamic analysis includes
features such as API calls, running time, memory usage, CPU usage, etc.
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Malware Detector – Structural Entropy
This category represents a malware detection method that uses structural entropy as input
features to a machine learning model. Note that structural entropy is similar to running window
entropy.
Malware Detector – n-grams
This category represents a malware detection method that uses byte code n-grams as
input features to a machine learning model. n-grams are n-tuple representations of the bytes.
Malware Classifier – Byte Code
This category represents a malware classification method that uses byte code as input
features to a machine learning model. The byte code is the malware sample’s raw byte values.
Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis
This category represents a malware classification method that uses dynamic analysis data
as input features to a machine learning model. Dynamic analysis includes features such as API
calls, running time, memory usage, CPU usage, etc.
Malware Classifier – HMM
This category represents a malware classification method that uses hidden Markov
models as input features to a machine learning model.
Malware Classifier – Images From Bytes
This category represents a malware classification method that uses images created from
the sample’s byte code as input features to a machine learning model. In this category, images
are calculated from the raw byte values of the malware sample.
Malware Classifier – Images From Bytes And Opcodes
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This category represents a malware classification method that uses images created from
the sample’s byte code and opcodes as input features to a machine learning model. In this
category, images are calculated from the raw byte values of the malware sample. Opcodes are
the instructions the CPU executes.
Malware Classifier – Intermediate Language Of Opcodes
This category represents a malware classification method that uses an intermediate
language representation of opcodes as input features to a machine learning model. An
intermediate language is a language that represents the operation of a program but is at a higher
level.
Malware Classifier – Static Analysis
This category represents a malware classification method that uses static analysis data as
input features to a machine learning model. Static analysis includes features such as file length,
number of sections, names of sections, etc.
Malware Classifier – Static Analysis And Images From Bytes
This category represents a malware classification method that uses static analysis data
and images from the sample’s byte code as input features to a machine learning model. Static
analysis includes features such as file length, number of sections, names of sections, etc. In this
category, images are calculated from the raw byte values of the malware sample.
Malware Classifier – Static Analysis And Opcodes
This category represents a malware classification method that uses static analysis data
and opcodes as input features to a machine learning model. Static analysis includes features such
as file length, number of sections, names of sections, etc. Opcodes are the instructions the CPU
executes.
Malware Classifier – Static And Dynamic Analysis
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This category represents a malware classification method that uses static and dynamic
analysis data as input features. Static analysis includes features such as file length, number of
sections, names of sections, etc. Dynamic analysis includes features such as API calls, running
time, memory usage, CPU usage, etc.
Malware Classifier – Structural Entropy
This category represents a malware classification method that uses structural entropy as
input features to a machine learning model. Note that structural entropy is similar to running
window entropy.

Overview Of The Prior Works for Malware Classification
This section provides a chronological overview of seventy-one methods surveyed from
prior literature. This overview provides a brief description and will categorize each method
using the categories that were described in the previous section. Each method is identified with a
unique number and by citation so that the process of referencing the methods by either field is
clear.
The overview information for each publication will identify the components in Figure 2
and Definition 1 for each method. Full quotes of the original source were included where
appropriate, and paraphrasing was used for the others. Although the component functions (T(),
P(), etc.) were not explicitly constructed in this section, the information used to construct such
functions is provided. This was purposefully chosen because some of the functions were
complex. The explanations were more concise when explained in shorter human concepts or
quotations from the original publication rather than any other method explored by this author.
1996
Method #01. (Tesauro, Kephart, & Sorkin, 1996): In 1996, this was one of the first
papers that used machine learning algorithms to classify malware. This research provided a
detector for boot sector viruses. The detector used trigrams of boot sectors for their feature space
as input to an artificial neural network (ANN). They reported an accuracy of 80-85% for viral
boot sectors.
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•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Boot Sectors

•

EFFICACY: accuracy 80-85% for viral boot sectors

•

TRAINING DATA: 200 boot sector viruses and 100 legitimate boot sectors.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Calculates trigrams of boot sector viruses.
Eliminates any trigrams from valid boot sectors. Eliminates trigrams that are "too
frequent". Eliminates trigrams that are not part of a 4-cover of available trigrams in their
training set. This, according to the authors, leaves only approximately 50 trigrams that
are features.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Artificial Neural Network with
no hidden layers. Has a tunable parameter for threshold. This paper discusses a
threshold of 0.5-0.7.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Can tune the threshold up to 0.7 to have "an adequate
safety cushion for false positives, while only slightly increasing (by a few percent) the
false positive rate".

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2001
Method #02. (Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001): In 2001, this paper introduced

used a malware detector that used three machine learning algorithms on features measured from
malware static analysis. They reported an accuracy of 97.76%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy 97.76%

•

TRAINING DATA: “4,266 programs split into 3,265 malicious binaries and 1,001 clean
programs”.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): "We used system resource information, strings
and byte sequences that were extracted from the malicious executables in the data set as
different types of features." Three DLL features were extracted: "1. The list of DLLs
used by the binary 2. The list of DLL function calls made by the binary 3. The number of
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different function calls within each DLL". Strings were extracted. Byte sequences were
extracted.
•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Three learning models were
used: “an inductive rule-based learner that generates boolean rules based on feature
attributes”, “a probabilistic method that generates probabilities that an example was in a
class given a set of features” and “a multi-classifier system that combines the outputs
from several classifiers to generate a prediction.” “RIPPER, Naive Bayes, and a MultiClassifier system” were used.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2004
Method #03. (Kolter & Maloof, 2004): In 2004, this paper used several machine

learning algorithms on n-gram features of the malware sample’s bytes to detect malware. They
reported an area under the ROC curve (AUC) of 0.996. This paper was republished in 2006
(Kolter & Maloof, 2006).
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – n-grams

•

EFFICACY: AUC of 0.996

•

TRAINING DATA: “We gathered 1971 benign and 1651 malicious executables”.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We used the hexdump utility [29] to convert
each executable to hexadecimal codes in an ascii format. We then produced n-grams, by
combining each four-byte sequence into a single term. For instance, for the byte sequence
ff 00 ab 3e 12 b3, the corresponding n-grams would be ff00ab3e, 00ab3e12, and
ab3e12b3. This processing resulted in 255,904,403 distinct n-grams… We then selected
the top 500 n-grams, a quantity we determined through pilot studies (see Section 6.1)”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “ibk, tfidf, naive Bayes,
support vector machines (svms), decision trees, boosted naive Bayes, boosted svms, and
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boosted decision trees… several learning methods, most of which are implemented in
weka: ibk, tfidf, naive Bayes, a support vector machine (svm), and a decision tree.”
•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): The collection of the “relevant” n-grams

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2008
Method #04. (Siddiqui, 2008): In 2008, Siddiqui published a thesis that introduced a

malware detector using a variety of machine learning algorithms on features produced from the
n-grams of byte code and static analysis of the sample. Siddiqui reported an accuracy as high as
98.4%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and n-grams

•

EFFICACY: accuracy as high as 98.4%

•

TRAINING DATA: Approximately 8,000 samples with 4,617 malicious binaries.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): T() can calculate n-grams, api/system calls,
assembly instructions, and hybrid features.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): A preprocessing function that limited the numbers
of features based upon Chi-Squared tests was used in this research.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Logistic regression, neural
network, decision tree, support vector machines, bagging, random forest, and principal
component analysis

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): A tuning function selecting the most "useful" MLM was
used.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #05. (Perdisci, Lanzi, & Lee, 2008a): In 2008, this paper introduced a malware

detector for packed samples. The features from static analysis of the sample were provided to
numerous machine learning models to detect packed samples. They reported an accuracy of
98.91% and an AUC of 0.9995.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis
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•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.91% and an AUC of 0.9995

•

TRAINING DATA: “We performed experiments on 5,498 executables. 2,598 are packed
computer viruses collected from the Malfease Project dataset (http://malfease.oarci. net),
2,231 are benign executables extracted from a clean installation of Windows XP Home
plus several common user applications, and 669 are packed benign executables obtained
by manually packing applications selected from the start menu of Windows XP using 17
different executable packing tools.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): The nine features are measured as: the number
of standard and non-standard sections; the number of executable sections; the number of
readable/writeable/executable sections; the number of entries in the IAT; the PE header,
code, data, and file entropy.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Naïve Bayes, J48 decision tree,
k-nearest-neighbors, Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) (“constructed using 1 input layer
with 9 nodes (one for each feature), 1 hidden layer with 5 nodes, and 1 output layer with
2 nodes (one for each class). All the hidden and output nodes use a sigmoidal activation
function, whereas the input nodes use a linear activation function. The backpropagation
algorithm was used for training, with 20% of training patterns reserved for validation.”),
entropy threshold classifier.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): For the entropy threshold classifier, the threshold can be
tuned.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #06. (Perdisci, Lanzi, & Lee, 2008b): In 2008, an additional paper was

published from the authors of (Perdisci et al., 2008a). The second paper included n-gram
analysis in the feature space. They reported an accuracy of 87.3% and AUC of 0.977.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and n-grams

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 87.3% and an AUC of 0.977

•

TRAINING DATA: “We developed a proof-of-concept version of McBoost and
evaluated it on 5,586 malware and 2,258 benign programs.”
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•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): There are two classifiers proposed in this
research. The first's features are: “We extract nine features from the PE file, namely: 1)
Number of standard sections; 2) Number of non-standard sections; 3) Number of
Executable sections; 4) Number of Readable/Writable/Executable sections; 5) Number of
entries in the IAT; 6) Entropy of the PE header; 7) Entropy of the code (i.e., executable)
sections; 8) Entropy of the data sections; 9) Entropy of the entire PE file.” The second
set of features, for the detector, are unpacked version of the input binaries.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Naïve Bayes, J48 decision tree,
k-nearest-neighbors, Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) (“constructed using 1 input layer
with 9 nodes (one for each feature), 1 hidden layer with 5 nodes, and 1 output layer with
2 nodes (one for each class). All the hidden and output nodes use a sigmoidal activation
function, whereas the input nodes use a linear activation function. The backpropagation
algorithm was used for training, with 20% of training patterns reserved for validation.”),
entropy threshold classifier. Additionally, a Bagged-Decision-Threes (BDT) was used as
the malware detector.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): For the entropy threshold classifier, the threshold can be
tuned. There is also a decision threshold that can be set.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): The post processing function of the output
from the packer detector is used to either unpack the sample for n-gram analysis, or use
the binary as is.
2009
Method #07. (Jason L Wright, 2009): In 2009, Wright introduced a method for

detecting functional blocks as cryptography using opcode statistics as features to a neural
network. Wright reported an accuracy above 99%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Opcode Statistics

•

EFFICACY: accuracy above 99%

•

TRAINING DATA: The C library from OpenBSD.
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•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “For NNLC, the inputs to the artificial neural
network (ANN) are the total number of instructions with the following opcodes: XOR
(exclusive or), SHL (logical shift right), SHL (logical shift left), ROR (rotate right), and
ROL (rotate left). Additionally, the densities of these instructions are applied to five more
inputs. Density is defined here as the number of the specific opcodes divided by the total
number of opcodes in the function.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Various architectures were
tried for the neural network. The architecture that yielded the lowest total error consisted
of 10 input neurons, 5 neurons in a single hidden layer, and a single output neuron.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Can modify the hyperbolic tangent gain and learning
constant.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not applicable
Method #08. (M. Shafiq, Tabish, & Farooq, 2009): In 2009, this paper introduced a

malware detector based upon static analysis features using decision trees and neural networks.
They reported a detection rate of 0.996.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.6%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We have obtained about half a million malicious executables from
Offensive Computing.net. We have also obtained several thousand benign executables
from freshly installed Windows machines and online resources such as sourceforge and
CNET’s download.com.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Number of standard, non-standard, executable,
read/write/executable sections; number of entries in IAT; entropy of PE header, code
sections, data sections, entire PE file; COFF file header; optional header; text section;
data section; resource section; resource enumeration.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): A neural network and J48
decision trees.
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•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #09. (M. Z. Shafiq, Tabish, Mirza, & Farooq, 2009b): In 2009, this paper

introduced a malware detector based upon static analysis features using a variety of machine
learning algorithms. They reported an accuracy of more than 99%. This paper was very similar
to (M. Z. Shafiq, Tabish, Mirza, & Farooq, 2009a).
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of more than 99%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The first malware dataset is the VX Heavens Virus collection
consisting of more than ten thousand malicious PE files. The second malware dataset is
the Malfease dataset, which contains more than five thousand malicious PE files. We
also collected more than one thousand benign PE files from our virology lab, which we
use in conjunction with both malware datasets in our study.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): DLLs referred; COFF file header; optional
header - standard fields; optional header - Windows specific fields; optional header - data
directories; .text section - header fields; .data section - header fields; resource directory
table & resources.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Redundant feature removal (RFR), principal
component analysis (PCA), Haar wavelet transform (HWT)

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Instance based learner Ibk,
decision tree J48, Naïve Bayes, support vector machines using sequential minimal
optimization (SMO), inductive rule learner RIPPER

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #10. (Tabish, Shafiq, & Farooq, 2009): In 2009, this paper introduced a

malware detector based upon n-grams of the malware’s byte code. They reported an accuracy of
more than 90%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – n-grams
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•

EFFICACY: accuracy more than 90%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We have collected 1, 447 benign PE files from the local network
of our virology lab. The collection contains executables such as Packet CAPture (PCAP)
file parsers compiled by MS Visual Studio 6.0, compressed installation executables and
MSWindows XP/Vista applications’ executables. The diversity of the benign files is also
evident from their sizes, which range from a minimum of 4 KB to a maximum of 104,
588 KB (see Table 3). Moreover, we have used two malware collections in our study.
First is the VXHeavens Virus Collection, which is labeled and is publicly available for
free download. We only consider PE executables to maintain focus. Our filtered dataset
contains 10, 339 malicious PE files. The second dataset is the Malfease malware.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): DLLs referred; COFF file header; optional
header - standard fields; optional header - Windows specific fields; optional header - data
directories; .text section - header fields; .data section - header fields; resource directory
table & resources

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Redundant feature removal (RFR), principal
component analysis (PCA), Haar wavelet transform (HWT)

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Instance based learner Ibk,
decision tree J48, Naïve Bayes, support vector machines using sequential minimal
optimization (SMO), inductive rule learner RIPPER

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #11. (Tabish et al., 2009): In 2009, this paper introduced a malware detector

that used n-grams of a malware sample’s bytes for several machine learning model algorithms.
They reported an accuracy of more than 90%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – n-grams

•

EFFICACY: accuracy more than 90%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We have used ‘VX Heavens Virus Collection’ database which is
available for free download in the public domain... This is a comprehensive database that
contains a total of 37,420 malware samples. The samples consist of backdoors,
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constructors, flooders, bots, nukers, sniffers, droppers, spyware, viruses, worms and
trojans etc. We only consider Win32 based malware in PE file format. The filtered
dataset used in this study contains 10, 311 Win32 malware samples.”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Samples are reduced to blocks of bytes.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “Overall, the features’ set consist of 13 diverse
features, which are separately computed on 1, 2, 3, and 4 gram frequency histograms.
This brings the total size of features’ set to 52 features per block.” Features include:
Simpson's Index, Canberra Distance, Minkowski Distance of Order, Manhattan Distance,
Chebyshev Distance, Bray Curtis Distance, Angular Separation, Correlation Coefficient,
Entropy, Kullback-Leibler Divergence, Jensen-Shannon Divergence Itakura-Saito
Divergence, Total Variation

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “We have used Instance based
(IBk), Decision Trees (J48), Naïve Bayes and the boosted versions of these classifiers in
our pilot study. For boosting we have used AdaBoostM1 algorithm. We have utilized
implementations of these algorithms available in WEKA.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): The block size, in bytes

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): A correlation module that bases detections on
MLM().
2010
Method #12. (J L Wright & Manic, 2010): In 2010, Wright continued the research into

detection of functional blocks of cryptography. Wright reported an accuracy of 99.5%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Opcode Statistics

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.5%

•

TRAINING DATA: The C library from OpenBSD.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “The input data set for training the networks
consists of the count of the number of each distinct processor opcode in each function in
a library as well as the density of each opcode.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available
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•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Cross-fold validation is used to determine the best structure
for the ANN.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #13. (Sun, Versteeg, Boztas, & Yann, 2010): In 2010, this paper introduced a

packer classifier. Packers are a type of executable compression and are often used with malware
samples by their authors. This classifier used structural entropy as a feature space and they
reported an accuracy of greater than 99%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of greater than 99%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We test these algorithms on a large data set that consists of clean
packed files and 17,336 real malware samples.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In order to extract the best features from
packed files, we employ a refined version of the sliding window randomness test with
trunk pruning method [5]. Compare with the original sliding window randomness test
(see Appendix B), the window size and skip size used in this research are set to the same
value. That is, there is no overlapping windows. Therefore, no repeat information is used
in the feature set.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “We test various statistical
classification algorithms, including k−Nearest Neighbor, Best-first Decision Tree,
Sequential Minimal Optimization and Naïve Bayes.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Window and skip sizes for entropy window.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2011
Method #14. (L Nataraj, Karthikeyan, Jacob, & Manjunath, 2011): In 2011, this paper

introduced a malware classifier that used bytes from the malware samples represented as two-
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dimensional images as features. The images were filtered using an algorithm known as “GIST”
to produce 320 features to the KNN machine learning classification algorithm. They reported an
accuracy of 98%. This method is the method that will be compared empirically with Malgazer
as this author has been in contact with one of the authors from this paper. This algorithm will be
identified throughout this dissertation as the “GIST” method. Additional online references for
this method are available at (Laks, 2013, 2014), as indicated by one of the authors of this paper.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98%

•

TRAINING DATA: “25k malware from Anubis and VxHeavens Dataset.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Bytes from the sample are transformed to a
gray scale image.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “To compute texture features, we use GIST,
which uses a wavelet decomposition of an image. This feature has been successful in
scene classification and object classification. Each image location is represented by the
output of filters tuned to different orientations and scales. We use a steerable pyramid
with 8 orientations and 4 scales applied to the image.”

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “We use k-nearest neighbors
with Euclidean distance for classification.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #15. (Rieck, Trinius, Willems, & Holz, 2011): In 2011, this paper introduced a

malware classifier that used dynamic analysis information and KNN clustering. They reported
an F-measure of 0.96.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: F-measure of 0.96

•

TRAINING DATA: “The reference data set is extracted from a large database of
malware binaries maintained at the CWSandbox web site. The malware binaries have
been collected over a period of three years from a variety of sources, such as honeypots,
spam traps, anti-malware vendors and security researchers. From the overall database, we
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select binaries which have been assigned to a known class of malware by the majority of
six independent anti-virus products... The selected malware binaries are then executed
and monitored using CWSandbox, resulting in a total of 3,133 behavior reports in MIST
format”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Malware is executed in a sandbox environment.
The system calls create a sequential report, which becomes a vector space. The authors
developed a "MIST" language representation of the machine level instructions.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): The MIST vector space is reduced to real
numbers using natural language processing.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): A k-nearest neighbors
clustering algorithm augmented with a classification algorithm based upon the clusters.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2013
Method #16. (Dahl, Stokes, Deng, & Yu, 2013): In 2013, this paper introduced a

malware detector that used n-grams of the malware’s byte code and static analysis of the sample
in neural networks. They reported an error rate as low as 0.42%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – n-grams

•

EFFICACY: error rate as low as 0.42%

•

TRAINING DATA: “To construct the labeled training dataset, we first obtain over 2.6
million files, 1,843,359 of which are malicious and 817,485 of which are benign.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In our work, we also employ sparse binary
features based on file strings, application programming interface (API) tri-grams, and
API call plus parameter value. To achieve good classification accuracy, we use over 179
thousand sparse, binary features generated from feature selection… we extract three types
of features including null-terminated patterns observed in the process’ memory, tri-grams
of system API calls, and distinct combinations of a single system API call and one input
parameter.”
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•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “Enumerating all of the distinct combinations of
the three attribute sets yields over 50 million possible features. In order to reduce the
input space to a reasonable set of features which can be classified by standard supervised
learning techniques, we next perform feature selection using mutual information. Feature
selection generated over 179 thousand sparse binary features that best discriminate each
class (e.g. malware family, malware, benign) from every other class in our dataset.” The
high dimensional space is projected into a lower dimensional space to reduce the number
of features.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks and logistic
regression

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #17. (Santos, Brezo, Ugarte-Pedrero, & Bringas, 2013): In 2013, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used opcode statistics as features in a variety of machine
learning algorithms. They reported an accuracy of more than 90%, and an AUC of more than
0.90.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Opcode Statistics

•

EFFICACY: accuracy more than 90%, AUC more than 0.90

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collected malware from the VxHeavens website to assemble a
malware dataset of 13,189 malware executables. This dataset contained only Portable
Executable (PE)5 executable files, and it was made up of different types of malicious
software (e.g., computer viruses, Trojan horses and spyware). For the benign software
dataset, we collected 13,000 executables from our computers. This benign dataset
included text processors, drawing tools, windows games, Internet browsers and PDF
viewers.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): "We use a representation based on opcodes
(i.e., operational codes in machine language). Our method is based on the frequency of
appearance of opcode-sequences: it trains several data-mining algorithms in order to
detect unknown malware… Therefore, our approach only uses opcodes and we discard
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the operands within the instructions.” Disassemble the executables, generate the opcode
profile, compute the opcode relevance
•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Decision trees, support vector
machines (SVM), k-nearest neighbors, Bayesian networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Experimentation on the parameters of the MLM()
algorithms.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #18. (Annachhatre, Austin, & Stamp, 2013): In 2013, this paper introduced a

malware classifier based on hidden Markov model scoring and k-means clustering. They did not
report an efficacy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – HMM

•

EFFICACY: Not reported

•

TRAINING DATA: “The dataset was requested from the Malicia project website. It
comprises of 11000+ malware binaries collected from 500 drive-by download servers
over a period of 11-months. We have used 9442 malware samples from this dataset for
malware classification”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We scored the malware samples using the
hidden Markov models for variety of compilers and malware generators (GCC, MINGW,
CLANG, TURBOC, TASM and MWOR).”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Hidden Markov models and kmeans clustering

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2015
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Method #19. (Lakshmanan Nataraj, Karthikeyan, & Manjunath, 2015): In 2015, this
paper introduced a malware classifier that used n-grams of the malware sample’s bytes, fuzzing
hashing, and image similarity to a “Sparse Representation based Classification (SRC) and
Nearest Neighbor (NN) Classifier”. They reported an accuracy of 98.66%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.66%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Two datasets: Malimg and Malheur[:] Malimg Dataset: 25
families, 80 samples per family, M = 840,960. Malheur Dataset: 23 families, 20 samples
per family, M = 3,364,864.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): n-grams, fuzzy hashing, image similarity

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Random projections

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Sparse Representation based
Classification (SRC) and Nearest Neighbor (NN) Classifier”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #20. (Wolff & Chisholm, 2015): In 2015, this presentation introduced a

structural entropy analysis method and used structural entropy as a feature to a lasso logistic
regression machine learning model to detect malware. They reported an accuracy of 87.2%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 87.2%

•

TRAINING DATA: “"Data is a corpus of Windows Portable Executable (PE) files
downloaded from Virus Total in June, 2014… We formed a balanced data set of 39,968
files; of these, 19,991 (50.01%) were labeled as malware, whereas 19,997 (49.98%) were
labeled as clean computer programs.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Structural entropy

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA), Mean
Changepoint Modeling (MCPM), Wavelet Decomposition, Summary Statistics

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Lasso logistic regression

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices
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•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Numerous parameters can be tuned.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #21. (Nath & Mehtre, 2015): In 2015, this paper introduced a malware detector

for PDF streams. The feature space was PDF streams and the machine learning model was
decision trees.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – PDF Streams

•

EFFICACY: Not reported

•

TRAINING DATA: “Here, we are creating the dataset by taking a group of benign files
and malicious files. We have got almost collected 10982 malicious files along with 173
latest samples belonging to targeted attacks from [20].”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Extraction of streams from PDFs.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Calculation of entropy on extracted data

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Decision trees

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Not available

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #22. (Gu et al., 2015): In 2015, this paper introduced a malware detector using

structural entropy and wavelet analysis in a “Weighted decision” machine learning algorithm.
They reported an accuracy of 93.1%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 93.1%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We use this system to test 200 samples.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Wavelet decomposition of entropy

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Weighted decision”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #23. (Saxe & Berlin, 2015): In 2015, this paper introduced a malware detector
using entropy statistics and static analysis of the sample with a neural network classifier. They
reported an accuracy of 95%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Entropy Statistics

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 95%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Our benign and malware binaries were drawn from Invincea’s own
computer systems and Invincea’s customers networks. We used malicious binaries
obtained from both the Jotti commercial malware feed and from Invincea’s private
malware database. Our final dataset, after VirusTotal filtering, contains 431,926 binaries,
with 81,910 labeled as benignware and 350,016 as malware.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Byte/Entropy histogram features, PE import
features, String 2D histogram features, PE metadata features

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Threat score using Bayes’ rule.
2016
Method #24. (L. Xu, 2016): In 2016, this paper introduced a malware detector that used

static and dynamic analysis features for a neural network and SVM machine learning model. Xu
reported an accuracy of 94.7%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 94.7%

•

TRAINING DATA: “In our dataset, 4002 samples are categorized as benign applications
and 1886 samples are categorized as malware… We collected 5888 applications from
Google Play and VirusShare. To reveal malicious and benign applications, we submit our
samples to the VirusTotal web service and inspect the output of 51 commercial AntiVirus (AV) scanners. We label all applications as malicious that are detected by at least
two of the scanners. The other applications are labeled as benign. We end up with 1886
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malicious applications and 4002 benign applications. The malicious samples were mostly
discovered in 2014, and they are categorized into 39 families by a commercial AV
scanner named AVG”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Linux "strace" dynamic data. Static features
from the samples: “In total, 10 static and dynamic feature sets are extracted from our
malicious and benign Android applications including requested permissions, permission
request APIs, used permissions, advertising networks, intent filters, suspicious calls,
network APIs, providers, instruction sequences, and system call sequences. In total, we
generate 16 feature vector sets and 4 graph sets.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Generates graphs and “histogram, signature, ngram, and the Markov Chain representations”

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks and SVM

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #25. (Gibert & Bejar, 2016): In 2016, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used static analysis features for a convolutional neural network machine learning
model. They reported an accuracy of 98.56%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.56

•

TRAINING DATA: “For this challenge, Microsoft provided a dataset of 21741 samples,
with 10868 for training and the other 10873 for testing, being a dataset of almost half a
terabyte uncompressed. Microsoft provided a set of malware samples representing 9
different malware families. Each malware sample had an Id, a 20 character hash value
uniquely identifying the sample and a class, an integer representing one of the 9 malware
family names to which the malware belong: (1) Ramnit, (2) Lollipop, (3) Kelihos_ver3,
(4) Vundo, (5) Simda, (6) Tracur, (7) Kelihos_ver1, (8) Obfuscator.ACY, (9) Gatak.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Extract bytes and x86 instructions to create
gray scale image representations of the sample.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available
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•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #26. (Wojnowicz, Chisholm, Wolff, et al., 2016): In 2016, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used structural entropy and wavelet analysis of the sample as
features to a logistic regression, wavelet-based classifier. They reported an accuracy of 99% for
parasitic malware.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99% for parasitic malware

•

TRAINING DATA: “Data were 699,121 samples of Portable Executable (PE) files from
a Cylance repository. Of these samples, 17,605 files (2.51%) were parasitic malware, and
the remaining files were legitimate software. We randomly selected 80% of the dataset
for training, and the remaining 20% were allocated to the test set.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Wavelet decomposition of structural entropy

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Calculation of Structured Entropic Change Score
(SSECS)

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Wavelet-based classifier
(logistic regression)

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Logistic regression parameters

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #27. (Wojnowicz, Chisholm, & Wolff, 2016): In 2016, this paper introduced a

malware detector that used structural entropy as features to a logistic regression, wavelet-based
classifier. They reported an accuracy of 68.7%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 68.7%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Data were a set of n=39,968 portable executable files from a
Cylance repository. 19,988 (50.01%) of these files were known to be malicious, and the
remaining files were benign.”
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•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Wavelet decomposition of structural entropy

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Wavelet-based classifier
(logistic regression)

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #28. (Narra, Troia, Corrado, Austin, & Stamp, 2016): In 2016, after the thesis

published by Nara (Narra, 2015), this paper introduced a malware classifier based on hidden
Markov models and the k-means clustering machine learning model. They reported an AUC of
0.977.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – HMM

•

EFFICACY: AUC of 0.977

•

TRAINING DATA: “Most of the malware datasets used for this research were obtained
from the Malicia project website. The Malicia dataset consists of more than 11,000
malware binaries collected from 500 drive-by download servers over a period of 11
months. All of the malware samples are in the form of executable (.exe) or dynamic-link
library (.dll)files. Along with the malware samples, Malicia includes a database of
metadata. Themetadata gives information as to when and where the malware was
collected and, in most cases, the classification of the malware. Of the 11,000 malware
samples in the dataset, about 7,800 were distributed among three dominant families,
namely, Winwebsec, Zbot, and Zeroaccess. Our analysis is primarily focused on these
three dominant datasets, but we do consider four additional datasets in some of our
experiments.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “For the research presented in this paper, we
train HMMs for different compilers and malware families, based on extracted opcode
sequences.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): k-means and expectation
maximization
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•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #29. (Kolosnjaji, Zarras, Webster, & Eckert, 2016): In 2016, this paper

introduced a malware classifier that used dynamic analysis features for a convolutional and
recurrent neural network machine learning model. They reported an accuracy of 89.4%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 89.4%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collect malware samples and trace malware behavior using a
malware zoo. Our malware collection consists of samples gathered from three primary
sources: Virus Share, Maltrieve and private collections. We select these sources to
provide a large and diverse volume of samples for evaluation.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We choose the Cuckoo sandbox which is open
source, widely-used, and provides a controlled environment for executing malware.
During the execution of malware samples we record calls to the kernel API that we later
use to characterize these malware samples. For each malware sample we obtain a
sequence of API calls (system calls) and employ this sequence for behavioral modeling.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Redundant feature removal

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “We construct a neural network
based on convolutional and recurrent network layers in order to obtain the best features
for classification. This way we get a hierarchical feature extraction architecture that
combines convolution of n-grams with full sequential modeling.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #30. (Gharacheh, Derhami, Hashemi, & Fard, 2016): In 2016, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used static analysis and opcodes as features to a hidden
Markov model machine learning model. They reported perfect accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: perfect accuracy
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•

TRAINING DATA: “The proposed method is examined and tested on the well-known
malware MWOR and the malware constructed by kits NGVCK, G2, MPCGEN,
MetaPHOR and the random benign executable files which are selected from the Clang,
Cygwin, GCC, MingW, TASM, Turbo C. The total number of malware and benign files
in the training and test sets together is 1245.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Extracts opcode sequences

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Hidden Markov models

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #31. (W. Huang & Stokes, 2016): In 2016, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used dynamic analysis features from a malware sample for a neural network. They
reported an error rate of 2.94%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: error rate of 2.94%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We were provided a large corpus of labeled, raw data by analysts
from the Microsoft Corporation which was extracted from 6.5 million files. We believe
this is the largest dataset used in a published malware classification study. Among this
data collection, 2.85 million examples were extracted from malicious files and 3.65
million from benign files. The set of malicious files contained 1.3 million belonging to
the 98 malware families and 1.55 million from the generic malware class. We randomly
selected 4.5 million examples for training and 2.0 million for a hold out test set.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “All models are trained with data extracted
from dynamic analysis of malicious and benign files… For each executable file which is
emulated by the anti-malware engine, two sets of raw information are extracted: a
sequence of application programming interface (API) call events plus their parameters
and a sequence of null-terminated objects recovered from system memory during
emulation… The combined feature set consisting of null-terminated tokens, API event
plus parameter value, and API trigrams contains millions of potential features… The
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output of the feature selection process is a ranked set of 50,000 features which is input to
the MtNet system. The 50,000 features are initially selected during training. Later, these
features are applied when evaluating an unknown file”
•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #32. (L. Xu, Cavazos, Jayasena, & Cavazos, 2016): In 2016, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used dynamic and static analysis features from the malware
for the neural network and restricted Boltzmann machine. They reported an accuracy of 94.7%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static and Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 94.7%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collected 5888 applications from Google Play and VirusShare.
To reveal malicious and benign applications, we submit our samples to the VirusTotal
web service and inspect the output of 51 commercial Anti-Virus (AV) scanners. We label
all applications as malicious that are detected by at least two of the scanners. The other
applications are labeled as benign. We end up with 1886 malicious applications and 4002
benign applications. The malicious samples were mostly discovered in 2014, and they are
categorized into 39 families by a commercial AV scanner named AVG.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We first extract static and dynamic
information, and convert this information into vector-based representations.” Requested
permissions, permission request API, used permissions, advertising networks, intent
filters, suspicious calls, network APIs, providers, instruction sequences, system call
sequences.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Generates graphs

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks and restricted
Boltzmann machines

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available
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•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #33. (Wang et al., 2016): In 2016, this paper introduced a malware classifier

that used static analysis features from the malware for the neural network. They reported an
accuracy of 96%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 96%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collected 5000 real-world malware samples from
malware sharing sources like Vxvault, VirusTotal, Malshare and some other public
resources. We scanned the samples with different AVs and kept only those samples
where majority of AV detection name was same. So we kept only 17 different prevalent
malware families from the initial sample set.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper we proposed, implemented and
evaluated a method, called ByteFreq that can cluster large number of samples using byte
frequency. Byte frequency is represented as time series and SAX (Symbolic Aggregation
approXimation) is used to convert the time series in symbolic representation.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Symbolic representations and clusters strings

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural network

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2017
Method #34. (Yue, 2017): In 2017, Yue introduced a malware classifier that used gray

scale images of the malware samples as the feature to convolutional neural networks. Yue
reported an accuracy of 98.63%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.63%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For instance, the dataset used in our paper contains 25 classes, and
some class contains more than 2000 images while some other has only 80 images or so.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Converts byte code into gray scale images.
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•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional Neural
Networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): A weighted softmax loss parameter.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #35. (Kolosnjaji, Eraisha, Webster, Zarras, & Eckert, 2017): In 2017, this

paper introduced a malware classifier that used static analysis features to convolutional neural
networks. They report an accuracy of 93%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 93%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collected a set of malware samples over multiple months from
three primary sources: Virusshare, Maltrieve and private collections… Our final dataset
after noise filtering contains 22,757 executables, with 22,694 malicious executables and
63 benign executables from ZDNet’s download list of most popular programs”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Static features from the sample and opcode
information. PE Metadata, PE Import features, Assembly Opcode features

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks
and artificial neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #36. (Zhao, Han, & Meng, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used an intermediate language representation of the opcodes for a long short-term
memory (LSTM) neural network. They report an accuracy of 97.7% and AUC of 0.9832.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Intermediate Language of Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 97.7% and AUC of 0.9832
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•

TRAINING DATA: “The malware dataset used in our experiment is obtained from
VxHeaven, which is a well-known malware repository. Our dataset contains 310,000
malwares, with 210,000 labeled malwares and 100,000 unlabeled malwares.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “MDIL leverages REIL (Reverse Engineering
Intermediate Language) [8] as the intermediate representation and expands it to provide
an abstract representation of the malware.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Long short term memory
(LSTM)

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #37. (Yuxin & Siyi, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware detector

based on opcode statistical features for a deep belief network (DBN). They report an accuracy of
98%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Opcode Statistics

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98%

•

TRAINING DATA: “In Table 1, the benign samples in each dataset are sampled from a
big dataset containing 4600 benign files, and the malicious samples are sampled from a
malware dataset containing 4600 samples… All the experimental samples are PE format
files. The malicious samples are downloaded from the following Web sites:
vx.netlux.org, www.kaggle.com/c/malware- classification/ and
www.offensivecomputing, and the benign files come from the Windows system files.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Sample is disassembled and opcode n-grams
are used as features.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Deep believe networks (DBN)

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #38. (Kilgallon, De La Rosa, Cavazos, Rosa, & Cavazos, 2017): In 2017, this
paper introduced a malware classifier that used static and dynamic features from a sample for a
variety of machine learning model algorithms. They report an accuracy of 92%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static and Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 92%.

•

TRAINING DATA: “In this section, we present and discuss the major results from
running and analyzing a dataset of 3320 malware samples using Cuckoo, and the
additional implementation of the machine learning classifiers to predict the malware
analysis run time, as well as predicting what family a malware belongs to.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Furthermore, we extract features from
dynamic analysis performed in Cuckoo, and combine these features with static analysis
features from r2 to form a hybrid feature vector that is used to create a malware family
classification model… Our static features which are derived from static analysis are
contextual byte features, portable executable (PE) import features, a 2-dimensional
histogram of string features, and PE metadata features. Contextual byte features take the
form of a byte-entropy histogram, which models the files distribution of bytes. From the
PE header, we extract the PE Import and Metadata tables in which we hash each into a
size 256 vector. Also, we extract all the strings in the file to be hashed into a vector as
well. These features are combined to form a 1024 length vector, which will provide us
with static information for that sample. Saxe and Berlin show that this set of static
features can be used to build highly accurate machine learning models… In our dynamic
analysis, we run the malware in a Cuckoo sandbox and extract its behaviors in JSON
reports. We then convert these reports to dynamic features. The dynamic features that are
used to build our machine learning models correspond to API calls from all malware seen
in the dataset which are generated from dynamic analysis. In addition, each of the
malware’s dynamic features is comprised of an API call histogram.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Five particular classifiers are
selected for our experiments: Decision Tree, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine,
Neural Network, and K-nearest Neighbors. Finally, we use 10-fold cross validation to
perform the training and testing of our algorithms.”
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•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #39. (Lui & Wang, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware detector

that used gray scale images and opcode n-grams for a variety of machine learning model
algorithms. They reported an accuracy of 98.5%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Images from Bytes and n-grams

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.5%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Dataset: In the last two weeks, we capture the malware using
Kingsoft, ESET NOD32, and Anubis from our campus network. The malware contains
4,755 samples, which are from 10 malware families. Benign software is collected under
32-bit windows 7. It includes 2,100 samples from the clients of campus.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We adopt gray scale image and OpCode ngram to obtain high quality features.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Algorithms: seven classical
algorithms are from the sckit-learn of python 2.7, such as Random Forest (RF), SVM
(kernel = ‘poly’), Logistic Regression (Logistic), Gradient Boosting Classifier
(Boosting), GaussianNB (GNB), Decision Tree Regressor (DT) and Multilayer
perceptrons (MLP). It should be noted that MLP is the deep learning structure mentioned
earlier.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #40. (Vanderbruggen & Cavazos, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a

malware classifier that used static analysis features for neural network and random forest. They
reported an accuracy of 7.2% error rate.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: 7.2% error rate
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•

TRAINING DATA: “We obtained millions of files from Reversing Labs’ stream of
malware targeting financial institutions. These malware are from forty families, targeting
a variety of systems. For the experiments presented in this paper, we randomly
subsampled each family with more than one thousand variants. This left us with a dataset
made of one thousand files from eleven different families.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We consider two categories of static analyses:
bytes-level and code-level. Bytes-level analysis considers the raw bytes in the file. This
includes: ASCII strings extraction [8], bytes N-grams [9], [10], and statistical measures
(i.e. entropy) [11]. One of the most comprehensive bytes analysis is the extraction of the
bytes-entropy histogram of a file [12]. This analysis identifies the amount of information
associated with various bytes distributions providing a highly representative image of the
file. Code-level analyses involves the domain of reverse-engineering. It considers the
executable portion of the files, x86 instructions, byte-code instructions, or scripting
languages. Tools like IDApro [13] or Radare2 [14] can extract executable code from
various type of files”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks, Random
forests

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #41. (Rezende, Ruppert, Carvalho, Ramos, & Geus, 2017): In 2017, this paper

introduced a malware classifier that used images made from the malware sample’s byte values as
features with a convolutional neural network. They reported an accuracy of 98.62%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.62%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The DCNN method has been evaluated with the Malimg dataset
proposed by Nataraj et al. The dataset comprises 9,339 byteplot images from 25 different
malware families. As reported by the authors, all byteplot images were generated from
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malware executables submitted to the Anubis analysis system and labels provided by
Microsoft Security Essentials were used to obtain the ground truth for the dataset.”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Malware samples are represented as byteplot
grayscale images and a deep neural network is trained freezing the convolutional layers
of ResNet-50 pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset and adapting the last layer to malware
family classification”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “Convert each byteplot to an RGB image,
rescaling it to 224 × 224 dimension and subtracting the mean RGB value computed on
the ImageNet dataset from each pixel, as proposed by Krizhevsky et al., to feed it to the
deep neural network”

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks
and ResNet-50

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #42. (Shijo, P.V. Salim, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware

detector using static and dynamic analysis of the malware sample for a variety of machine
learning model algorithms. They reported an accuracy of 98.62%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static and Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.62%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For malware, we approached VirusTotal, which is one of the
biggest platforms where we can analyze any malware sample, and they allowed us to use
their paid VirusTotal Intelligence Service for 2 months. We collected around 15,000
malware samples from their platform. Final working data set include 11347 malware as
some of the samples either could not be parsed by pefile Python module or some of them
could not be run inside Virtual Machine due to some errors… For benign executables, we
used a simple python script to scrape all the valid executables from a freshly installed
windows 7 and windows XP on a virtual machine. We were able to collect around 773
files. 1000 Benign fileswere downloaded from the VirusTotal intelligence search by
restricting the number of positives for all the anti-virus vendors to be zero.”

65
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Strings, Pefile parser, Cuckoo Sandbox

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): COFF file and optional header attributes;
histograms related to strings length; entropy measures using sliding window on bytes, file
system related features; mutexes names and related features; registry changes related
features

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): KNN, Random Forest,
Decision Tree, Xg-Boost Classifiers

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #43. (Mosli, Li, Yuan, & Pan, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware

detector using dynamic analysis of the malware sample with a variety of machine learning model
algorithms. They reported an accuracy of 91.4%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 91.4%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The dataset comprised 3,130 malware samples from the
VirusShare malware repository [28]. Additionally, 1,157 benign software samples were
collected from various locations such as the Windows System32 directory and from
software websites such as FileHippo.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “After dynamically obtaining the handle data
by running the software in a sandbox, machine learning is used to discriminate between
benign and malicious uses of handles and to generalize handle usage behavior to detect
previously-unknown malware… The four Windows virtual machines were run
concurrently, each with an instance of benign or malicious software. During the analysis
task, a memory dump was produced of each Windows virtual machine along with a
report with content and behavioral information about the sample. Furthermore,
VirusTotal was used to scan each sample to ensure that the sample was labeled correctly
as benign or malicious, and then determine the malware family to which it
belonged… Handle data was extracted from the memory dumps of machines with
benignware or malware using Volatility.”
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•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “The term frequency-inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF) was used to extract measurable features from the Volatility handles out- put;
the extraction and model training was implemented using scikit-learn. A vocabulary was
created comprising the handle types to be extracted from the handle text files. A list of all
the possible terms in the vocabulary was obtained from Schuster.”

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Three machine learning
models were compared: (i) k-nearest neighbor (KNN); (ii) support vector machine
(SVM); and (iii) random forest.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #44. (Pai, Troia, Visaggio, Austin, & Stamp, 2017): In 2017, this paper

introduced a malware classifier that used hidden Markov models and k-means clustering. They
reported an accuracy of greater than 90%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – HMM

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of greater than 90%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Most of our malware samples were obtained from the Malicia
project website; see also [19]. The Malicia dataset consists of about 11,000 malware
binaries. However, for our experiments we focus primarily on the three dominant families
in the dataset, namely, Zbot, ZeroAccess, and Win-websec.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Hidden Markov models

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): k-means and expectation
maximization

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Number of clusters and dimensions

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #45. (Choi, Jang, Kim, & Kim, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a

malware classifier that used gray scale images of the malware sample’s bytes as features for a
convolutional neural network. They reported an accuracy of 95.66%.
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•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 95.66%

•

TRAINING DATA: 10,000 benign and 2,000 malware files from vendors.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Generates images from the byte code from
samples.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks.

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #46. (Han, 2017): In 2017, this thesis introduced a malware trojan detector

using dynamic analysis of the malware sample for a variety of machine learning model
algorithms. They reported an accuracy of up to 98.3%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy up to 98.3%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The experiment dataset includes 3000 Portable Executable
samples, among which 1500 are malicious and the other 1500 are benign software. The
ground truth labels are obtained through Virus Total online scanner. We divide the
sample set into three subsets with 1000 samples each. The first subset is for initial
training, the second subset is for initial testing and continuous updating of the classifiers,
and the third subset is for continuous testing.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In our current implementation we considered
two options for the training phase. The first option relies on manual exploration, where
users exercise most of the core functionality of each application in the training set. While
this does not technically ensure 100% coverage of code paths, it sufficiently captures the
code paths commonly executed by normal users. The second option relies on symbolic
execution to improve the code coverage and thus the functionality coverage. We will
explore this option in future work. The full results will be delivered in this thesis.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available
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•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “TroGuard built 5 models using
the meta classifier Ensembles of Nested Dichotomies (END) in the Weka machine
learning suite, based on the C4.5 decision tree classification algorithm.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #47. (Rhode, Burnap, & Jones, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a

malware detector that used dynamic analysis of the sample for a recurrent neural network. They
report an accuracy of 94%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 94%.

•

TRAINING DATA: “We initially obtained 1,000 malicious and 600 “trusted”
Windows7 executables from VirusTotal along with 800 trusted samples from the system
files of a fresh Windows7 64- bit installation. We then downloaded a further 4,000
Windows 7 applications from popular free software sources, such as Softonic,
PortableApps and SourceForge. We included the online download files as they are a
better representation the typical workload of an anti-virus system than Windows system
files… The final dataset comprised 2,345 benign and 2,286 malicious samples, which is
consistent with dataset sizes in this field of research e.g. ([omitted]). We used a further
2,876 ransomware samples obtained from the VirusShare online malware repository for
the ransomware case study”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper we investigate the possibility of
predicting whether or not an executable is malicious based on a short snapshot of
behavioural data.” Collected were: total processes, max process ID, CPU User, CPU
System, Memory Use, Swap Use, Packets sent, Packets received, Bytes Received, Bytes
Sent

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “Prior to training and classification, we normalise
the data to improve model convergence speed in training. By keeping data between 1 and
-1, the model is able to converge more quickly, as the neurons within the network operate
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within this numeric range. We achieve this by normalising around the zero mean and unit
variance of the training data.”
•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Recurrent neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): “We conduct a random search of hyperparameter
configurations and provide details of the configurations leading to high classification
accuracy, giving insight into the methods required for optimising our malware detection
model.”

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #48. (Raff et al., 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware detector that

used static analysis features from the sample for a recurrent neural network. They reported an
accuracy of 94% and an AUC of 98.1.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 94% and AUC of 98.1

•

TRAINING DATA: “For this work we use the same training and testing data as in Raff
et al. (2016). Specifically, we use the Group B training data, and Group A & B testing
data. Group B data was provided by an anti-virus industry partner, where both the benign
and malicious programs are meant to be representative of files seen on real machines.
The Group B training set consists of 400,000 files split evenly between benign and
malicious classes. The testing set has 77,349 files, of which 40,000 are malicious and the
remainder are benign. The Group A data was collected in the same manner as most work
in the malware identification literature (Schultz et al. 2001; Kolter and Maloof 2006) ,
which is available to the public. The benign data (or “goodware”) comes from a clean
installation of MicrosoftWindows, with some commonly installed applications (e.g.,
Firefox, Flash, etc) and the malware comes from the VirusShare corpus (Roberts
2011). The Group A test set contains 43,967 malicious and 21,854 benign testing files…
In addition, reaching out to the original company, we have obtained a larger training
corpus of 2,011,786 binaries, with 1,000,020 benign and 1,011,766 malicious. We use
this larger dataset to show that our new MalConv architecture continues to improve with
increased training data, while the byte n-gram approach appears to have plateaued in
terms of performance.”
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•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this work we introduce malware detection
from raw byte sequences as a fruitful research area to the larger machine learning
community… We instead take a static analysis approach, where we look at information
from the binary program that can be obtained without running it. In particular, we look at
the raw bytes of the file itself, and build a neural network to determine maliciousness.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Recurrent neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #49. (Z. Xu, Wen, Qin, & Ming, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a

malware detector that used static analysis and opcode features for a variety of machine learning
model algorithms. They reported an accuracy of 97.88% and an AUC of 0.9959.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 97.88 and AUC of 0.9959

•

TRAINING DATA: “Our dataset consists of a malware dataset and a benign software
dataset. The malware dataset consists of the samples of the BIG 2015 Challenge and the
samples before 2017 in theZoo aka Malware DB, with 11376 samples in total; while the
benign software dataset are collected from QIHU 360 software company, which is the
biggest Internet security company in China, with 8003 samples in total.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Different from most existing work, we take
into account not only the behaviour information but also the data information, namely,
the opcodes, data types and system libraries used in executables… This section presents
the processing of the feature extractor, which consists of the following steps: (1)
decompilation, (2) information extraction, and (3) feature selection and representation.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Moreover, in our
implementation, we employ various machine learning methods, such as K-Nearest
Neighbor, Native Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine to
train our classifier”

71
•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #50. (Meng et al., 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware classifier

that used static analysis and opcode features for a convolutional neural network. They reported
an accuracy of 98%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We choose the data-sets from VX Heavens for our experiment,
which is an important malware database for malware research. The data-sets including
Trojan and Backdoor consist of 5647 malwares from four families.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this section, we use word2vec method to
make a distributed representation for each malware gene. The basic idea is that each
malware gene is trained to a k-dimensional real vector, thus all the malware gene
sequences were converted into an n×k two-dimensional matrix, where n is the length of
the malware gene sequences. Each vector represents a point in the k-dimensional space,
and each element of the vector is determined by repeatedly training and adjusting the
weight for the gene sequences. The spatial correlation between the vectors is used to
represent the semantic relevance and similarity of the malware genes. In the paper, we
consider API calls as the malware genes and express intrinsic correlation of API calls
using word2vec method. API calls are functional, such as openfile(), writefile(),
deletefile() etc.. All of these are API calls for file operations, which are semantically
similar. However, most existing methods of matching similar API calls are artificial.
With word2vec method, all the API calls are expressed effectively and the semantic
similarity is expressed automatically.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural network

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #51. (Athiwaratkun & Stokes, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware
classifier that used dynamic analysis features for a long short-term memory (LSTM) model and a
gated recurrent unit (GRU) model. They reported a false positive rate of 1% and a 31.3%
improvement in the true positive rate of compared methods.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: false positive rate of 1% and a 31.3% improvement in the true positive rate
of compared methods

•

TRAINING DATA: “Before presenting the proposed models in the next section, we first
describe the dataset used in our work. A modified version of the production Microsoft
anti-malware engine was used to perform dynamic analysis of 75,000 Windows portable
executable (PE) format files equally split between malware and benign files. Our dataset
is further randomly split into three datasets including a training set with 50,000 files, a
validation set with 10,000 files, and a test set with 15,000 files”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Samples are detonated and system calls are
recorded.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “In this work, we propose
several new malware classification architectures which include a long short-term memory
(LSTM) language model and a gated recurrent unit (GRU) language model… Finally, we
propose a new single-stage malware classifier based on a character-level convolutional
neural network (CNN).”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #52. (T. H. Huang & Kao, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced an Android

malware detector that used static analysis features of the sample for a convolutional neural
network. They reported an accuracy of more than 75%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of more than 75%.
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•

TRAINING DATA: “We have collected over 1 million malware samples and 1 million
benign samples from the data provided by our research cooperate partner’s (Leopard
Mobile Inc.) core products Security Master and Clean Master (which had reached 3,810
million installations globally with 623 million monthly active users by December
2016)… The data was collected from January to May in 2017, among which we had a
collection of approximately 1.5 million of benign and malicious Android apps for our
experiments. We keep our research results and data on the website
http://R2D2.TWMAN.ORG (72 GB). So far, we have accumulated 2 million effective
data collections and continue to train and adjust our model.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In particular, we develop a color
representation for translating Android apps into RGB color code and transform them to a
fixed-sized encoded image… Since the byte-code in classes.dex and rgb color code are
both hexadecimal, we proposed a transformation algorithm that enables the bytecode as
rgb color code and into color image (called Android color images).”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Also, based on the successful
study in image detection in CNN, and the method proposed by [21]. Thus, we attempt to
find out the hidden relationship between the program execution logic and the order of
function calls behind the malware by taking advantage of the CNN in order to accurately
detect known and even unknown malware… Hence we present a coloR-inspired
convolutional neuRal networks (CNN)-based AndroiD malware Detection (R2-D2),
which can detect malware without extracting pre-selected features (e.g., the control-flow
of op-code, classes, methods of functions and the timing they are invoked etc.) from
Android apps… After that, the encoded image is fed to convolutional neural network for
automatic feature extraction and learning, reducing the expert’s intervention… After that,
we apply CNN to the Android color images for the Android malware detection.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #53. (McLaughlin et al., 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced an Android
malware detector that used static analysis and opcode features from the sample for a
convolutional neural network. They reported an accuracy of 98%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The second dataset was provided by McAfee Labs (now Intel
Security) and comes from the vendor’s internal repository of Android malware. After
discarding empty files or files that are less than 8 opcodes long, the dataset contains 2475
malware samples and 3627 benign samples. This dataset does not include malware family
labels and may include malware and/or benign applications present in the small dataset.
Hence to ensuring training hygiene i.e. to ensure we do not train on the testing-set, the
network is trained and tested on each dataset separately without cross- contamination. We
refer to this dataset as the ’Large Dataset’. We also have an additional dataset provided
by McAfee Labs containing approximately 18,000 android programs, and which was
collected more recently than the first two datasets. This was used for testing the final
system after setting the hyper-parameters using the smaller datasets. After discarding
short files, the dataset contains 9268 benign files and 9902 malware files. We refer to this
dataset as the ’V. Large Dataset’.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Malware classification is performed based on
static analysis of the raw opcode sequence from a disassembled program… The training
pipeline of our proposed system is much simpler than existing n-gram based malware
detection methods, as the network is trained end-to-end to jointly learn appropriate
features and to perform classification, thus removing the need to explicitly enumerate
millions of n-grams during training… In this work we propose a malware detection
method that uses a convolutional network to process the raw Dalvik byte-code of an
Android application.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Opcode embedding

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #54. (Tran & Sato, 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware classifier
that used dynamic analysis features for various machine learning model algorithms. They
reported an accuracy of 99.06%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.06%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For the experiments, we make use of the dataset implemented and
shared by Ki Y. This dataset was built from 23,080 malware samples randomly from
Malicia project and VirusTotal, and it was shared online (via URL
http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/apimds-dataset).”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “The proposed malware classification
procedures introduced in this paper use? API call sequences as inputs to classifiers. In
addition, taking advantage of the development in Natural Language Processing field, we
use some methods such as n-gram, doc2vec (or Paragraph vectors), TF-IDF to convert
those API sequences to numeric vectors before feeding to the classifiers. Our proposed
approaches are divided into 3 different methods to classify malware, that is TF-IDF,
Paragraph Vector with Distributed Bag of Words and Paragraph Vector with Distributed
Memory.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): SVM, k-nearest neighbor,
MLP, random forests

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #55. (Wojnowicz et al., 2017): In 2017, this paper introduced a malware

detector that used structural entropy as features for a logistic lasso regression machine learning
model. They reported an accuracy of 96.62%. Adding additional features brought the accuracy
up to 98.62%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Structural Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 96.62% and 98.62%, depending on the feature selection
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•

TRAINING DATA: “Samples were a corpus of Portable Executable (PE) files
downloaded from Virus Total in June, 2014. Files were labeled as “clean” if no trusted
Anti-Virus vendors labeled the file as malware, whereas files were labeled as “malware”
if one or more trusted Anti-Virus vendors labeled the file as malware. We formed a
balanced data set of 39,969 files; of these, 19,991 (50.01%) were labeled as malware,
whereas 19,978 (49.98%) were labeled as clean computer programs. The “malware”
category contained different types of malicious software (e.g., computer viruses, Trojan
horses and spyware –but not adware). Before feature extraction, 31,960 (80%) of the
samples were randomly selected to belong to the “training set”, and the other 7991 (20%)
of the samples were classified in the “test set”. The training set was used not only (a) to
train the feature weights in the final classifier, but also (b) to determine the sparsity of the
final classifier and (c) to determine weights for constructing the “propensity features”
described below.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In particular, SUSPEND (a) quantifies the
“amount of structure” in the entropy signal (through detrended fluctuation analysis), (b)
finds the location and size of sudden jumps in entropy (through mean change point
modeling), and (c) computes the distribution of entropic variation across multiple spatial
scales (through wavelet decomposition). In addition, SUSPEND (d) summarizes the
entropy signal’s empirical probability distribution.” The structural entropy is calculated.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA), Mean
Changepoint Modeling (MCPM), Wavelet Decomposition, Summary Statistics

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “In principle, any ML classifier
could be used by SUSPEND to relate the features extracted from the entropy signal to
malware status. In this paper, we apply a logistic lasso regression, as the interpretability
of this model is particularly useful for investigating performance.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Calculates entropic suspiciousness score
Method #56. (Yakura, Shinozaki, Nishimura, Oyama, & Sakuma, 2017): In 2017, this

paper introduced a malware classifier that used gray scale images of the malware’s bytes as
features for a convolutional neural network. They reported a 31.34% error.
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•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: 31.34% error

•

TRAINING DATA: “Dataset In the experiment, VX Heaven malware dataset was used
because it has numerous samples and because it is used in many research efforts
including [22]. As the ground-truth information of which malware family to which each
sample belongs, detection results by Microsoft Security Essentials was used in the
manner described in [22]. By excluding families with a small population (the threshold
was set to 60), we obtained 147,803 samples from 542 families.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Converts byte code to an image

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “This method, by applying
convolutional neural network (CNN) with a technique called attention mechanism to an
image converted from binary data, enables calculation of an “attention map,” which
shows regions having higher importance for classification in the image.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
2018
Method #57. (Cakir & Dogdu, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used static analysis features for a gradient boosting algorithm. They reported an
accuracy of 95%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 95%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Microsoft released a large malware dataset in 2015 WWW
Conference. It is called Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge Dataset (BIG 2015).
We used this dataset in this work. Training dataset has 10869 sample malware from 9
different classes of malware. These malware classes are (1) Ramnit, (2) Lollipop, (3)
Kelihos_ver3, (4) Vundo, (5) Simda, (6) Tracur, (7) Kelihos_ver1, (8) Obfuscator.ACY,
(9) Gatak. The data distribution among these malware classes are shown in Figure 1. We
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sampled 100, 200, 300, and 398 files from all classes (except class 5) and used these
samples in order to show the performance of generated classification models trained with
these low number of samples. We excluded class 5 (Simda) samples since it has a very
low number of samples (42) and we wanted an even number of samples from each class
in the experiments to remove the bias.”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper a shallow deep learning-based
feature extraction method (word2vec) is used for representing any given malware based
on its opcodes.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): “Word2Vec is a popular tool used in the literature
especially for natural languages like English. In this model an association of each word is
accomplished with a mathematical vector representation under which some structural or
semantic relation holds. Despite being designed for natural language processing, it is also
satisfactory for malware assembly code representation.”

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Gradient Boosting algorithm
is used for the classification task.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and logarithmic loss

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #58. (Ni, Qian, & Zhang, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used static analysis and gray scale image features for a convolutional neural
network. They reported an accuracy of 98.862% on average and 99.260% at best.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis and Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.862% on average

•

TRAINING DATA: “The experimental data in this paper is from the Malware
Classification Challenge on Kaggle by Microsoft 2015. There are 10,868 labeled
malware samples from 9 families in this dataset with binary and disassembly files. After
preprocessing, 10,805 samples remain. 80% of them will be used for training and the rest
for testing.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper we propose a malware
classification algorithm that uses static features called MCSC (Malware Classification
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using SimHash and CNN) which converts the disassembled malware codes into gray
images based on SimHash and then identifies their families by convolutional neural
network.”
•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Image generation from SimHash.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #59. (Hassen, 2018): In 2018, this thesis introduced a malware classifier that

used function call graphs from static analysis as features to a neural network. Hassen reported a
97.9% accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 97.9%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For the purpose of evaluating our proposed approach for
classifying malware into families, we will be using the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge (BIG 2015) dataset. The original dataset consists of 10,867 labeled malware
samples. Our disassembled file parser were able to properly parse 10,260 of the samples.
Hence, we will be using these in the following evaluations. The class distribution of these
samples are shown in Table 4.1. To compare our work with Adagoi, we will use a
secondary dataset consisting of 1,113 benign android apps and 1,200 malicious android
apps. The malicious samples are from the Android Malware Genome Project. A
colleague at our university provided us with the benign samples, downloaded from the
Google Play Store.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We propose a method for extracting features
from function call graphs (FCGs).”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Function clustering.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): This research proposes a classifier that can adapt to open
set malware classification, which can include a tuning function for this task.
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•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #60. (Le, Boydell, Mac, & Scanlon, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a

malware classifier that used sampled byte code of the malware sample for a convolutional and
BiLSTM neural networks. They reported an accuracy of 98.2%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Byte Code

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.2%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For our experiments, we used the malware data from the Microsoft
Malware Classification Challenge (BIG 2015) on Kaggle. Although the Kaggle challenge
itself finished in 2015, the labeled training dataset of 10,868 samples is still available and
represents a large collection of examples classified into malware classes, as shown in
Table 1. As well as being able to use this data to both train and evaluate our own deep
learning approaches, the Kaggle challenge still allows the submission of predictions for a
separate unlabeled test set of 10,873 samples for evaluation.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Our 1 dimensional representation of a raw
binary file is similar to the image representation of a raw binary file; but it is simpler, and
it preserves the sequential order of the byte code in the binaries. The sequential
representation makes it natural for us to apply the Convolutional Neural Network - Bi
Long Short Term Memory architecture (CNN-BiLSTM) on top of it; helping us achieve
better performance than using the CNN model alone… To this end, we used a generic
image scaling algorithm, where the file byte code is interpreted as a one dimensional
‘image’ and is scaled to a fixed target size. This is a type of lossy data compression.
However, by using an image scaling algorithm, we aim to limit the distortion of spatial
patterns present in the data… In our experiments that follow, we scale each raw malware
file to a size of 10,000 bytes using the OpenCV computer vision library [37] - i.e. after
the scaling one malware sample corresponds to one sequence of 10, 000 1-byte values.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Sampling the byte code to fixed size

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks
and BiLSTM neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Not available

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available
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•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #61. (Yan, Qi, & Rao, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used byte code images and opcode features for CNN and LSTM networks. They
reported an accuracy greater than 99%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier Images from Bytes and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy greater than 99%

•

TRAINING DATA: “To verify the performance of MalNet, we perform evaluation
experiments on a large dataset, which contains 21,736 malware samples from Microsoſt
and 20,650 benign samples collected by us. We choose 1/10 samples as validation
dataset, where MalNet achieves detection accuracy of 99.88% and true positive rate of
99.14% with a false positive rate of 0.1%, much higher than the n-gram baseline result.
Meanwhile we also make a malware family classification for 21,736 malware samples in
9 malware families to compare MalNet with other related works, where MalNet achieves
99.36% overall accuracy outperforming most of other methods. Besides, since rapid
growing malware samples require a fast and efficient malware detection method, we
evaluate the detection efficiency for MalNet.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper, we propose MalNet, a novel
malware detection method that learns features automatically from the raw data… MalNet
performs a comprehensive static analysis which includes two novel methods based on
deep neural networks. One method is learning from grayscale images by Convolution
Neural Network (CNN). The grayscale image is extracted from raw binary file in which
CNN can get the structure features of a malware from its local image patterns. The other
method is learning from opcode sequence by Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM).
Opcode sequences are extracted by decompilation tool where LSTM can learn features
about malicious code sequences and patterns.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Then MalNet uses CNN and
LSTM networks to learn from grayscale image and opcode sequence, respectively, and
takes a stacking ensemble for malware classification… Overall, MalNet uses these two
networks to learn features from the raw data and then uses stacking ensemble to fuse two
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networks’ discriminant result with extra metadata feature and finally generates a binary
classification result for malware detection.”
•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #62. (Saleh, Li, & Xu, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

detector that used static and dynamic analysis features for a naïve Bayes and random forest
classifier. They report an accuracy of 96.7%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static and Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 96.7%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The programs were first seen by VirusTotal during the period from
December 2014 to April 2015. We collected 100,000 malicious programs and 100,000
benign programs during each month between December 2014 and April 2015, which
leads to a total of 1,000,000 programs.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper, we combine three kinds of
contextual information, namely static, dynamic, and instruction-based, for malware
detection. This leads to the definition of more than thirty thousand features, which is a
large features set that covers a wide range of a sample characteristics… First, we define
and introduce a large set of features, including both static and dynamic aspects of
malware samples. Specifically, we define more than 32,000 features. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the largest feature set that has been defined for malware
analysis… Therefore, we collect several features from many aspects of a malicious file,
and use them to build our feature model for describing a system of malware. These
feature sets include dynamic analysis of the file when it runs in a controlled environment,
static analysis of the file header features, and data based on the instructions that compose
the executable file… Combining these three sets culminates in a feature vector containing
all the features. Our vector consists of 32,069 features… The scan report from VirusTotal
is a JSON file containing static and dynamic analysis data of the file. The static analysis
data is obtained using the pefile tool, while the dynamic analysis is done by a modified
version of Cuckoo.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available
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•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “Second, we use Random
Forest and Naive Bayes machine learning techniques to learn malware detection models
based on this large set of features… We use two popular machine learning algorithms to
conduct our experiments: Naive Bayes and Random Forest.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #63. (Krcal, Svec, & Balek, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

detector that used a variety of high- and low-level features for a neural network. They report a
98.55% accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.55%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Out of the Avast’s repository of PE files we have chosen all those
collected during recent 16 months of size between 12 and 512 kilobytes excluding files
with some obfuscation methods such as compression or encryption detected. The train,
validation and test sets consists of the first 12 months, the next 2 months and the last 2
months, respectively, so that we measure how the model generalizes into the future. For
the sake of simplicity, we use binary labels clean and malware only with roughly
balanced occurrence throughout our dataset.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Samples are unpacked. “Our approach is the
end-to-end counterpart of so-called static malware analysis: the network is given mere
sequence of bytes that the executable consists of.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #64. (Yousefi-Azar, Hamey, Varadharajan, & Chen, 2018): In 2018, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used a variety of high- and low-level features for a neural
network. They report an accuracy of 99.45% on Windows PE files.
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•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.45%

•

TRAINING DATA: Approximately 96,625 samples from a variety of sources.

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We show feature extraction, which is
performed by tf-simhashing, is equivalent to the first layer of a particular neural
network… The byte representation contains important information such as APIs, opcodes. The model learns the pattern of bytes. The tf-simhashing static feature
representation is a fast solution to embed the byte patterns into a short size vector.
Malytics generalizes the patterns well even for novel samples. Also, it not easy to craft
adversarial samples to attack Malytics… Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is one of the
main categories of hashing methods. It hashes input data so that similar data maps to the
same “buckets” with high probability, maximizing the probability of a “collision” for
similar inputs. Simhashing is one of the most widely used LSH algorithms, adopted to
find similar strings."”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “The three phases are
implemented by a neural network with two hidden layers and an output layer.”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #65. (Xiaofeng, Xiao, Fangshuo, Shengwei, & Jing, 2018): In 2018, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used dynamic analysis of malware samples for a recurrent
neural network model. They report an AUC of 0.993.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: AUC of 0.993

•

TRAINING DATA: “The experiment samples come from four data sets: normal samples
from windows7 and windows xp system exe files, the malicious samples were randomly
picked up from the Virus Share, VirusTotal. A open source sandbox, cuckoo, is used to
monitor the system's kernel API call during the sample execution. In our experiment, the
sandbox executed every sample for two minutes. The labels of samples were derived
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from VirusTotal.com after a weighted probability calculation to the detection results of
VirusTotal.com.”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “This paper proposes a system architecture that
combines LSTM deep learning model based on sequence data and machine learning
model based on API statistical features.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Removal of redundant data.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): “In this paper, recurrent neural
network model is used to extracts the abstract features… We combined the LSTM deep
learning model [2] and random forests model and proposed a malware detection
architecture, ASSCA”

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and ROC curves

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #66. (Kalash et al., 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware classifier

that used gray scale images of the malware’s bytes for a convolutional neural network. They
report a 99.97% accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.97%

•

TRAINING DATA: “Malimg Dataset: This dataset [5] has a total of 9,339 malware
samples that are represented as grayscale images. Each malware sample in the dataset
belongs to one of the 25 malware families/classes. Also, the number of samples
belonging to a malware family vary across the dataset. In our experiments, we randomly
select 90% of malware samples in a family for training and the remaining 10% for
testing. At the end, we have 8,394 malware samples for training and 945 samples for
testing… Microsoft Malware Dataset: In 2015, Microsoft hosted a Kaggle competition
for malware classification. In this challenge, Microsoft released a huge dataset (almost
half a terabyte when uncompressed) consisting of 21,741 malware samples. This dataset
is divided in two parts, 10,868 samples for training and the other 10,873 samples for
testing. Each malware sample belongs to one of 9 different malware families. Like the
Malimg dataset, the distribution of malware samples over classes in the training data is
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not uniform and the number of malware samples of some families significantly
outnumbers the samples of other families.”
•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We convert malware binaries to grayscale
images and subsequently train a CNN for classification.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices and logloss

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #67. (Su et al., 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware classifier that

used gray scale images of the malware’s bytes for a convolutional neural network. They
reported an 81.8% classification accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Images from Bytes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 81.8%

•

TRAINING DATA: “For these experiments, we have used an IoT DDoS malware
dataset newly collected by IoTPOT, the first honeypot for collecting IoT threat samples.
The malware samples are labelled using VirusTotal with the majority rule. The dataset
originally contains 500 malware samples… The number of samples are balanced for each
family by randomly removing the samples that belong to classes that are too large. After
the preprocessing phase, we analyzed 365 samples where each class has the same number
of samples. Among them, we utilize 45 sample (each class has 15 samples) for testing,
and the rest for training.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “We firstly extract one-channel gray-scale
images converted from binaries, and then utilize a light- weight convolutional neural
network for classifying IoT malware families.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Convolutional neural network

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
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Method #68. (Burnap, French, Turner, & Jones, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a
malware detector that used dynamic analysis features for a self-organizing map (SOM) machine
learning model algorithm. They reported an accuracy of 90%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 90%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We collected an initial sample of 594 malicious files of the
Portable Executable (PE) 32-bit format where at least 10 individual virus scanners
labelled the file as malware. For the purposes of developing a ‘clean’ sample we
collected a further 594 files that were labelled ‘trusted’ - i.e. considered not to be
malware by all the individual scanners.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “During training, a 9-dimensional input vector
of normalised values from the training set was directed to either the Good map, used to
represent the class of clean baseline data, or to the Bad map, used to represent the class of
data that includes ‘dangerous’ values. Importantly, ‘Bad’ data will likely include ‘Good’
examples.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Self organizing feature maps

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #69. (HaddadPajouh, Dehghantanha, Khayami, & Choo, 2018): In 2018, this

paper introduced a malware detector that used static analysis and opcode features for a recurrent
neural network machine learning model. They reported an accuracy of 98.18%.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98.18%

•

TRAINING DATA: “To train our models, we use an IoT application dataset comprising
281 malware and 270 benign ware. Then, we evaluate the trained model using 100 new
IoT malware samples (i.e. not previously exposed to the model) with three different Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) configurations”
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•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): Samples are disassembled and opcodes are
used as features.

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Opcode sequence pruning. Statistics are
produced from the pruned opcode sequences.

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Recurrent neural network

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #70. (Azmoodeh, Dehghantanha, & Choo, 2018): In 2018, this paper

introduced a malware detector that used static analysis and opcode features for a neural network.
They reported a 99.68% accuracy.
•

CATEGORY: Malware Detector – Static Analysis and Opcodes

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 99.68%

•

TRAINING DATA: “We created a dataset of 1078 benign and 128 malware samples for
ARM-based IoT applications [44]. All malware samples were collected using VirusTotal
Threat Intelligence platform between February 2015 and January 2017. All goodware
were collected from a variety of official IoT App stores such as Pi Store.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “In this paper, we present a deep learning based
method to detect Internet Of Battlefield Things (IoBT) malware via the device’s
Operational Code (OpCode) sequence… In this study, 4,543 1-gram and 610,109 2-gram
distinct OpCode sequences were extracted and CIG(f,CB) and CIG(f,CM) were
calculated.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Graph generation

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available
Method #71. (Pektaş & Acarman, 2018): In 2018, this paper introduced a malware

classifier that used dynamic analysis features from a malware sample for a confidence weighted
linear classification. They reported an accuracy of 98%.
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•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Dynamic Analysis

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of 98%

•

TRAINING DATA: “The testing malware dataset was obtained from ‘VirusShare
Malware Sharing Platform’ [34]. A large amount of malware with different types
including PE, HTML, Flash, Java, PDF, APK was downloaded… At the end of the
analysis, we prepared a set of testing dataset constituted by 17,400 responding samples
belonging to 60 distinct families. Also, 532 benign executables are obtained from the
system32 folder of Microsoft windows. These classes are not balanced in terms of the
same sample size but since 60 families of malicious executables and one benign class
constitute the dataset, balance problem among class size is reduced.”

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): “Runtime behaviours are extracted with a
particular focus on the determination of a malicious sequence of application
programming interface (API) calls in addition to the file, network and registry activities.
Mining and searching n-gram over API call sequences is introduced to discover episodes
representing behaviour-based features of a malware… In this study, we deploy VirMon
to extract Windows kernel-level notification routines as the underlying automated
dynamic platform and we use Cuckoo to extract API call sequences.”

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): Not available

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM(): Confidence weighted linear
classification

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Not available

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not available

Other Prior Literature
Not all of the prior literature presented classification or detection methods that used
machine learning models. A handful of publications provided foundational concepts and
experimentation with entropy and they were relevant to this dissertation. This section will
briefly identify the additional publications that were reviewed.
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In 2007, Lyda and Hamrock examined a structural entropy approach to malware analysis
(Lyda & Hamrock, 2007). Note that structural entropy is similar to running window entropy, but
there is a skip value used with structural entropy so not every entropy calculation occurs at every
index. The authors concluded that decisions could be made with respect to the entropic structure
of a malware sample.
Also in 2007, a patent was published that contained the similar material to the Lyda
publication above (McMillan & Garman, 2007). This patent described statistical decision
making on entropy information of malware. This patent describes how to calculate structural
entropy. Running window entropy is a special case of structural entropy where the skip value is
one byte. The content of this patent is conceptually similar to the Lyda and Hamrock publication
(Lyda & Hamrock, 2007).
In 2011, Sorokin examined the concept of comparing files using structural entropy
(Sorokin, 2011). This research used a discrete wavelet transform (DWT) on the structural
entropy in order to compare segments. This research demonstrated that structural entropy, of
which running window entropy is a special case, can be used to compare the content of files.
In 2013, Baysa examined structural entropy as it relates to metamorphic malware (Baysa,
2013). In this work, Baysa demonstrated that structural entropy can be used to detect changing
malware. Later in 2017, Paul examined structural entropy to identify file types (Paul, 2017).
Both of these publications provide weight that structural entropy, of which running window
entropy is a special case, can be used for malware analysis and possibly classification.

Analysis Of Prior Literature And Contributions To Science
The sheer number of publications relevant to malware detection or classification using
machine learning algorithms was unmanageable without a method to organize them. As
demonstrated in this chapter, each of the prior methods can be categorized and described using
the components of Figure 2 and Definition 1. This generalized model was applied to seventyone prior methods. This section will explore the content of the prior methods with respect to
Malgazer’s contribution to science.
In the prior literature, there were forty-one malware detectors and thirty malware
classifiers. The following is a list of all the malware detectors:
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•

Method #01 –

•

Method #30

•

Method #53

Method #12

•

Method #32

•

Method #55

•

Method #16

•

Method #37

•

Method #62

•

Method #17

•

Method #39

•

Method #63

•

Method #20

•

Method #42

•

Method #64

•

Method #21

•

Method #43

•

Method #65

•

Method #22

•

Method #46

•

Method #68

•

Method #23

•

Method #47

•

Method #69

•

Method #24

•

Method #48

•

Method #70

•

Method #26

•

Method #49

•

Method #27

•

Method #52

Malgazer is different than all of the previously listed methods because they are malware
detectors and not general classifiers. As shown in Figure 1, all detectors are a subset of
classifiers. As by the research question posed in the introduction chapter, Malgazer will be
classifying samples after the detection has already occurred. Therefore, malware classifiers are
more relevant to Malgazer. The following list contains the thirty malware classifiers surveyed in
this chapter:
•

Method #13

•

Method #35

•

Method #57

•

Method #14

•

Method #36

•

Method #58

•

Method #15

•

Method #38

•

Method #59

•

Method #18

•

Method #40

•

Method #60

•

Method #19

•

Method #41

•

Method #61

•

Method #25

•

Method #44

•

Method #66

•

Method #28

•

Method #45

•

Method #67

•

Method #29

•

Method #50

•

Method #71

•

Method #31

•

Method #51

•

Method #33

•

Method #54

•

Method #34

•

Method #56
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These thirty methods attempt to accomplish the same goal as Malgazer, which is to
classify malware samples. From the thirty classifiers above, only two classifiers use features
similar to running window entropy: Method #13 and Method #20. Even though it had a high
accuracy, Method #13 only classified samples if they were packed. This was not the only
intention of Malgazer because the classifications will be made with respect to functionality. On
the other hand, Method #20 only reported an accuracy of 87.2%. This accuracy could likely be
improved based upon accuracies reported in other methods, as the next paragraph will explain.
Method #20 also used structural entropy, of which running window entropy is a special case.
This dissertation examines running window entropy as a feature space. Therefore, it is obvious
that the research question Malgazer is trying to solve contributes to science on a topic that has
only two similar prior publications. If Malgazer is able to functionally classify malware using
running window entropy and machine learning, it will be a contribution to science where prior
literature is lacking.
It should be noted that there were five detectors that included entropy as features:
Method #22, Method #23, Method #26, Method #27, and Method #55. The efficacy of these
detectors varied widely from 68.7% to 99% accuracy. It is clear from these methods that if
detectors can reach up to 99% accuracy with entropy, classifications could be improved from
87.2% accuracy seen in Method #20. The Malgazer classifier improved accuracy to 95% using
running window entropy.

Selection Of Prior Works For Empirical Comparison
Efficacy, in general, varied greatly across the seventy-one methods. Accuracy was as
low as 60% up to a reported perfect accuracy. Accuracy can be biased by any number of factors
in the machine learning model training and testing phases, therefore accuracy dependencies need
to be removed with an empirical study. This dissertation will compare an empirical study of a
prior method with an empirical study of Malgazer. This study will attempt to remove
dependencies that may be biasing the reported accuracies of prior methods. Unfortunately, most
of the methods in prior literature did not include the training data sets, the testing data sets,
source code, or enough details about the method so that the experiments could have been
replicated with some degree of certainty. The “GIST” method, Method #14, was chosen from
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many when an author of the paper replied to a request for more information that allowed for the
replication of their method.
Since no method has components from Figure 2 and Definition 1 that are the same as
Malgazer, it was appropriate to select a similar prior method for empirical comparisons. Method
#14, also referred to more compactly as “GIST” throughout this paper, was implemented using
the same datasets and methods used to develop Malgazer. This process allowed for an in-depth
empirical comparison between Malgazer and “GIST”. This author developed Python source
code of the “GIST” method based upon an e-mail conversation with one of the authors and the
literature cited in Method #14.

Summary
This chapter methodically reviewed the prior literature on machine learning based
malware classification and detection. The components from Figure 2 and Definition 1 were used
to describe each prior method. Each prior method was assigned a method number and a citation
for easier referencing throughout this dissertation. An analysis was conducted on the prior
literature and it was discovered that only two publications addressed the same topic as Malgazer,
thereby showing Malgazer’s contribution to science. The two publications did not use the same
methodology as Malgazer, so Malgazer is new science. This chapter also reviewed prior relevant
works that were foundational. Lastly, this chapter discussed the selection of a prior Method #14,
also referenced through this dissertation as “GIST”, for the in-depth empirical comparison to
Malgazer in future chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter will present the research methodology for the development of Malgazer and
answer the research question from the first chapter. Building Malgazer was a complex endeavor
and the research methodology will be presented chronologically by milestone to highlight each
design characteristic. The research methodology for Malgazer consisted of twelve distinct
phases presented in Figure 9, and each phase will be described in this methodology chapter as a
section. Then, this chapter will conclude by discussing how this research methodology
accomplished the research objectives presented in the first chapter.
First, Malgazer needed running window entropy data but the original algorithm was too
slow to compute tens of thousands of samples during experimentation. Therefore, the running
window entropy calculation was optimized for time. This optimization is the content of chapter
4. Simultaneously, an exploratory data set was sourced from VirusTotal using a methodology
described later in this chapter.
The output of the running window entropy algorithm produced a data set that could be
used as input features to machine learning models, but the known classifications for each sample
were needed next. Publicly available classifications were collected for this purpose from
VirusTotal. Next, the VirusTotal data and running window entropy data was explored
qualitatively to determine the best approach to answer the research question. The qualitative
exploration will be mentioned here, but the results are described in more detail within chapter 5.
Based upon those findings, the final malware data set was sourced. The final malware data set
were used to train and test the classifiers developed throughout this research.
During the exploration phase, it was discovered that classification data from VirusTotal
was not consistent between vendors, so an algorithm was developed to produce unified
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Figure 9. The design process
functional classifications from the VirusTotal data. The algorithm to determine classifications
from VirusTotal data will be presented as a section later in this chapter.
Next, the feature data (running window entropy) was computed for the final training data
set using the Malgazer Python library. This chapter will include a short explanation of this
library and a tour of the source code repository is available in appendix A. The machine learning
algorithms selected for this research will also be explained in this chapter.
Next, the optimal hyper-parameters were identified using a methodical grid searching
technique, as discussed in the introduction chapter. The searching technique and the results are
discussed further in chapter 6. Then, the optimal hyper-parameters calculated from grid
searching were used to cross fold validate (train) the Malgazer classifier to measure mean
accuracies and accuracy variance. Cross fold validation will be explained in this chapter and the
results of the validation are presented in chapter 6. This chapter will also present the methods
used to compare the Malgazer classifier with prior literature empirically. The data, analysis of
the data, and comparison to prior methods are presented in chapters 6 and 7. After the Malgazer
classifier was developed, a web application was written so the classifiers could be easily
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accessed remotely with very little programming familiarity. The web application is explained in
chapter 8. The next sections within this chapter will address each item summarized in this
introduction.

Optimizing Running Window Entropy
When initially exploring this research topic and experimenting with malware data
samples in early 2017, it was quickly obvious that computing running window entropy at scale
for tens of thousands of samples, or more, was going to be a slow endeavor. Therefore, one of
the first goals and first completed milestone was to optimize the original running window
entropy algorithm with respect to time so that it would calculate faster. It was obvious that most
of the computation time included the &'( function from Shannon’s equation, and that function
was called repeatedly within nested “for” loops. Chapter 4 describes the development of a faster
algorithm that flattens the nested “for” loops to decrease the total number of &'( function calls.
This milestone led to the faster computation of running window entropy so that the data sets
discussed in the next sections could be calculated by a single individual with limited computing
resources. The measurement of success for this design science research artifact is also addressed
in Chapter 4.

Determining Classifications
Now that the running window entropy data could be calculated efficiently, classifications
of the malware samples were required. There was no one source that provided a unified and
reliable set of functional classifications, so a method was needed to obtain them. This section
will describe how functional classifications were determined from VirusTotal (“VirusTotal,”
n.d.-a) public information.
VirusTotal is very well known in the malware analysis community and it provides a free
scanner for malware samples using numerous anti-virus and anti-malware products. VirusTotal
consumes multiple file samples every second from all over the world, of which many are
malware. VirusTotal aggregates a continual, up to date malware sample feed from their users’
uploads that can be used to source malware for machine learning algorithms.
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VirusTotal provides the public access, commercially, through an “Intelligence” feed of
this sample stream. This author had commercial access to the intelligence feed during this
research as part of his regular employment duties, although the methods described within this
dissertation do not add on costs to the intelligence feed’s base access like other VirusTotal API
methods. Through VirusTotal, the malware ingestion feed can be searched live by user
generated Yara (VirusTotal, n.d.-b) signatures. Yara is an arbitrary data matching application
that is used heavily within the malware analysis community. Any VirusTotal samples that
matched a Yara signature are stored for the user to retrieve as a notification at a later time. It is
through this facility that this author created the functional classifications along with all of the
data sets.
When a malware sample matches a provided Yara signature, the results of several antivirus and anti-malware product scans of the sample are also provided in the report returned to the
user. In this research, the results of the VirusTotal malware scanning was used to determine the
functional classification of each malware sample. Through experimentation, it was found that
VirusTotal would return approximately seventy anti-virus or anti-malware product scans for each
submitted malware sample in early 2018. Some detections in the exploratory data set were better
than others for automated classification purposes, and this will be discussed further in chapter 5.
Through visual inspection, it was obvious that each product in VirusTotal used
independent classifications schemes. For example, one product in the report may have classified
a sample as “Ransomware” while another product classified the same sample as “Locky”.
Making matters worse, some products in the report used a functional classification and family
name, but not both at the same time for a sample. Since this research was focused on functional
classifications, this made sourcing consistent functional classifications difficult. The products
returning different classifications for the same sample may each have been correct in their
assessment, but a unified functional classification must be drawn from the numerous products
available on VirusTotal if that data is to be used for machine learning purposes. This is an
example of the transformation “T” and pre-processing “P” functions in the generalized machine
learning based malware classification model introduced in the first chapter where the data it
transformed/preprocessed was the VirusTotal file classification. The VirusTotal classification
data had to be normalized and standardized before it was useful to machine learning algorithms.
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In order to determine a unified classification system based upon the VirusTotal reports,
an experimentation malware data set was sourced. The exploratory data set was captured using
the following Yara signature3 on the VirusTotal Intelligence feed in mid-March 2018:

01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
03.
04. /* 20180312.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_files_20180312_1 {
07. condition:
08.
file_type contains "peexe"
09. }
The rule above filtered the intelligence feed and only captured samples that were
Window PE executable type. For this research, the results from the rule were only retrieved for
samples that had at least twenty-five detections in VirusTotal. The results were gathered using
scripts freely available in the Malgazer source code repository (Jones, 2017b). Returned from
this filter was a data set of VirusTotal classifications of approximately 28,042 samples. Each
sample included scans from the seventy products, listed below:
•

ALYac

•

Avira

•

Cybereason

•

AVG

•

Babable

•

Cylance

•

AVware

•

Baidu

•

Cyren

•

Ad-Aware

•

BitDefender

•

DrWeb

•

AegisLab

•

Bkav

•

ESET-NOD32

•

AhnLab-V3

•

CAT-

•

Emsisoft

•

Alibaba

QuickHeal

•

Endgame

•

Antiy-AVL

•

CMC

•

F-Prot

•

Arcabit

•

ClamAV

•

F-Secure

•

Avast

•

Comodo

•

Fortinet

•

Avast-Mobile

•

CrowdStrike

•

GData

3

Note that line numbers were added for convenience and are not part of the signature.
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•

Ikarus

•

Invincea

•

Jiangmin

•

NANO-

•

TotalDefense

Antivirus

•

TrendMicro

•

Paloalto

•

TrendMicro-

K7AntiVirus

•

Panda

•

K7GW

•

Qihoo-360

•

VBA32

•

Kaspersky

•

Rising

•

VIPRE

•

Kingsoft

•

SUPERAntiSpy

•

ViRobot

•

MAX

ware

•

Webroot

•

Malwarebytes

•

SentinelOne

•

Yandex

•

McAfee

•

Sophos

•

Zillya

•

McAfee-GW-

•

Symantec

•

ZoneAlarm

Edition

•

SymantecMobil

•

Zoner

eInsight

•

eGambit

•

nProtect

•
•

•

MicroWorldeScan

•

Tencent

Microsoft

•

TheHacker

HouseCall

Upon visual inspection, the following six products generally provided the most consistent
functional classification name somewhere within their classification:
1. Microsoft

4. Sophos

2. Symantec

5. Trend Micro

3. Kaspersky

6. ClamAV

The final functional classification was determined by the classification of the products
in the preceding list, in increasing order. The lower number in the previous list took
precedence over products with higher numbers, such that Malgazer used the Microsoft
product classification before the ClamAV product classification for each sample.
Once the functional information had been parsed from the original VirusTotal product
classification string, the data was normalized to just six malware groups to focus the scope of
this research. The classifications chosen for this research were Trojan, Ransom, Worm,
Backdoor, Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA), and Virus. The choice of these groups
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Table 1. Malgazer classification lookup table
Search String
Trj
PUP
Wrm
Bkdr
Cryp
PUA
RiskTool
VirTool
VirLock
HackTool
RemoteAdmin
Trojan
Worm
Troj

Malgazer Classification
Trojan
PUA
Worm
Backdoor
Ransom
PUA
PUA
Virus
Ransom
PUA
PUA
Trojan
Worm
Trojan

came from an exploratory data analysis phase with the initially collected exploratory data set,
mentioned previously. This exploratory data analysis will be discussed in a later chapter.
After the classifications were determined by the six products in the list above, they
were case-insensitively searched for strings using the terms from the first column of Table 1.
The translation in Table 1 came from a best effort attempt to understand and classify the
exploratory data set captured from VirusTotal. The existence of a string in the first column
applied a classification from the six malware groups listed in the second column of Table 1,
where the six products were searched in order (Microsoft, Symantec, etc.). This functional
classification was used as Malgazer’s classification for the next phases of this research.

Qualitative Data Exploration
After downloading and classifying approximately 28,042 samples from VirusTotal in
March 2018, a brief data exploration effort began. During this exploration phase, the running
window entropy data was computed over every sample for four windows: 512; 1,024; 2,048;
and 4,096 bytes. The running entropy data was translated into data structures commonly used
for machine learning through the development of the Malgazer Python library.
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After some statistical calculations, it quickly became apparent that the exploratory
data was unbalanced. Unbalanced data meant there were more samples of one category
versus others so that they were not distributed evenly in a histogram. This is a common
situation because the numbers of threats per classification is dynamic as the threat landscape
changes over time. During one era, ransom malware may have been more popular than
another era, for example. Therefore, it was determined that this exploratory data set will only
be used to verify that the running window entropy can be used to classify samples using
machine learning methods and aid in writing the Malgazer Python libraries (explained in an
upcoming section). This path was chosen because it was likely that the accuracies discovered
during the exploratory phase could have been artificially high due to learning bias. Instead, it
is important to know that an exploratory data analysis phase was used to make the initial
design decisions discussed in this chapter. More information about the data exploration
process is presented in chapter 5. Since the exploratory data set was unbalanced, a larger final
and balanced data set was needed and the sourcing methodology for the data set is presented
in the next section.

Collecting The Final Data Sets
After reviewing the classifications in the exploratory phase, the larger final data set
was sourced from VirusTotal using several Yara signatures throughout May of 2018. The
classifications were determined by the classification determination algorithm previously
described in this chapter. Each of the Yara signatures was allowed to run until approximately
11,000 samples were collected from each of the six malware classification groups: Backdoor,
Worm, Trojan, Virus, PUA, and Ransom. A sample was kept if twenty-five or more products
on VirusTotal determined the sample was malware, otherwise the sample was discarded.
Then, each of the binaries was downloaded from the data set until there were 10,000 samples
left in each classification, making the complete data set 60,000 malware samples. The Yara
signatures used for this final data set collection follows.
Backdoor Samples
01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
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03.
04. /* 20180501.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_backdoor_files_20180501_1 {
07. condition:
08.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (microsoft contains
"Backdoor")
09. }
Worm Samples
01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
03.
04. /* 20180501.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_worm_files_20180501_1 {
07. condition:
08.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (microsoft contains
"Worm")
09. }
Trojan Samples
01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
03.
04. /* 20180501.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_trojan_files_20180501_1 {
07. condition:
08.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (microsoft contains
"Trojan")
09. }
Virus Samples
01. Virus Files
02.
03. import "math"
04. import "pe"
05.
06. /* 20180501.1 */
07.
08. rule peexe_ransom_files_20180501_1 {
09. condition:
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10.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (microsoft contains
"Ransom")
11. }
PUA Samples
01. PUA Files
02.
03. import "math"
04. import "pe"
05.
06. /* 20180508.1 */
07.
08. rule peexe_pua_files_20180508_1 {
09. condition:
10.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (signatures contains
"PUA" or signatures contains "PUP")
11. }
01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
03.
04. /* 20180501.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_hacktool_files_20180501_1 {
07. condition:
08.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (microsoft contains
"HackTool")
09. }
Ransom Samples
01. import "math"
02. import "pe"
03.
04. /* 20180508.1 */
05.
06. rule peexe_ransom_files_20180508_1 {
07. condition:
08.
(file_type contains "peexe") and (signatures contains
"Ransom")
09. }
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Machine Learning Algorithm Input Features
Two types of data were computed and used as machine learning features in this study:
running window entropy and GIST. The GIST features were described in Method #14 of the
literature review chapter and were used for an empirical comparison to Malgazer’s running
window entropy features. As discussed previously, the running window entropy data is
variable length depending on the malware’s size and the running window size. Therefore, the
arrays had to be resampled to a fixed number of values for every sample in the data set. Four
values were used for the running window entropy data sampled length. The running window
size for the entropy calculations can also vary, so four values were chosen as the window size.
The final data set was computed with the running window entropy window sizes of 256; 512;
1,024; and 2,048 bytes sampled to 512; 1,024; 2,048; and 4,096 values. The final data set was
also computed with the standard 320 features as described in the GIST Method #14. All of
the features were computed using the Malgazer Python libraries.

The Malgazer Python Libraries
Several Python libraries were created to compute the features in the data sets and are
referred to as the Malgazer Python libraries. The Malgazer Python libraries are located in the
Malgazer source code respository (Jones, 2017b). There are four Python modules within this
repository. Each will be explained below. A tour of the Malgazer repositories is available in
appendix A.
entropy.py
This module includes a “RunningEntropy” class that was used to calculate running
window entropy from data. This module also provided a resample function so that running
window entropy could be resampled to a fixed number of data points.
files.py
This module includes a “Sample” class that was used to hold the data of a malware
sample. The malware sample data could be read from a file or a list of bytes in memory, and
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the “Sample” class also calculated the GIST data, running window entropy, and SHA256 hash
values.
ml.py
This module includes a “ML” class that is a wrapper around machine learning
algorithms. This class was used to create, train, use, predict, and measure various machine
learning algorithms.
utils.py
This module includes a “Utils” class that provided various useful functionalities to
Malgazer. For example, all of the preprocessing functionality that estimated classifications
based upon raw VirusTotal reports is located here. Other external Malgazer scripts actually
call various functions within this “Utils” class for most of the logic.

Choosing Machine Learning Algorithms
Python is used heavily by the data science community, so there were several machine
learning algorithms already implemented. All of the machine learning algorithms described
in the introduction chapter were chosen for this study and they were already implemented
either in SciKit-Learn (“scikit-learn,” n.d.) or Keras (“Keras,” n.d.) with Tensorflow
(“Tensorflow,” n.d.) as a backend. These algorithms were chosen because it was a
manageable number of machine learning algorithms that were also cited frequently in prior
literature.

Searching For Best Model Parameters
One of the machine learning algorithms written into Malgazer is the grid searching
algorithm. The grid searching algorithm reads possible hyper-parameters of the machine
learning model from the user and trains the machine learning model with all of the
possibilities, reporting them in descending order of accuracy. This allows for orderly
searching of model parameters to more finely tune the machine learning model to the input
data. For example, as discussed in the introduction chapter, neural networks can be built with
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different numbers of units in different numbers of hidden layers with different optimizers and
activation functions. The structure of the neural network may play a great role for one data
type, but not another data type. The chosen optimizer may converge for one training, but not
another training. Using the grid searching algorithm, one can iterate through all of the
possible neural networks and select the one with the highest accuracy.
For other models, such as SVM, there are multiple hyper-parameters that should be
tuned according to the data. Grid searching locates the best accuracy across an n-dimensional
space, where each dimension is defined by the variable representing a hyper-parameter (such
as the variable “C”4 in an SVM model, or the number of layers in a neural network). Once the
hyper-parameters were optimized for the final data set, the subsequent trainings of the
Malgazer and GIST classifiers used those optimal parameters.

Training Machine Learning Models
Once the optimal hyper-parameters were calculated, they were used as the hyperparameters to train the final machine learning models. Two classifiers were created for each
type of machine learning model, a Malgazer classifier and the GIST classifier. These
classifiers provided a comparison of empirical results to one another, and a theoretical
comparison other reported accuracy in prior literature. The specific information used to train
the classifiers is presented in chapter 6, along with the training results.
In general, the studied classifiers were trained using two methods. First, each
classifier was trained using cross fold validation. In this research, ten folds were used for the
cross-fold validation. This means that the final data set, discussed previously, was assembled
into ten non-overlapping data sets where training occurred with nine of the folds and tested on
the tenth fold. The randomly selected samples were stratified, meaning that each class was
represented equally in each fold, removing as much bias as possible. Then, the process was
repeated ten times until every fold has been used as the testing set once. For each fold, the
accuracies were recorded so that the mean and variance could be computed. Cross fold
validation is common in data science literature and helps provide a more realistic accuracy
score for a classifier.
4

This is a different “C” than in the generalized malware classification model presented in the first
chapter. The “C” discussed here is a scalar floating point value.
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Once the cross-fold validation scores were recorded, the classifiers were trained one
final time on 90% of randomly selected samples from the final data set and tested on the
remaining 10%. Again, the randomly selected samples were stratified, meaning that each
class was represented equally in the training and testing data sets. Training the classifier one
final time also saved the classifier as a file that can be used in the web application developed
during this research and described later. The final training also provided an ROC curve with
AUC data.

Comparison Of Malgazer To Prior Literature
The classifiers created in the training phase were measured using AUC (Area under
the curve of ROC) and confusion matrices. Confusion matrices allowed for the computation
of many other statistics, such as accuracy. Overall accuracy was used for the major
comparison to prior literature, but AUC was also be examined where appropriate. Empirical
results were obtained during the classifier training phase and are presented in detail in chapter
6. Although this author did not have access to every data set for the methods described in the
literature review chapter for a fair comparison, a theoretical comparison to their reported
accuracies is made in chapter 7 nonetheless. Analysis regarding accuracy per class for the
classifiers will also be explored in chapter 7.
If Malgazer performed better than random guessing, which has a 1/6 probability of
being right in the six classification groups chosen here, then it answered the design sciencebased research question in the first chapter. If Malgazer did not perform better than random
guessing, then the null hypothesis was true. If an instance of a Malgazer classifier performed
better than random guessing, the existence of such classifier would not only answer the
research question, but it would demonstrate that the null hypothesis is false. While it is
difficult to measure the true efficacy of all design science artifacts, such as the generalized
model in Figure 2 and Definition 1, instantiations in the form of a classifier can be measured
empirically. Later chapters discuss the measured comparisons to prior methods.
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The Web Application
Once the Malgazer and GIST classifiers were instantiated, they still required someone
with programming knowledge to use them. Therefore, a web application that provides access
for those without programming knowledge was developed. For those with programming
knowledge, there was an API exposed in the Malgazer web application that allows for
programmatic access to the classifier. This makes use of the classifier much easier than as
raw data structures in Python. The web application was the last design science artifact created
by this research, and it can be found in the Malgazer source code repository.

Accomplishing the Research Objectives and Contributions
Several research objectives were presented in the first chapter, and they will be
revisited here to discuss how this research methodology accomplished those goals. First, a
generalized machine learning based malware classifier model was presented. This model was
used to describe the prior literature in the previous chapter. As a result, the model was
validated by demonstrating its usefulness categorizing prior literature, plus it was be used
when developing the Malgazer classifier in chapter 6.
Next, an optimized running window entropy algorithm was discussed. The
optimization process is the content of the next chapter. The next chapter will show that the
running window entropy was optimized so that the calculations were faster. Next, a method
to collect and normalize functional classification information from VirusTotal was discussed.
This chapter presented such a method and accomplished this objective.
After that, a method to scale the training of machine learning based classifier using
cloud resources was discussed. As part of chapter 6, this method will be presented. Then, the
first chapter discussed an optimized machine learning based malware classifier. Developing
this classifier is the basis of chapter 6, and with it the data sets, logs, and figures have been
included online for independent verification and replication. Lastly, the introduction
discussed a user web application to automate the machine learning based malware classifier.
This application will be discussed in chapter 8. Therefore, every objective defined in the
introduction has been covered with this research methodology chapter or will be covered in
future chapters.
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Summary
This chapter discussed the research methodology used to create the design science
research artifacts introduced in the first chapter. This chapter provided the design decisions
and the logic behind them, such as optimization of running window entropy or the method to
normalize and standardize VirusTotal data to create the six Malgazer functional classification
groups. After a qualitative exploration of malware sample data, a final data set was sourced
from VirusTotal using Yara signatures presented in this chapter.
Then, the types of features from running window entropy and GIST were discussed.
These features were calculated using the Malgazer Python library, and each module from this
library was also discussed in this chapter. Next, the choice of machine learning algorithms
was made for this research project, and the background for these algorithms was initially
discussed in the introduction chapter. Once the algorithms were chosen, grid searching was
used to find the optimal hyper-parameters for each algorithm for the final data set.
The final Malgazer and GIST classifiers were trained on the final data set, and the
results of the training were compared to prior literature. The results of the training and the
comparison are presented in chapters 6 and 7. Finally, a web application was developed to
provide easy and programmatic access to the trained classifiers. This was the last design
science artifact created by this research.
This chapter concluded by revisiting the research objectives and discussing how each
one was satisfied by this research methodology. The next chapter will discuss the results of
the qualitative data exploration process.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMIZING RUNNING WINDOW ENTROPY
Introduction and Purpose
This dissertation examines running window entropy as a feature set to a machine
learning based classifier. Machine learning classifiers are trained and tested on large training
data sets. To reduce costs associated with this computationally intensive operation, the
running window entropy algorithm was optimized for this research and is presented in this
chapter. The material in this chapter was first published at a peer reviewed conference by
Jones and Wang, available at (Jones & Wang, 2018). Slight modifications were made from
the original paper to read more formally and fit into this dissertation, but the design science
artifact remains the same.

Evaluation Criteria
The evaluation criteria for successful optimization will be a comparison of running
time for the original algorithm versus the optimized algorithm theoretically and empirically.
For empirical measurements, the algorithms presented in this chapter were implemented in
Python, which is a platform independent language. This test could be performed with other
languages and with similar constructs should produce similar results, with a factor of speed
associated with that particular programming language. This chapter will present a Python
implementation, but the focus of this chapter is on the algorithm itself. The algorithm, if
implemented with similar constructs discussed in this chapter and the associated Python code,
will be shown to be optimized theoretically regardless of the implementation language.
The algorithms will be measured solely on their computing time, removing any factors
associated with multi-processer or multi-threaded systems. This measurement is available in
Python through the “time.process_time” function. The running time will be captured for the
execution of each algorithm ten times in a row and then the average will be computed. A
noticeable decrease in the average running time of one algorithm over another will be
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considered proof of time optimization for the second algorithm. To keep the comparisons
simple, the algorithms will be implemented in a single threaded, single processor fashion.
The execution times for both algorithms in this chapter were measured on an Apple Macbook
Pro with 16 GB 1.6 GHz DDR3 RAM, a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, running on MacOS
Sierra v10.12. The correctness of the algorithms was verified using code this author
developed, openly available at (Jones, 2017a).

The Original Algorithm
Shannon defined (Shannon, 1948) entropy for an information source as:
) = −+ ∑/.01 -. &'(-.

(2)

The malware sample’s size is fixed with length k and will be defined as:
3 = {51 , 57 , … 59:1 , 59 }

(3)

A data window of length j that begins at offset l within A will contain a portion of data
for A, such that:
<= = {5= , 5=>1 , … 5=>?:1 }

(4)

The running window entropy can be visualized in Figure 10 with a four-byte running
window size, for demonstration purposes only. The figure demonstrates the nested “for”
loops in the calculation and the output of one window entropy value

.

Entropy values will be calculated for each <= where 1 ≤ & ≤ ! − " + 1. This is the
window that will be defined as the running window entropy. The result of the running
window entropy will output the following series:
A = {)1 , )7 , … )=:1 , )= }

Figure 10. Running window entropy revisited

(5)
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This equation can be restated in terms of j, the size of the running window, instead of l
as follows:
A = {)1 , )7 , … )9:? , )9:?>1 }

(6)

Note that Shannon’s entropy equation assumes there is a continuous probability
function for the information. Since data is discrete and not continuous, a frequency sample
will be used to estimate the probabilities (Lall, Sekar, Ogihara, Xu, & Zhang, 2006).
) = − ∑/.01

BC
?

B

&'(7 ( ? C )

(7)

Here, F. is the total count of the symbol G within the running entropy window. " is the
size of the running entropy window. There are 2 possible values for the symbol. When the
symbol is defined to be a byte, as it is in this chapter, there are 256 total symbols. Therefore,
the equation above can be simplified to:
) = − ∑7HI
.01

BC
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B

&'(7 ( ? C )

(8)

When F. is zero, note that the i-th component is zero so that the log of zero, which is
undefined, can be ignored completely.
The result from equation 8 will be between 0 and 8. A value of 0 means the data is not
random, while a value of 8 means that the data is maximally random. Assuming the entropy
window is at least 256 bytes, dividing the result of the equation by 8 will normalize the
entropy values between 0 and 1. This is an example of K from Shannon’s equation equaling
for the purposes of normalization. For entropy windows less than 256 bytes, this scale
constant could be the ceiling of log base 2 of the window size to normalize it between 0 and 1,
but windows less than 256 bytes will not be considered in this dissertation.
The running window entropy calculation described in equation 8 can be implemented
with the following Python function, also available at (Jones, 2017a, 2017b):
01. # Original Window Entropy Function
02. def original_window_entropy():
03.
# Start the time counter
04.
starttime = time.process_time()
05.
06.
# Entropy list
07.
H = [0 for i in range(1, k-j+2)]
08.
for x in range(1, k - j + 2):
09.
m = [0 for i in range(0, 256)]
10.
for y in range(1, j + 1):
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11.
m[malware[x + y - 2]] += 1
12.
entropy = float(0)
13.
for y in range(0, 256):
14.
if m[y] != 0:
15.
entropy += -(float(m[y] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[y] / j)))
16.
H[x - 1] = entropy / K
17.
# End the time counter
18.
endtime = time.process_time()
19.
return endtime-starttime, H
In the algorithm above, lines 8, 10 and 13 form a nested “for” loop over the data: an
outer “for” loop for the malware file size and inner “for” loops for the running window
entropy size. Throughout this chapter, the inner “for” loops can be identified as “the inner for
loop” because two inner “for” loops can be represented by one inner “for” loop, in basic time
complexity analysis, times a constant multiplier. The nested “for” loops are a timeconsuming task that basic theoretical algorithm analysis would determine to be tilde a factor
of

in which k is the size of the malware (in bytes) and j is the size of the entropy window

(in bytes). A tilde notation of an algorithm is the asymptotic growth approximation of the
algorithm’s running time as a factor of input. In other words, the tilde notation of an
algorithm approximates the growth of running time for the algorithm as a function of the size
of the input. In this case, the time growth is a function of the window size and the malware
size.
Using the evaluation criteria discussed previously, ten executions of the original
algorithm were measured and averaged for malware sizes 256 bytes through 131,072 bytes
(128KB). The malware in this case was simulated by an array of random byte values. The
choice of a simulated malware file does not impact this algorithm’s performance and the same
arrays were used for testing both algorithms. The simulated malware files were also
measured for entropy window sizes 256, 512, 1,024, and 2,046 bytes. Note that it is not
possible to calculate the running window entropy on a malware file with a size less than the
window. The measured data for the original algorithm is available in Table 2.
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Table 2. The original RWE algorithm execution time in seconds
Malware Size
(bytes)
256
512
1,024
2,048
4,096
8,192
16,384
32,768
65,536
131,072

256 Byte
Entropy
Window
1.64E-04
4.09E-02
1.26E-01
2.92E-01
6.35E-01
1.39E+00
2.75E+00
5.63E+00
1.19E+01
2.37E+01

512 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
2.51E-04
1.22E-01
3.76E-01
8.91E-01
1.96E+00
4.10E+00
8.38E+00
1.69E+01
3.39E+01

1,024 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
3.56E-04
3.76E-01
1.12E+00
2.68E+00
6.32E+00
1.23E+01
2.48E+01
5.24E+01

2,048 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
N/A
5.69E-04
1.20E+00
3.64E+00
8.71E+00
1.84E+01
3.86E+01
7.86E+01

Figure 11. The original RWE algorithm performance in seconds
The data from Table 2 was plotted two-dimensionally over the malware size and
running window size in Figure 11. Time is clearly dependent on the size of the malware
sample and running window, increasing for both dimensions. This supports the theoretical
tilde analysis of the algorithm showing that the asymptotic growth of the algorithm is a factor
of

, the window length times the malware size.
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Figure 12. Running window entropy optimization

The Optimized Algorithm
The running window entropy algorithm can be optimized by flattening (in other
words, removing) the inner “for” loop, represented by lines 10-15 in the algorithm presented
above. The optimization takes advantage of prior calculations within the running window
entropy, using the previously computed values from the entropy sum at the previous offset,
and only correcting the running sum for differences caused by the new byte entering the
window from the right and the old byte leaving the window out of the left when the window
moves to the next offset. This process can be visualized graphically in Figure 12 with a fourbyte running window size for demonstration purposes only. The old value leaving the
window on the left is represented by the gold arrow. The new value entering the window on
the right is represented by the red arrow. The computed sum for the current entropy at offset
31 is represented in green. This is the sum that will be reused in the optimization for offset
32. In other words, the optimization corrects the already computed sum in green with the
change in value for the removed gold and added red arrows and keeps the other prior
computations already completed in the green value.
With only four operations, the entire inner “for” loop can be removed. The four
operations replacing the inner loop are: 1) remove the entropy of the symbol leaving the
window on the left (gold arrow), 2) decrement the symbol count and add back the entropy
(green arrow) of the newly decremented count of the symbol leaving on the left (gold arrow),
3) remove the entropy (green arrow) for the symbol entering on the right (red arrow), 4)
update the symbol count and add back the entropy (green arrow) of the newly increased count
of the symbol entering on the right (red arrow). To help understanding the optimized
algorithm, the following pseudocode explains the optimization:
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1. Fill a first in, first out queue with a data window <= at & = 1 where the left side of the
queue is the first inserted data value and the right side is the last inserted data value.
2. Count the number of each symbol in <= and save the results into an array of symbol
counters named J.
3. Calculate the frequency of each symbol in J by dividing each count value for the
symbol by the entropy window length ". Normalize the data, if desired, by
multiplying the results by +.
4. Calculate each

BC
?

from J to calculate the entropy as described by the entropy equation

number 8. Save this single entropy result in a variable named K.
5. Output K into A as )1 .
6. Save this K as the running sum for the next steps.
7. While & ≤ ! − " + 1

do:

8. Pop the left most value off <= .
9. Add +

BC
?

B

&'(7 ( ? C ) to K, where F. is the value popped off the queue <= in the previous

step.
10. Decrement the value counter for this popped data value from J.
11. Subtract +

BC
?

B

&'(7 ( ? C ) from K, where F. is the decremented value count representing

the value popped off the queue <= in the previous steps and now in S.
12. Push the next value from 3 into the right most value of <= .
13. Add +

BC
?

B

&'(7 ( ? C ) to K, where F. is the value pushed into the queue <= in the

previous step.
14. Increment the value counter for this pushed data value from J.
15. Subtract +

BC
?

B

&'(7 ( ? C ) from K, where F. is the incremented value pushed into the

queue <= in the previous step and now in J.
16. Output K into A as )= .
17. Save this K as the running sum for additional steps.
18. Let & = & + 1.
19. Go to step 7 if & ≤ ! − " + 1, otherwise continue.
20. Output the resulting running entropy values as A.
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The Python function of the optimized running window entropy is as follows, and is
available at (Jones, 2017a, 2017b):
01. # Optimized Window Entropy Function
02. def optimized_window_entropy():
03.
# Start the time counter
04.
starttime = time.process_time()
05.
# Entropy list
06.
H = [0 for i in range(1, k - j + 2)]
07.
# Create the count list
08.
m = [0 for i in range(0, 256)]
09.
# Initial population of count list
10.
for x in range(1, j + 1):
11.
m[malware[x - 1]] += 1
12.
# Compute initial entropy
13.
entropy = float(0)
14.
for y in range(0, 256):
15.
if m[y] != 0:
16.
entropy += -(float(m[y] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[y] / j)))
17.
H[0] = entropy / K
18.
for x in range(2, k - j + 2):
19.
lastval = malware[x - 2]
20.
nextval = malware[x + j - 2]
21.
entropy += float(m[lastval] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[lastval] / j))
22.
m[lastval] -= 1
23.
if m[lastval] != 0:
24.
entropy += -(float(m[lastval] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[lastval] / j)))
25.
if m[nextval] != 0:
26.
entropy += float(m[nextval] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[nextval] / j))
27.
m[nextval] += 1
28.
entropy += -(float(m[nextval] / j) *
math.log2(float(m[nextval] / j)))
29.
H[x - 1] = entropy / K
30.
# End the time counter
31.
endtime = time.process_time()
32.
return endtime - starttime, H
A theoretical algorithm analysis of the source code above leads to a theoretical tilde
asymptotic growth of a factor of

which, in theory, is less than ! ∗ " when " is greater than

4. In this research " is greater than or equal to 256, so the algorithm is optimized in theory.
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Using the evaluation criteria described previously, the average execution times for
corresponding experiments as the original algorithm were collected for the optimized
algorithm and provided in Table 3, for the empirical measurement.
The data from Table 3 was plotted in a two-dimensional graph in Figure 13. Time is
clearly dependent on the size of the malware and less dependent on the size of the running
window, as seen in the original algorithm. This supports the theoretical tilde analysis of the
Table 3. The optimized RWE algorithm execution time in seconds
Malware Size
(bytes)
256
512
1,024
2,048
4,096
8,192
16,384
32,768
65,536
131,072

256 Byte
Entropy
Window
1.54E-04
8.14E-04
2.19E-03
5.23E-03
1.12E-02
2.30E-02
4.35E-02
9.55E-02
1.99E-01
3.93E-01

512 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
2.45E-04
1.68E-03
4.74E-03
1.10E-02
2.24E-02
5.09E-02
1.00E-01
2.00E-01
3.95E-01

1,024 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
3.20E-04
3.50E-03
9.81E-03
2.27E-02
5.49E-02
1.06E-01
2.16E-01
4.83E-01

2,048 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
N/A
4.97E-04
6.91E-03
2.02E-02
4.91E-02
1.04E-01
2.13E-01
4.24E-01

Figure 13. The optimized RWE algorithm performance in seconds
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algorithm showing that asymptotic growth of the algorithm is a factor of ! ∗ 4, the malware
size times four.

Evaluation Of The Optimized Algorithm
It is clear from the tables and graphs that the optimized algorithm outperforms the
original algorithm theoretically and empirically. Table 4 lists the percentage of time for the
optimized algorithm compared to the original algorithm. In most cases, the optimized
algorithm requires only 2% or less of the time of the original algorithm. In cases where the
window size is equal to the malware size, there is little performance gain. In this situation,
the window is unnecessary because the entropy of the entire file is calculated. An inner “for”
loop should not be needed in those circumstances. Removing 98% or more of the calculation
time with the optimized algorithm proves that this research was successful as defined in the
evaluation criteria described previously.
For one average example, the original algorithm requires 23.7 seconds to calculate a
256-byte running window entropy over a 128k byte file, which are modest numbers for real
world scenarios. The optimized algorithm requires 0.393 seconds for the same calculation.
As discussed earlier, an organization facing 200,000 new malware variants each day,
assuming each malware is at least 128k bytes long with a 256-byte running entropy window,
the optimized algorithm could save nearly 54 days of computation time alone. At 0.393
seconds per sample, the optimized algorithm could compute over 200,000 samples within the
same day. Bigger gains could be realized for parallel and cloud computing.
The correctness of the optimized algorithm was verified against the original algorithm
using source code this author developed and available at (Jones, 2017a). Other than slight
rounding errors due to fixed numerical sizes in Python, the optimized algorithm produced the
same results as the original algorithm.
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Table 4. The optimized v. original percentage of execution time for RWE
Malware Size
(bytes)
256
512
1,024
2,048
4,096
8,192
16,384
32,768
65,536
131,072

256 Byte
Entropy
Window
93.55%
1.99%
1.74%
1.79%
1.76%
1.65%
1.58%
1.69%
1.67%
1.66%

512 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
97.61%
1.38%
1.26%
1.24%
1.14%
1.24%
1.20%
1.18%
1.16%

1,024 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
89.77%
0.93%
0.87%
0.85%
0.87%
0.86%
0.87%
0.92%

2,048 Byte
Entropy
Window
N/A
N/A
N/A
87.23%
0.58%
0.56%
0.56%
0.57%
0.55%
0.54%

Summary
This chapter presented an independently verifiable, non-trivial optimization technique
to reduce the computation of a running window entropy to less than 2% of the original
algorithm. This is a method design science artifact. This time savings represents days and
months of computation time in conservative scenarios. This algorithm is also used in prior
research and applying this optimization will increase performance of prior research. The
optimized algorithm presents an incredible time and cost savings to identify relevant portions
of malware for the analyst’s or security product’s attention, while the correctness of the
optimized algorithm has been verified against the original algorithm. The source code used in
this chapter is publicly available (Jones, 2017b, 2017a) for further research and
implementation.
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CHAPTER 5
QUALITATIVE DATA EXPLORATION
Introduction
When deciding on a focused topic for this dissertation, a qualitative data exploration
phase was completed with approximately 25,190 publicly available malware samples collected
from VirusTotal (“VirusTotal,” n.d.-a). The exploratory data set was acquired using a series of
Yara (VirusTotal, n.d.-b) signatures that were presented in chapter 3. Once the samples were
collected, the reported classifications by each vendor were analyzed in order to map several
different classifications into the six main functional groups that are the subject of this study. The
six functional classifications developed from the exploratory data set will be used to capture the
final malware data set used throughout the remainder of this dissertation. Therefore, the data
exploration phase, while short, helped improve the overall quality of the final malware classifiers
and guided many of the decisions in the research methodology. Without this phase, the research
would not have been as successful.

Collecting The Exploratory Data Set
The exploratory data set was sourced quickly in order to begin development on the
Malgazer Python libraries at the start of this research. The purpose of the exploratory data set
was to use it as example data to create a reusable set of Python libraries. As such, the samples
were collected based solely on the file type equaling a Microsoft Windows PE file and at least
twenty-five detections (as reported by VirusTotal) using the Yara signature presented in the
previous chapter. The Yara signature was allowed to run for some time, and the results were
downloaded using the Malgazer Python libraries. The corresponding file content for each
malware sample in the VirusTotal feed was downloaded as well.
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Computing The Running Window Entropy
After the samples were downloaded, the running window entropy values were calculated
for each file. The RWE window size was 256 bytes, while many sampled data points were used
ranging from 1,024 to 8,192 bytes. The data was saved to CSV and Pickle formats so they could
be used in the future.

Exploring The Classifications
The data returned from VirusTotal can be visualized as a large spreadsheet where the
rows represent one malware sample and the columns represent attributes about the samples. The
columns returned from VirusTotal in early 2018 were:
•

ALYac

•

CrowdStrike

•

MAX

•

AVG

•

Cybereason

•

Malwarebyts

•

AVware

•

Cylance

•

McAfee

•

Ad-Aware

•

Cyren

•

McAfee-GW-Edition

•

AegisLab

•

DrWeb

•

MicroWorld-eScan

•

AhnLab-V3

•

ESET-NOD32

•

Microsoft

•

Alibaba

•

Emsisoft

•

NANO-Antivirus

•

Antiy-AVL

•

Endgame

•

Paloalto

•

Arcabit

•

F-Prot

•

Panda

•

Avast

•

F-Secure

•

Qihoo-360

•

Avast-Mobile

•

Fortinet

•

Rising

•

Avira

•

GData

•

SUPERAntiSpyware

•

Baidu

•

Ikarus

•

SentinelOne

•

BitDefender

•

Invincea

•

Sophos

•

Bkav

•

Jiangmin

•

Symantec

•

CAT-QuickHeal

•

K7AntiVirus

•

Tencent

•

CMC

•

K7GW

•

TheHacker

•

ClamAV

•

Kaspersky

•

TotalDefense

•

Comodo

•

Kingsoft

•

TrendMicro
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•

TrendMicro-HouseCall

•

Zoner

•

positives

•

VBA32

•

date

•

ruleset_name

•

'VIPRE'

•

eGambit

•

scans

•

'ViRobot'

•

first_seen

•

sha1

•

Webroot

•

id

•

sha256

•

WhiteArmor

•

last_seen

•

size

•

Yandex

•

match

•

subject

•

Zillya

•

md5

•

total

•

ZoneAlarm

•

nProtect

•

type

The “positives” column provided the number of VirusTotal detections. This column will
contain a number equal to or greater than twenty-five because the results were filtered while
downloaded using the Malgazer source code. The “sha256” column contained the hash for the
malware sample. The SHA256 hash is a computationally secure, mathematically computed
value from the file’s contents. This is the unique identifier used to track the samples in this
research. Information about any of the samples throughout this research can be searched by
anyone on VirusTotal if they have the SHA256 hash.
The data in this spreadsheet was analyzed by visually scanning classifications in each
column to find the columns with the most detections that appeared to be consistent. The
columns “Microsoft”, “Symantec”, “Kaspersky”, “Sophos”, “TrendMicro”, and “ClamAV”
contained data that appeared to be useful for functional classifications, in that order. An example
of the data in the spreadsheet is available in Table 5 for eleven malware samples.
It is quickly apparent that not all vendors were able to detect the same samples, therefore
multiple vendors were chosen. It is also quickly apparent that detections between vendors were
not consistent. For example, the third sample in Table 5 the “Microsoft” column reads
“Virus:Win32/Shodi.I” while “Sophos” calls the sample “Mal/Generic-S”. In this case, it would
make sense to classify this sample as “Virus” from the Microsoft classification. This is how the
final classifications were determined for this research.

Table 5. Example VirusTotal Detections
SHA256
4009b81841c893eceaf2d92e1816a968fad6
6db69f70429724e6d6f7bb9a4ca7

Microsoft

79b155f341a6c3311b4ded9fc2c239f0e124
b705b627cfe62a9b6b6620d80c5b
eea41fa0f53c20ab2302fdfef59dd4b3dba80f
14ec419f9d9c0fb18eac484c1a

Symantec
Trojan.Ge
n.2

Kaspersky

Trojan.Ge
n.2
Virus:Win32/Shodi.
I

60dcb577124f01cbfcadbe7a86b61d06ad37
83083a04f4847a2a255f210ffb28

HEUR:Trojan.Win3
2.StartPage

Cloud
Wrappe
r (PUA)
W32/Sh
odi-I
Troj/Si
mbot-J

TROJ_KRYPTK.SMS

Mal/Ge
neric-S

HT_DYNAMER_GA25
051D.UVPM

Trojan.Ge
n.NPE.2

f308ad39249c32127653c45e20eb318aca5d
b848494812d07b688573c128f90a

Trojan:Win32/Dorv.
A

Trojan
Horse

Trojan.Win32.Inject.
azgw

Trojan.Ge
n.2

Worm:Win32/Ludb
aruma.A

TROJ_OBFUSCATOR_
GC140262.UVPM

SMG.Heu
r!gen

Virus:Win32/Shodi.
I

b897a0fb1865e016bb88806300ddd9ee739f
7919442f40d1b5d22cc974923996

HT_DYNAMER_GA25
051D.UVPM

W32/Sc
ribble-B

HEUR:Trojan.Win3
2.Generic
Virus.Win32.Virut.c
e

TrojanDropper:Win
32/Dinwod.B!bit

Mal/Ge
neric-S
Virus.Win32.Virut.c
e

Trojan:Win32/Qhost

5c9888db9bf4aebe7102dc086505aed8afc3
3ccc7e4bb75257e8052f77f77061
6d38be3380671eaa11f1dec1758012b6a2e7
b8f48ced5bd4edc37ea48c640da4

TrendMicro
HT_DYNAMER_GA25
051D.UVPM

Trojan.Ge
n.NPE.2

fbee9ad67e71ac0e109503a2acd0dd7be1e5f
91c473bcb349fbbd5e0050a1d3f
472257d7fc92f035a50b37ec2536b24bf83e
c66ef356df4c03afd8f297138bcf

2c1b5dabfc0d3646d27814e8e0092e856deb
bb704a53de402a9b49ed3a81130a

Sophos

Suspicious
.IRCBot
Trojan.Ge
n.2
Trojan.Ge
n.2

HEUR:Trojan.Win3
2.Generic
not-avirus:RiskTool.Win
32.FlyStudio.bjxf
TrojanRansom.Win32.Bloc
ker.kpuo

HT_AGENT_HC05008
3.UVPM
TROJ_OBFUSCATOR_
GC140262.UVPM

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.
Agent1149280
Win.Trojan.
Agent1149280
Win.Trojan.
Shohdi6136104-0
Win.Trojan.
Fam6454574-1
Win.Trojan.
Qhost-160
Win.Trojan.
Shohdi6136104-0
Win.Trojan.
Injector6297684-0
Win.Trojan.
Agent1149280

HT_AGENT_GL26002
B.UVPM
Generic
PUA JE
(PUA)
W32/M
ato-N

TSPY_LUDBARUMA_
BK083EDB.TOMC

Win.Worm.
Untukmu5949608-0
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In the Malgazer source code, the classification logic can be found in the “Utils” class
inside the “estimate_vt_classifications_from_DataFrame” function. There are other helper
functions that can load the data from a CSV or HDF file into a DataFrame in the same class as
well. This function calls another function named “parse_vt_classifications”, which contains the
logic for how each vendor’s classification would be parsed for functional characteristics. Each
vendor’s classification was analyzed during this exploratory phase and a parser for each was
written. Some of the vendors’ classifications could be parsed with ease, generically, while many
other vendors’ classifications required specific logic for their classification. The parsers for all
of the vendors can be found in this Python class, which may be useful to others for future
research.
Recall from the research methodology’s explanation of the classification determination
algorithm that the vendors’ classifications will be searched for certain strings, and the final
classification will be determined from a match. The translation table in Table 1 was instantiated
in Python code and can be found in the same class. The following code is the translation table as
a Python dictionary:

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

translate_classifications = {
'Trj': 'Trojan',
'PUP': 'PUA',
'Adw': 'Adware',
'Drp': 'Dropper',
'Wrm': 'Worm',
'Bkdr': 'Backdoor',
'Cryp': 'Ransom',
'PUA': 'PUA',
'RiskTool': 'PUA',
'Generic': 'Generic',
'VirTool': 'Virus',
'VirLock': 'Ransom',
'HackTool': 'PUA',
'RemoteAdmin': 'PUA',
'Trojan': 'Trojan',
'Mal': 'Generic',
'Malware': 'Generic',
'Worm': 'Worm',
'Troj': 'Trojan',
'FakeAV': 'FakeAV',
'DwnLdr': 'Downloader',
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23.
24.

'TrojanDownloader': 'Downloader',
}
The output of the translation will contain more than the six functional groups discussed in

this research, since it only translates terms. For this research, just the six functional groups were
selected going forward, so only rows containing the six functional names were included. The
algorithms written in the Malgazer source code were used to automatically determine this final
functional classification of each sample so further analysis could be conducted.

Exploring The New Classifications
Once the new functional classifications were determined, the samples were counted. The
“Trojan” classification contained 8,963 samples. The “Worm” classification contained 5,475
samples. The “Virus” classification contained 5,349 samples. The “PUA” classification
contained 1,717 samples. The “Backdoor” classification contained 1,708 samples. Lastly, the
“Ransom” classification contained just 163 samples. The total number of samples explored in
this phase was 23,375.
Note that the classifications are unbalanced. The “Trojan” category is overrepresented
with 8,963 samples while the “Ransom” category is underrepresented with only 163 samples. If
this data set were to be used for actual classifier training, the classifier would “learn” that most
samples were similar to the “Trojan” category while there were not many “Ransom” samples to
provide a significant population within the classifier. This problem was solved by selecting a
final training data set that is balanced across classifications. The method to remedy this situation
will be discussed in a later section.

Experimenting With Classifiers
Once the classifications and running window entropy data were computed for the
exploratory data set, several ad-hoc artificial and convolutional neural networks were trained
from the data through experimentation. While the actual accuracies were not important as this
was not the final data set, it was relevant that running window entropy features produced 80% or
better classification accuracy. This accuracy came from classifiers that were not finely tuned, so
it was possible accuracies could have been higher. At was at this point the discovery that
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running window entropy features for malware classification purposes would be successful. This
accuracy was much greater than the random guessing technique with probability of 1/6, so the
null hypothesis was not true.

Collecting The Final Malware Data Set
Now that all the parameters of the research were set, it was possible to source the final
malware data set. This data set was sourced from VirusTotal as well, using the same basic
techniques to source the exploratory data set. Instead of one Yara signature to pull malware,
several Yara signatures were created that targeted the six functional groups, mainly through the
“Microsoft” classifications, but in some cases all classifications. The Yara signatures used to
pull the final malware data set were presented in the research methodology chapter and will not
be reproduced here.

Summary
This chapter briefly presented the qualitative data exploration phrase from this research.
The chapter began with an explanation of how the exploratory data set was collected from
VirusTotal. Next, this chapter discussed the running window entropy feature calculations of the
same data set. Then, this chapter discussed the qualitative analysis of the classifications
retrieved from VirusTotal, and how the six functional classifications were selected. Once the
final classification scheme was decided, statistical information from the exploratory data set was
computed. This led to the realization that a balanced final training data set was required.
However, some artificial and convolutional neural networks were still trained on the unbalanced
exploratory data set and accuracies were above 80%. This provided evidence that running
window entropy could be used to functionally classify malware over random guessing. Lastly,
the final malware data set was collected. The results of the classifiers trained on the final data
set will be presented in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
MALGAZER: AN RWE-BASED MALWARE CLASSIFIER
Introduction
This chapter will present the results of developing the Malgazer classifier along with
the results of the prior GIST classifier methodology on the same data set. Together, this
required over 200 experiments that culminated in months of computation time. Each
experiment was a grid search, a cross fold validation, or final training for each of the selected
classifier algorithms, hyper-parameters, and input features.
This chapter will begin with a presentation of the grid searching results and the
computed hyper-parameters. Next, this chapter will present the results of the ten-fold cross
validation accuracy mean and variance using the optimal hyper-parameters. The reason for
cross validation testing is to understand how the classifier would perform across the whole
data set on average rather than one random selection. Then, this chapter will present the final
training results. The Malgazer and GIST classifiers will be theoretically compared to other
prior literature in the next chapter.

Computing The Machine Learning Features
After the final data set was collected, the running window entropy features were
calculated. Various window sizes and data points were calculated. The window sizes were
256; 512; 1,024; and 2,048 bytes while the data points were 512; 1,024; 2,048; and 4,096
bytes. Additionally, the 320 GIST features were calculated for each sample and stored. The
calculations were computed using the “extract_rwe_features.py” and “extra_gist_features.py”
scripts in the Malgazer source code repository. These scripts crawled directories to locate
files, they calculated the RWE or GIST features, and then they stored the data. The calculated
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feature data is publicly available via instructions located in the Malgazer source code
repository (Jones, 2017b). Note that it is impossible to recreate the malware samples from the
RWE or GIST data because information is lost during the calculations. Therefore,
downloading the data will not harm a computer system or proliferate more malware samples.

Scaling The Computations
Once the running window entropy and GIST data were computed from the final
malware data set, the training began. Since this research included a larger data set and
comprehensively searched for the best model parameters to optimize classification accuracy,
much more computing power than this author owned was needed. The following training
phases described in the next sections were computed on an assortment of Microsoft Azure and
Amazon AWS cloud services. Since this research was conducted by one individual, the 200+
experiments had to be organized and computed as fast as possible, and the application
Terraform (“Terraform.io,” n.d.) facilitated the creation and destruction of cloud resources on
demand.
Terraform is an application that implements infrastructure as code. This means that
the cloud computing infrastructure can be declared in Terraform’s language and with one
command line the services are created or destroyed. This also means that infrastructure can
be versioned, just like source code, because the infrastructure is instantiated through source
code. The Terraform source code used for Malgazer training research is publicly available at
(Jones, 2018). This source code is one of the design science artifacts discussed in the
introduction chapter. Although the basics of Terraform is not presented here, one fluent with
Terraform could create the same training instances on their Azure or AWS account with the
repository above just as this author did. More information is available in the appendix as a
source code repository tour.

Searching For The Best Model Parameters
The algorithm for calculating the best model parameters is known as “grid searching”
(“Scikit Learn GridSearchCV,” n.d.). Several grid searches were performed to find the
optimal hyper-parameters of the machine learning algorithms selected for Malgazer. Each
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sub-section below will list the tested classifier parameters along with the calculated best
parameters for each of the machine learning models using the final training data set. Each of
the machine learning models was evaluated using the Malgazer RWE and the GIST features,
for empirical comparisons. The optimal hyper-parameters were calculated using the
“train_classifier.py” script available in the Malgazer source code repository (Jones, 2017b).
The complete logs for each of the training sessions are also available in the same repository
under the “training” directory.
k-Nearest Neighbors
The KNN algorithm was used by Method #14 in (L Nataraj et al., 2011), also referred
to as the GIST method in this dissertation. In this method, the authors used KNN with
Euclidean distance as their machine learning model. Scikit Learn makes this algorithm
available in Python (“Scikit Learn KNeighborsClassifier,” n.d.). Table 6 and Table 7 present
the grid searching results of the KNN machine learning model on the RWE and GIST data
sets. For both data sets, using weights as “uniform” with the single closest neighbor provided
the best results.

131

Table 6. Grid search results for KNN and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“n_neighbors”:
“weights”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
GIST
2
100%
1, 5, 10, 50
“uniform”, “distance”
“n_neighbors” = 1, “weights” =
“uniform”
92.84%

Table 7. Grid search results for KNN and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“n_neighbors”:
“weights”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
1, 5, 10, 50
“uniform”, “distance”
“n_neighbors” = 1, “weights” =
“uniform”
88.77%

Decision Trees
Decision trees are one of the simplest and fastest machine learning model algorithms
to implement (“Scikit Learn DecisionTreeClassifier,” n.d.). A grid search using decision trees
was computed for the RWE and GIST features. The results of the grid search are available in
Table 8 and Table 9. Only the “criterion” and “splitter” values can be searched for decision
trees. Both of the models achieved the best scores with the “entropy” criteria and a random
splitter.
Random Forests
Random forests are a collection of decision trees, and a forest’s hyper-parameters
include the hyper-parameters from the decision tree model, plus it has the number of
estimators (the number of decision trees) and an “oob_score” (“Scikit Learn
RandomForestClassifier,” n.d.). The model was grid searched for the RWE and GIST
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training data and the results are presented in Table 10 and Table 11. Both of the data sets
performed the best when the criterion was “entropy”, the number of estimators was five, and
the “oob_score” is true.
Nearest Centroid
The nearest centroid algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
NearestCentroid,” n.d.). Only one hyper-parameter is available for tuning, the shrink
threshold. The nearest centroid algorithm was grid searched for the GIST and Malgazer RWE
data, and the best parameters are presented in Table 12 and Table 13.
Support Vector Machines
The support vector machine algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit
Learn SVC,” n.d.). Several hyper-parameters were grid searched. The best parameters are
presented in Table 14 and Table 15. Note that the SVM algorithm is computationally
intensive and there are a number of hyper-parameters that can be tuned, which multiplies the
number of classifiers that must be tested during the grid search. Therefore, only 20% of the
final training data set was used to compute the best parameters for each data set so that the
computations were manageable.
AdaBoost And Decision Trees
Adaboost is a machine learning algorithm that improves a base estimator’s accuracy.
The Adaboost algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
AdaBoostClassifier,” n.d.). Adaboost was grid searched for a decision tree base estimator
using the same parameters as the decision tree subsection. The results of the grid search for
this machine learning model combination are available in Table 16 and Table 17.
AdaBoost And Random Forests
Adaboost is a machine learning algorithm that improves a base estimator’s accuracy.
The Adaboost algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
AdaBoostClassifier,” n.d.). Adaboost was grid searched for a random forest base estimator
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using the same parameters as the random forest subsection. The results of the grid search for
this machine learning model combination are available in Table 16 and Table 17. Note that
only 10% of the final training data set was used during the grid search because of the
computationally intensive nature. 10% of the final training data set made the computations
manageable, for these algorithms.
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Table 8. Grid search results for decision tree and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“criterion”:
“splitter”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Decision Tree (DT)
GIST
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“criterion” = “entropy”, “splitter” =
“random”
88.38%

Table 9. Grid search results for decision tree and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“criterion”:
“splitter”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Decision Tree (DT)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“criterion” = “entropy”, “splitter” =
“best”
90.65%

Table 10. Grid search results for random forest and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“criterion”:
“n_estimators”:
“oob_score”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Random Forest (RF)
GIST
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
True, False
“criterion” = “entropy”, “n_estimators” =
5, “oob_score” = True
87.80%

Table 11. Grid search results for random forest and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“criterion”:
“n_estimators”:
“oob_score”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Random Forest (RF)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
True, False
“criterion” = “entropy”, “n_estimators” =
5, “oob_score” = True
88.08%
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Table 12. Grid search results for NC and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“shrink_threshold”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Nearest Centroid (NC)
GIST
2
100%
0, 1, 5, 10, 50
“shrink_threshold” = 1
47.90%

Table 13. Grid search results for NC and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“shrink_threshold”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Nearest Centroid (NC)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
0, 1, 5, 10, 50
“shrink_threshold” = 0
52.45%

Table 14. Grid search results for SVM and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“kernel”:
“C”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Support Vector Machines (SVM)
GIST
2
20%
“rbf”
0.1; 1; 10; 100; 1,000; 10,000; 100,000
“C” = 1,000; “kernel” = “rbf”
88.52%

Table 15. Grid search results for SVM and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“kernel”:
“C”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

Support Vector Machines (SVM)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
20%
“rbf”, “poly”, “linear”, “sigmoid”
0.1; 1; 10; 100; 1,000; 10,000; 100,000
“C” = 100; “kernel” = “rbf”
87.85%
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Table 16. Grid search results for AdaBoost/DT and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“base_estimator__criterion”:
“base_estimator__splitter”:
“algorithm”:
“learning_rate”:
“n_estimators”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

AdaBoost
Decision Tree (DT)
GIST
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“SAMME”, “SAMME.R”
1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001
10, 25, 50
“algorithm” = “SAMME”,
“base_estimator__criterion” = “entropy”,
“base_estimator__splitter” = “best”,
“learning_rate” = 1, “n_estimators” = 50
92.27%

Table 17. Grid search results for AdaBoost/DT and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“base_estimator__criterion”:
“base_estimator__splitter”:
“algorithm”:
“learning_rate”:
“n_estimators”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

AdaBoost
Decision Tree (DT)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“SAMME”, “SAMME.R”
1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001
10, 25, 50
“algorithm” = “SAMME”,
“base_estimator__criterion” = “entropy”,
“base_estimator__splitter” = “random”,
“learning_rate” = 0.9, “n_estimators” =
50
93.61%
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Table 18. Grid search results for AdaBoost/RF and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“base_estimator__criterion”:
“base_estimator__splitter”:
“base_estimator__n_estimators”:
“algorithm”:
“learning_rate”:
“n_estimators”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

AdaBoost
Random Forest (RF)
GIST
2
25%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
“SAMME”, “SAMME.R”
1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001
2, 5, 10, 50
“base_estimator__criterion” = “entropy”,
“base_estimator__n_estimators’ = 100,
“learning_rate” = 0.5, “n_estimators” =
50
90.26%

Table 19. Grid search results for AdaBoost/RF and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“base_estimator__criterion”:
“base_estimator__splitter”:
“base_estimator__n_estimators”:
“algorithm”:
“learning_rate”:
“n_estimators”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

AdaBoost
Random Forest (RF)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
10%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
“SAMME”, “SAMME.R”
1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001
2, 5, 10, 50
“base_estimator__criterion” = “gini”,
“base_estimator__n_estimators’ = 100,
“learning_rate” = 0.01, “n_estimators” =
50
88.32%
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Table 20. Grid search results for OneVRest/DT and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__criterion”:
“estimator__splitter”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

OneVRest
Decision Trees (DT)
GIST
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“estimator__criterion” = “entropy”,
“estimator__splitter” = “random”
84.37%

Table 21. Grid search results for OneVRest/DT and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__criterion”:
“estimator__splitter”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

OneVRest
Decision Trees (DT)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
“best”, “random”
“estimator__criterion” = “entropy”,
“estimator__splitter” = “best”
86.61%

OneVRest And Decision Trees
The OneVRest algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
OneVsRestClassifier,” n.d.). The OneVRest algorithm needs a base estimator. The
OneVRest algorithm was grid searched with a decision tree machine learning model and the
results are presented in Table 20 and Table 21.
OneVRest And Random Forests
The OneVRest algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
OneVsRestClassifier,” n.d.). The OneVRest algorithm needs a base estimator. The
OneVRest algorithm was grid searched with a random forest machine learning model and the
results are presented in Table 22 and Table 23.
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Table 22. Grid search results for OneVRest/RF and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__criterion”:
“estimator__n_estimators”:
“estimator__n_jobs”:
“estimator__oob_score”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

OneVRest
Random Forest (RF)
GIST
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
-1
True, False
“estimator__criterion”: “entropy”,
“estimator__n_estimators”: 100,
“estimator__n_jobs”: -1,
“estimator__oob_score”: True
87.95%

Table 23. Grid search results for OneVRest/RF and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__criterion”:
“estimator__n_estimators”:
“estimator__n_jobs”:
“estimator__oob_score”:
Best Parameters:

Best Score:

OneVRest
Random Forest (RF)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
“gini”, “entropy”
2, 5, 10, 50, 100
-1
True, False
“estimator__criterion”: “entropy”,
“estimator__n_estimators”: 100,
“estimator__n_jobs”: -1,
“estimator__oob_score”: True
87.12%

OneVRest And KNN
The OneVRest algorithm has been implemented by Scikit Learn (“Scikit Learn
OneVsRestClassifier,” n.d.). The OneVRest algorithm needs a base estimator. The
OneVRest algorithm was grid searched with a KNN machine learning model and the results
are presented in Table 24 and Table 25.
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Table 24. Grid search results for OneVRest/KNN and GIST
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__n_neighbors”:
“estimator__weights”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

OneVRest
k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
GIST
2
100%
1, 5, 10, 50
“uniform”, “distance”
“estimator__n_neighbors” = 1,
“estimator__weights” = “uniform”
93.26%

Table 25. Grid search results for OneVRest/KNN and RWE
Machine Learning Model Type:
Base Estimator Type:
Feature Type:
Number of Cross Fold Validation Groups:
Percent of Final Training Data Set:
“estimator__n_neighbors”:
“estimator__weights”:
Best Parameters:
Best Score:

OneVRest
k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
RWE (256-byte window/1,024 data pts)
2
100%
1, 5, 10, 50
“uniform”, “distance”
“estimator__n_neighbors” = 1,
“estimator__weights” = “uniform”
88.91%

Cross 10-Fold Validation Scores
Using the parameters computed in the last section, the Malgazer RWE features and
GIST features were trained and measured with a ten-fold cross validation. The cross-fold
validation scores were calculated using the “train_classifier.py” script available in the
Malgazer source code repository. Each subsection will present the cross-fold validation data
from each model type.
k-Nearest Neighbors
The k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 26.
Decision Trees
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The decision tree algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The results
of the measurements are available in Table 27.
Random Forests
The random forest algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The results
of the measurements are available in Table 28.
Nearest Centroid
The nearest centroid algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 29.
Support Vector Machine
The support vector machine algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation.
The results of the measurements are available in Table 30.
Naïve Bayes
The Naïve Bayes algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The results
of the measurements are available in Table 31.
AdaBoost
The AdaBoost algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation for various base
models. The results of the measurements are available in Table 32.
OneVRest
The OneVRest algorithm was measured using 10-fold cross validation. The results of
the measurements are available in Table 33.
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Table 26. KNN cross validation scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
256
256
512
1,024
2,048

RWE
Accuracy Accuracy
Data
Mean
Variance
Points
N/A
94.24%
0.0069
512
91.03%
0.0055
1,024
91.07%
0.0057
2,048
91.10%
0.0055
4,096
91.05%
0.0056
1,024
91.26%
0.0054
1,024
91.37%
0.0056
1,024
91.57%
0.0057

Table 27. Decision trees cross validation scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
90.27%
92.25%
92.34%
92.82%

0.0078
0.0059
0.0072
0.0073

Table 28. Random forest cross validation scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
512
1,024
2,048
4,096
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
90.29%
89.99%
90.36%
90.51%
90.57%
91.28%

0.0081
0.0064
0.0078
0.0081
0.0084
0.0084
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Table 29. Nearest centroid cross validation scores
Features

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Data
Points

N/A
256
256
1,024

N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
47.95%
52.39%
52.50%
51.29%

0.0082
0.0073
0.0074
0.0066

Table 30. SVM cross validation scores
Features

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Data
Points

N/A
256
256
256
1,024

N/A
512
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
93.55%
93.02%
93.24%
93.37%
93.14%

0.0057
0.0061
0.0054
0.0059
0.0056

Table 31. Naïve Bayes cross validation scores
Features

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Data
Points

N/A
256
256
1,024

N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
53.64%
56.19%
56.26%
54.01%

0.0075
0.0046
0.0048
0.0047

Table 32. Adaboost cross validation scores
Base
Model

Features

dt
dt
dt
dt
rf
rf
rf
rf

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Accuracy Accuracy
Data
Mean
Variance
Points
N/A
93.68%
0.0060
1,024
94.63%
0.0042
4,096
94.95%
0.0046
1,024
94.96%
0.0047
N/A
93.93%
0.0051
1,024
94.69%
0.0043
4,096
94.84%
0.0041
1,024
95.00%
0.0045
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Table 33. OneVRest cross validation scores
Base
Model

Features

dt
dt
dt
dt
rf
rf
rf
rf
knn
knn
knn
knn
svm
svm
svm
svm

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

RWE
Data
Points

N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance

N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

89.03%
90.15%
90.63%
90.98%
90.37%
89.68%
90.10%
90.94%
94.24%
91.09%
91.04%
91.36%
92.71%
91.71%
92.01%
91.63%

0.0083
0.0090
0.0078
0.0070
0.0097
0.0091
0.0090
0.0094
0.0073
0.0055
0.0054
0.0055
0.0070
0.0069
0.0070
0.0067

Artificial Neural Networks
The artificial neural network algorithm was measured with 10-fold cross validation
using several network structures on the RWE and GIST data sets. Each of the neural
networks was trained using different optimizers built into the scientific Python libraries. To
understand how the optimizer plays a role in the overall accuracy, the results are reported in
Table 34 in full. The structure of each of the five networks listed in Table 34 will be
presented in the next subsections.
Table 34. Artificial neural network cross validation scores
Model

ann-1

Optimizer Features

sgd

GIST

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A

RWE
Data
Points
N/A

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
93.09%

0.0074
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Model

ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-1
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-2
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3

Optimizer Features

rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam

GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
93.46%
93.52%
93.16%
93.44%
93.42%
93.63%
92.43%
94.04%
93.96%
93.98%
93.65%
93.30%
91.74%
92.15%
93.61%
93.48%
93.48%
93.64%
93.30%
93.62%
92.23%
93.90%
93.81%
93.95%
93.72%
93.56%
93.94%
93.26%
93.67%
93.68%
94.08%
93.84%
93.90%
93.81%

0.0063
0.0060
0.0147
0.0062
0.0063
0.0060
0.0056
0.0073
0.0046
0.0066
0.0051
0.0042
0.0391
0.0140
0.0064
0.0063
0.0071
0.0062
0.0048
0.0059
0.0062
0.0061
0.0043
0.0037
0.0061
0.0049
0.0051
0.0071
0.0044
0.0057
0.0052
0.0065
0.0057
0.0063
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Model

ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-4
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5
ann-5

Optimizer Features

sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adadelta
adam
adamax
sgd
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam
sgd
rmsprop
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam

RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
256

RWE
Data
Points
512
512
512
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
512

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
92.53%
94.12%
94.09%
94.10%
94.01%
93.78%
94.19%
93.49%
93.85%
93.90%
94.09%
93.96%
94.05%
93.09%
92.79%
93.93%
94.29%
94.28%
94.19%
92.80%
92.13%
93.66%
93.70%
93.80%
93.90%
92.88%
92.56%
73.69%
94.38%
94.31%
94.22%
85.15%

0.0052
0.0050
0.0043
0.0051
0.0060
0.0046
0.0054
0.0090
0.0057
0.0068
0.0065
0.0043
0.0060
0.0235
0.0063
0.0064
0.0052
0.0048
0.0057
0.0086
0.0215
0.0054
0.0054
0.0057
0.0060
0.0118
0.0053
0.2753
0.0050
0.0038
0.0059
0.2290
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Figure 14. Artificial neural network #1
Artificial Neural Network #1
The artificial neural network number one is presented in Figure 14. The network
consists of an input layer with units equaling the number of input features, two hidden layers
(with units of ½ the number of features and 100 units), and an output layer with six units,
which equals the number of classifications. For the GIST features, there are 320 data points.
For the RWE features, the number of data points vary from 215 bytes to 4,096 bytes,
depending on the input data set.
Artificial Neural Network #2
The artificial neural network number two is presented in Figure 15. The network
consists of an input layer with units equaling the number of input features, four hidden layers
(with units of the number of features, ½ the number of features, ¼ the number of features, and
1/8 the number of features), and an output layer with six units, which equals the number of
classifications. For the GIST features, there are 320 data points. For the RWE features, the
number of data points vary from 215 bytes to 4,096 bytes, depending on the input data set.

148

Figure 15. Artificial neural network #2

Figure 16. Artificial neural network #3

Artificial Neural Network #3
The artificial neural network number three is presented in Figure 16. The network
consists of an input layer with units equaling the number of input features, four hidden layers
(with units two times the number of features, the number of features, ½ the number of
features, and ¼ the number of features), and an output layer with six units, which equals the
number of classifications. For the GIST features, there are 320 data points. For the RWE
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Figure 17. Artificial neural network #4

Figure 18. Artificial neural network #5
features, the number of data points vary from 215 bytes to 4,096 bytes, depending on the input
data set.
Artificial Neural Network #4
The artificial neural network number four is presented in Figure 17. The network
consists of an input layer with units equaling the number of input features, four hidden layers
(with units two times the number of features, the number of features, ½ the number of
features, and ¼ the number of features), and an output layer with six units, which equals the
number of classifications. For the GIST features, there are 320 data points. For the RWE
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features, the number of data points vary from 215 bytes to 4,096 bytes, depending on the input
data set.
Artificial Neural Network #5
The artificial neural network number five is presented in Figure 18. The network
consists of an input layer with units equaling the number of input features, four hidden layers
(with units two times the number of features, the number of features, ½ the number of
features, and ¼ the number of features), and an output layer with six units, which equals the
number of classifications. For the GIST features, there are 320 data points. For the RWE
features, the number of data points vary from 215 bytes to 4,096 bytes, depending on the input
data set.
Convolutional Neural Networks
The convolutional network algorithm was measured with 10-fold cross validation on
the RWE and GIST data sets. The network can be described by the following types of layers:
1. An input layer (the # of features)
2. A one-dimensional convolution with a kernel size of 1/8 of the number of
features. There are 100 filters constructed in this layer. The pool size is 10.
3. A one-dimensional convolution with a kernel size of 1/30 of the number of
features. There are 100 filters constructed in this layer. The pool size is 2.
4. A one-dimensional convolution with a kernel size of 2. There are 100 filters
constructed in this layer. The pool size is 2.
5. A flattening layer.
6. An artificial neural network layer with the number of units ¼ of the number of
features.
7. An artificial neural network layer with the number of units 1/8 of the number
of features.
8. An artificial neural network layer with the number of units 1/16 of the number
of features.
9. An output layer with six values, one representing each class.
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The results of the measurements of the CNN are available in Table 35.

Training The Final Classifiers
The Malgazer RWE features and GIST features were trained on several machine
learning model types. After the final classifier was trained, the Python object was pickled
using the “dill” library so that the classifiers could be reloaded at a later time. Neural
networks required multiple files to instantiate the classifier, and the Malgazer classes save or
load the networks using supplied functions within the class. Each subsection will present the
data from each model type.
k-Nearest Neighbors
The k-nearest neighbors algorithm was trained on the data and measured for accuracy.
The results of the measurements are available in Table 36.

Table 35. Convolutional neural network cross validation scores
Model

cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1

Base
Model
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
rmsprop
adagrad
adadelta
adam
adamax
nadam

Features

GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
256

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
512

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
92.70%
90.88%
92.31%
92.40%
91.93%
93.25%
92.13%
93.47%
93.11%
93.12%
93.23%

0.0070
0.0109
0.0234
0.0078
0.0058
0.0060
0.0069
0.0061
0.0067
0.0060
0.0058
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Table 36. KNN final training scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy

94.53%
91.18%
91.15%
91.35%

Table 37. Decision trees final training scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy

90.25%
92.57%
93.03%
92.73%

Table 38. Random forest final training scores
Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy

90.80%
90.50%
91.17%
91.42%

Decision Trees
The decision tree algorithm was trained on the data and measured for accuracy. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 37.
Random Forests
The random forest algorithm was trained on the data and measured for accuracy. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 38.
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Support Vector Machine
The support vector machine algorithm was trained on the data and measured for
accuracy. The results of the measurements are available in Table 40.
AdaBoost
The random forest algorithm was trained on the data and measured for accuracy. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 39.
OneVRest
The OneVRest algorithm was trained on the data and measured for accuracy. The
results of the measurements are available in Table 41.

Table 40. SVM final training scores
Features

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Data
Points

N/A
256
256
1,024

Accuracy

N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

93.95%
93.38%
93.60%
93.05%

Table 39. Adaboost final training scores
Base
Model
dt
dt
dt
dt
rf
rf
rf
rf

Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy

94.03%
94.97%
95.32%
95.25%
93.65%
95.25%
95.33%
94.90%
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Table 41. OnevRest final training scores
Base
Model
dt
dt
dt
dt
rf
rf
rf
rf
knn
knn
knn
knn
svm
svm
svm
svm

Features

GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE

RWE
Window
(Bytes)
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024
N/A
256
256
1,024

RWE
Data
Points
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024
N/A
1,024
4,096
1,024

Accuracy

89.10%
90.33%
91.12%
91.10%
93.05%
90.10%
90.53%
91.27%
94.53%
91.18%
91.15%
91.35%
93.05%
92.18%
92.35%
91.63%

Artificial Neural Networks
The artificial neural network algorithm was trained on the data and measured for
accuracy for the networks previously presented. The results of the measurements are
available in Table 42.
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Table 42. Artificial and convolutional neural networks final training scores
Model

knn-5
knn-5
knn-5
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1
cnn-1

Features

RWE
Window
(Bytes)

RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST

256
256
N/A
256
256
256
N/A

RWE
Datapoints

Accuracy

512
1,024
N/A
512
1,024
4,096
N/A

94.68%
94.95%
93.83%
93.88%
93.62%
93.47%
92.63%

Convolutional Neural Networks
The convolutional neural network algorithm was trained on the data and measured for
accuracy. The results of the measurements are also available in Table 42.

Summary
This concludes the presentation of the results from constructing the Malgazer and
GIST classifiers. For each machine learning model selected, the hyper-parameters were grid
searched and the optimal hyper-parameters were then measured on the final data set using tenfold cross validation. Once the optimal classifiers were determined, the final classifiers were
saved after training on 90% of the final data set and tested on the remaining 10%. This
process, while short when written, consisted of well over 200 time-consuming experiments to
collect the data presented here.
The next chapter will compare the Malgazer RWE and GIST results with the prior
literature. First, the empirical results will be compared and analyzed between the Malgazer
RWE and GIST data sets. Then, a theoretical comparison with other prior literature will be
presented to conclude discussion of prior methods.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARISON OF MALGAZER TO PRIOR LITERATURE
Introduction
The previous chapter presented detailed results from over 200 experiments that consisted
of grid searching, cross fold validation, and final training. From these results, the Malgazer and
GIST classifiers were compared to each other and the prior literature. This chapter begins with
the analysis of the empirical results for the Malgazer and GIST classifiers. Next, this chapter
compares the Malgazer and GIST classifiers to the prior literature. Even though the input data
sets and detailed methodologies were not available to facilitate replication, theoretical
comparisons were still drawn from this research to the prior research using the data collected.
This chapter concludes with a discussion of other observations learned throughout this research
project.

Analysis Of The Empirical Results
This section begins with an analysis of the grid searching results. Next, the cross-fold
validation results are analyzed because this data most accurately represented the mean accuracy
for the classifiers. Once the cross-fold validation scores have been analyzed, characteristics
discovered in the final training experiments are discussed. These three topics are the content of
the next three subsections.
Grid Searching Results
The RWE and GIST data sets were used to grid search optimal hyper-parameters for each
model. The purpose of this phase was to calculate the optimal hyper-parameters from a set of
potential hyper-parameters. Each test consisted of two cross-fold validation groups where the
classifier was trained on the first fold and tested on the second fold. For each classifier, a series
of potential hyper-parameters were used for training and the best accuracy was reported along
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with the optimal set of hyper-parameters. The previous chapter presented the hyper-parameters
grid searched in this research, and this section will discuss the results. Note that accuracies were
computed during the grid searching phase, but the results should only be used for estimates and
general comparisons as the accuracies computed from the cross-validation phase better
represented the classifiers’ true efficacy.
For KNN, the GIST and RWE optimal hyper-parameters were the same. Not
surprisingly, the GIST classifier outperformed the Malgazer RWE classifier. Recall that KNN
was the algorithm originally presented in the GIST methodology papers, so the fact that the KNN
algorithm performed well for GIST features was expected. Next, the decision tree algorithm was
grid searched using the GIST and RWE data sets. The results were same between the data sets,
with only the choice of splitter being different (“random” versus “best”). In this test, the RWE
classifier outperformed the GIST classifier by over 2%.
Next, the random forest algorithm was grid searched using the GIST and RWE data sets.
In this series of experiments, the accuracy and optimal hyper-parameters were the same for both
data sets. While the Naïve Bayes algorithm did not have hyper-parameters for tuning, the
nearest centroid algorithm did. The GIST nearest centroid algorithm used a shrink threshold of
one while the RWE classifier required a shrink threshold of zero. However, for both classifiers
the accuracy was below 53%, which well underperformed other classifiers analyzed during this
research. In other words, it was wasteful to spend more time on a classifier that was
approximately 20% less accurate than other classifiers.
Next, the SVM algorithm was grid searched with the GIST and RWE data sets. For
GIST, the optimal hyper-parameter “C” was equal to 1,000. For RWE, “C” was 100. For both
data sets, the optimal kernel hyper-parameter was “rbf”. The accuracies for both classifiers were
within 1%, so the benefits of using GIST versus RWE were more difficult to discern. The SVM
algorithm was very computationally intensive and required a long time to complete. Therefore,
only 20% of the training data was used to grid search both classifiers. While useful to find the
optimal hyper-parameters, it should be noted that grid searching the full data set, if time
permitted, may have produced different optimal hyper-parameters and possibly better accuracies
than this series of experiments. This was the tradeoff for a shorter computation time for this
machine learning algorithm.
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The Adaboost algorithm was used to train several base classifiers. The Adaboost
algorithm used a series of weak base classifiers to make a larger, more accurate, classifier. First,
Adaboost was used with the decision tree base classifier. The hyper-parameters for the GIST
and RWE data sets were the same, except for the learning rates. The optimal learning rate for
GIST was one, while the learning rate for RWE was 0.9. The RWE classifier outperformed the
GIST classifier by more than a percent, therefore the RWE classifier is likely more accurate than
the GIST classifier when using Adaboost and decision trees.
Next, Adaboost was used with the random forest base classifier. Like SVM, this training
experiment was computationally intensive and only 25% of the data for GIST was used while
10% of the data for RWE was used for training. The optimal hyper-parameters were the same
except for the learning rate and base estimator criterion. The base estimator criterion for
Adaboost/RF was “entropy”, while the criterion for RWE was “gini”. The learning rate for
GIST was 0.5, while the learning rate for RWE was 0.01. It was not fair to compare accuracies
between GIST and RWE classifiers from these calculations as different sized training data sets
were used. Since the Adaboost algorithm constructed several weak classifiers into a more
accurate classifier, other types of base estimators would not work with the Adaboost algorithm.
The Malgazer source code repository contains the full set of experiment logs for those interested
in exploring more data.
The OneVRest algorithm was used to train several base classifiers. The first base
classifier was the decision tree algorithm. The optimal hyper-parameters for OneVRest/DT was
“entropy” for the criterion, and “random” or “best” splitters for the GIST and RWE data set
respectively. The RWE data outperformed the GIST data by over 2%. Next, random forests
were used as the OneVRest base estimator. The grid search determined that the optimal hyperparameters were the same for GIST and RWE. The reported accuracies were within 1% between
the two data sets, making it difficult to declare the most accurate classifier in general. KNN was
used as a base classifier for OneVRest next. The optimal hyper-parameters were the same
between GIST and RWE, but the accuracy was nearly 5% better for the GIST data set. This was
not surprising, given that the original method in the GIST papers used the KNN algorithm.
The artificial and convolutional neural networks were not grid searched in the same
manner as the previous algorithms as this too much time and the same information was produced
from the cross-fold validation experiments. Recall that the cross-fold validation experiments
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provided accuracy mean and variance over ten folds of the data, so this measurement was the
best estimate of a classifier’s true accuracy. Now that the optimal hyper-parameters were
calculated for many machine learning algorithms, the cross-fold validation phase was executed
next. The cross-fold validation experiments will be analyzed in the next section.
Best Overall Accuracy From Cross Fold Validation
The results of the cross-fold validations presented in the previous chapter can be sorted
by accuracy mean to yield the most performant models. The top twenty-eight models are
available in Table 43. It is important to note that most of the models performed very well with
the RWE and GIST features, but the Adaboost algorithm with decision trees and random forests
trained from the RWE data was the most accurate. The nearest centroid and Naïve Bayes
algorithms did not perform nearly as well as the other algorithms, so they will no longer be
discussed as there are many more accurate classifiers.
Next, the more complex RWE based artificial neural networks performed better than the
GIST methodology. After the GIST methodology, artificial neural networks using both GIST
and RWE features performed well. The differences between the most accurate model and the
twenty-eighth most accurate model was slightly over 1%, which was clearly an improvement but
not a large improvement. This coupled with the fact that the most performant model was only
accurate 95% of the time on this particular data set, was noteworthy. As presented in the
literature review chapter, most prior literature reported accuracies well above 97%. There are
several possible explanations for this accuracy difference. The two or more percent difference
could be attributed to the final malware data set rather than the algorithms or types of input
features used (i.e. RWE or GIST). The lower accuracy could also be attributed to the selection
of the six functional groups. The possibilities for this accuracy difference will be explored later
in this dissertation.
Returning to the publication where the GIST method originated (L Nataraj et al., 2011),
the authors reported a “98% classification accuracy on a malware database of 9,458 samples with
25 different malware families.” The best accuracy for the same classifier trained on the
Malgazer data set using the functional classifications developed during this research was
94.24%. This was nearly a 4% difference. There are several possible explanations for this
discrepancy. First, this research did not have access to the 9,458 samples used in GIST paper to
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validate the reported accuracies in the original paper. It is possible that this lower number of
samples did not adequately represent the current real-world threat landscape and could have
resulted in inaccurate accuracy scores. Also, the samples could have been too similar to allow
for a more realistic comparison to other malware samples not in the training set. It is also
possible that the 25 malware families in the GIST training set was more specific than the
functional classifications developed in this research.
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Table 43. Top 28 classifier accuracies in descending order
Model

adaboost
adaboost
adaboost
adaboost
adaboost
adaboost
ann-5
ann-5
ann-4
ann-4
ovr
knn
ann-5
ann-3
ann-4
ann-3
ann-3
ann-3
ann-4
ann-3
ann-4
ann-1
ann-3
ann-1
ann-1
ann-4
ann-2
ann-2

Base
Features
RWE
Model /
Window
Optimizer
(Bytes)
rf
dt
dt
rf
rf
dt
adadelta
adam
adadelta
adam
knn
N/A
adamax
nadam
adamax
rmsprop
adadelta
adagrad
adadelta
adadelta
adamax
rmsprop
adam
adadelta
adagrad
adam
adadelta
nadam

RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
GIST
GIST
RWE
RWE
RWE
RWE
GIST
RWE
RWE

1,024
1,024
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
256
256
N/A
N/A
N/A
256
256
256
256
N/A
256
256

RWE
Data
Points
1,024
1,024
4,096
4,096
1,024
1,024
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
512
512
N/A
N/A
N/A
512
512
512
512
N/A
512
512

Accuracy Accuracy
Mean
Variance
95.00%
94.96%
94.95%
94.84%
94.69%
94.63%
94.38%
94.31%
94.29%
94.28%
94.24%
94.24%
94.22%
94.19%
94.19%
94.12%
94.10%
94.09%
94.09%
94.08%
94.05%
94.04%
94.01%
93.98%
93.96%
93.96%
93.95%
93.94%

0.0045
0.0047
0.0046
0.0041
0.0043
0.0042
0.0050
0.0038
0.0052
0.0048
0.0073
0.0069
0.0059
0.0054
0.0057
0.0050
0.0051
0.0043
0.0065
0.0052
0.0060
0.0073
0.0060
0.0066
0.0046
0.0043
0.0037
0.0051

162
On the other hand, it is possible that the Malgazer training data set did not adequately
reflect the functional classifications, and the true accuracy using a different classification
strategy was closer to the originally reported accuracy of 98%. Whichever reason might explain
the accuracy discrepancies, it is important to note that the Malgazer and GIST classifiers were
trained on the same Malgazer dataset with the same known functional classifications applied
equally. The differences in accuracies between features could be noted. In other words, if the
training data set was not optimal and the true accuracy of the GIST method was actually around
98%, it is possible that the Malgazer classifier would have performed better than 98% using
Adaboost and a random forest (or a decision tree) on that training set. This qualitative
observation leads from the fact that the most accurate RWE based model was more performant
than the most accurate GIST model. In fact, 78.57% of the top 28 classifiers trained during this
research were RWE based classifiers. There were four types of machine learning models for
RWE that outperformed the best GIST based classifier: adaboost/rf, adaboost/dt, ann-5, and ann4.
It is now possible to conclude that the training data set was extremely important to the
overall functional classification accuracy. If one classification was notoriously low in all cases,
the training data set or the classification strategy could have been to blame. The next section
analyzes the classification accuracies per class to find potential classifier improvements.
Classification Accuracy Per Class For The Final Training
During the final training phase, the Malgazer source code calculated and plotted the area
under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) using the SciKit Learn
functions. The ROC curves were plotted for each model as a whole, plus the classification
accuracy for each functional classification was computed and plotted independently. The highest
accuracy model (Adaboost/RF) using running window entropy with window size 1,024 bytes and
1,024 data points has been plotted in Figure 19. The “Trojan” classification had the lowest AUC
of 0.94, while the Virus classification had an AUC of 0.99. The next highest accuracy model
was Adaboost/DT and its ROC curve is presented in Figure 20. The “Trojan” classification once
again was the lowest AUC with a value of 0.95, but the “Backdoor”, “Virus”, and “Worm”
categories all had the highest AUC of 0.98.
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Figure 19. The AUC/ROC for Adaboost/RF (1,024-byte window, 1,024 data points)

Figure 20. The AUC/ROC for Adaboost/DT (1,024-byte window, 1,024 data points)
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Figure 21. The AUC/ROC for GIST and KNN
The GIST based method with the highest accuracy came from the k-nearest neighbor
algorithm. The ROC curves for this model are presented in Figure 21. Once again, the “Trojan”
classification received the lowest score with an AUC of 0.93. In every instance of final training,
“Trojan” was consistently low. Sometimes “Trojan” was joined with “PUA”, “Virus”, and
“Ransom” as being the lowest correct classification rates for some classifiers.
The fact that “Trojan” was consistently low may have led to lower overall accuracies
when compared to prior literature. For example, if the “Trojan” category were removed
completely, the accuracies of all experiments would have surely increased because the least
accurate classification was removed from consideration. Removing the “Trojan” classification
from the model before it was trained would benefit not only the Malgazer RWE classifiers, but it
would also benefit the GIST classifiers, according to the ROC curves. This is one method that
could be used to improve the classifiers further, if time allowed.
One may wonder why the “Trojan” classification could be problematic and the logic
behind removing the classification. To answer this question, an explanation of general malware
analysis is required. Malware can have nearly any type of functional characteristics, as long as
the sample performed malicious actions. One malware sample may have been ransomware,
while another sample may have stolen banking information from a web browser. Sometimes,
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one malware sample can have multiple functional characteristics, which made mapping the
characteristics into one discreet functional classification difficult.
There was also the avenue of infection that can play a role in the classification scheme.
For example, the classification “Trojan” better described the infection mechanism than a
functional description. A “Trojan” was an application that looked like a benign piece of software
while it still hid a malware payload. A “Trojan” could have also been a “Ransom” sample if the
payload locked the user’s files for ransom. The same trojan malware payload hiding in two
different benign software applications would also have had completely different RWE or GIST
values if the benign applications used to hide the malware payload were drastically different.
Even ignoring the effects of a malware payload does not reduce the differences in the computed
RWE and GIST values if the benign applications were drastically different. The reason the
benign applications factor heavily into those calculations is because it wraps a malware payload.
These drastic differences in the benign “wrappers” could have affected the classification
accuracies for “Trojan”.
All of the ROC curves for the final training can be found with the corresponding logs in
the Malgazer source code repository (Jones, 2017b). More data exists in the repository than was
reported here due to the large number of experiments, but all of the notable experiments were
discussed in this dissertation. Those readers interested in more details would benefit from
visiting the Malgazer repositories.

Comparing Malgazer To Prior Literature
In order to compare Malgazer to prior literature, it was important to understand the
components of Malgazer with respect to the generalized machine learning malware classification
model since this model allowed for comparisons between methods at the component level.
Based upon the analysis of the training results in this and the prior chapters, Malgazer was
categorized as follows:
•

CATEGORY: Malware Classifier – Running Window Entropy

•

EFFICACY: accuracy of approximately 95%
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•

TRAINING DATA: 60,000 malware samples and functional classifications from
VirusTotal, where there were six functional classifications developed from the publicly
available detection information: Virus, Trojan, Worm, PUA, Ransom, and Backdoor

•

TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION T(): The RWE data

•

PRE-PROCESSING FUNCTION P(): The re-sampled RWE to a fixed sample size

•

MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FUNCTION MLM():
o Adaboost/DT
o Adaboost/RF
o Artificial neural networks

•

ERROR FUNCTION E(): Confusion matrices

•

TUNING FUNCTION TU(): Window and data point sampling sizes for running window
entropy.

•

POST PROCESSING FUNCTION PP(): Not discussed.
Recall in the literature review chapter that thirty prior methods were malware classifiers.

The thirty prior methods were determined by applying the generalized model of malware
classification to prior literature and filtering the results so that they contained only malware
classifiers (instead of malware detectors, for example). For convenience, the list of the thirty
prior methods are reproduced below. Each method is briefly discussed after, and points will be
made only once instead of repeating the same point for each method that was obviously similar.
Other observations discovered during this analysis are presented in the last section of this
chapter.
•

Method #13

•

Method #31

•

Method #44

•

Method #14

•

Method #33

•

Method #45

•

Method #15

•

Method #34

•

Method #50

•

Method #18

•

Method #35

•

Method #51

•

Method #19

•

Method #36

•

Method #54

•

Method #25

•

Method #38

•

Method #56

•

Method #28

•

Method #40

•

Method #57

•

Method #29

•

Method #41

•

Method #58
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•

Method #59

•

Method #61

•

Method #67

•

Method #60

•

Method #66

•

Method #71

In Method #13, the authors reported an accuracy of greater than 99%. This was an
example that if based strictly on reported accuracies made the comparison with Malgazer and the
GIST implementations very difficult. 99% accuracy was very high, and much higher than the
accuracies calculated during this research. However, the training data set in this method was less
than one third of the training data set used in this research. It is quite possible that the training
data set used in this research contained more real-world, and current, samples than the method
from eight years prior. Since the GIST authors (Method #14) reported an accuracy of
approximately 98% but was measured to be approximately 94% in this research, it is entirely
possible that Method #13 would test lower as well. This would leave open the possibility that
Malgazer’s RWE based classifiers could match or outperform this prior method.
In Method #15, the authors used dynamic analysis information from just over three
thousand training samples. The number of samples used in this prior method was only 5% of the
number used during this research, so applying the prior method to Malgazer’s data set would
likely decrease the overall accuracy. Interestingly, since this method used dynamic malware
analysis information as the input data, dynamic features such as this could have been added to
the Malgazer or GIST classifiers. The features may have worked in parallel with each other in
the quest for the most accurate classifier.
In Method #18, no efficacy was reported. This method only used 9,442 malware samples
for training, which was less than one sixth of the data examined in this research. In Method #19,
the authors used a combination of techniques that led them to image similarity. The authors
reported an accuracy of 98.66%. This paper was similar to the GIST paper, in that they used a
large number of families as classifications rather than just six functional categories. The
accuracy was also similar to the GIST paper of approximately 98%. The training data set was
much smaller than in this research, with the authors reporting approximately 2,460 malware
samples used for training. Although the originally reported accuracy was higher, it would likely
reduce as more samples were added to the training data set. With only 100 total samples per
family composing the training data, this classifier would likely become less accurate with the
larger data sets used in this research.
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In Method #25, the authors used a technique to translate malware samples into gray scale
images. The gray scale images were classified using a convolutional neural network.
Convolutional neural networks are known for their accuracy when classifying one- or twodimensional structured data, so it was not surprising that this method reported an accuracy of
98.56%. The authors reported using a data set of 21,741 samples, which was approximately a
third of the size used in this research. Furthermore, the data set was classified by family name,
and this research examines functional classifications, so accuracy differences could be attributed
there as well.
In Method #28, the authors used Markov models to classify a data set of approximately
11,000 samples. The authors reported an AUC of 0.977 which is very close to the AUCs
reported in Figure 19 and Figure 20. According to the results, the Malgazer classifier at least
matched this prior method for accuracy, even though they classified two different types of
classifications (family vs. functional).
In Method #29, the authors used dynamic analysis features to classify a training data set.
The authors reported an accuracy of 89.4%, which was lower than the classifiers developed in
this research and the GIST classifier. In Method #31, the authors used a very large data set of
6.5 million files to classify malware based upon dynamic analysis. The authors reported an error
rate of 2.94%, which would have made the accuracy approximately 97%. This value was not a
surprise given the large training data set, as it was in the range considered normal for machine
learning based malware detection. This accuracy likely reflected the true accuracy of this
method because the size of the training data set was very large.
For both methods discussed in the prior paragraph, dynamic analysis data was required
for classification. This means that the samples were executed in a sandbox environment to
collect the dynamic data. First, some use cases may not permit the time required for this lengthy
process, usually lasting several minutes per sample. Second, dynamic analysis may not have
revealed the whole malware payload as only certain code paths are typically executed in those
automated environments. The data from a missing a code path could have flipped a sample from
one classification to another. This observation could be true for most any purely dynamic
analysis feature set.
In Method #33, the authors used a neural network to classify malware into families. The
authors reported an accuracy of 96% for approximately 5,000 malware samples. This
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classification accuracy was very close to the neural networks studied in this research and was
within 1% accuracy of the most performant model. Perhaps the difference in accuracy was due
to the classification scheme (functional vs. family) or the small training data set used in the prior
research.
In Method #34, the authors proposed a convolutional neural network family name
classifier using gray scale images of the malware samples as input. The authors reported an
accuracy of 98% using an unbalanced data set. As discussed throughout this dissertation,
unbalanced data sets could lead to inaccurate results because some categories would have been
more likely than others. Although the reported accuracy for this classifier was within a
reasonable range, it may have been less accurate in the real world, where the threat landscape
changes frequently.
In Method #35, the authors used numerous static analysis features with a convolutional
neural network to classify approximately 22,757 samples. The authors reported an accuracy of
93%, which was lower than the classifiers created in this research. This method used
approximately one third of the samples used in this research.
In Method #36, the authors used an intermediate language to represent the malware
samples and classify them with a LSTM neural network. The authors reported an accuracy of
97.7% and an AUC of 0.9832, which are higher than the values for the classifiers developed in
this research. The authors used approximately 310,000 samples as their data set, which was five
times more samples than used during this research. This method also studied an LSTM neural
network, which is a different type of neural network that was not studied during this research.
In Method #38, the authors used various machine learning models to classify malware
based on static and dynamic features. The authors reported an accuracy of 92%, which was
lower than the classifiers developed during this research. The authors also used only 3,320
malware samples, which was only 5.5% of the size of the training set used for this research. In
Method #40, the authors reported a 7.2% error rate (approximately 93% accuracy) classifying
millions of malware samples. This method used family names for classifications. A 93%
classification rate for millions of samples demonstrated that larger data sets generally reduce
classification accuracy because there were more outliers than in smaller training sets.
In Method #41, the authors used convolutional neural networks to classify gray scale
images of malware samples. The authors reported that with approximately 9,339 samples they
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achieved an accuracy of 98.62%. This method used less than one sixth of the samples used in
this research. 98% accuracy would be difficult to achieve with much larger data sets. In Method
#44, the authors used Markov models to classify approximately 11,000 malware samples with
accuracy greater than 90%. This accuracy was lower than most accuracies in the literature
review, and lower than the 95% accuracy from Malgazer classifiers.
In Method #45, the authors used gray scale images of malware samples as input to
convolutional neural networks. The reported accuracy was 95.66%, which was very close to the
accuracy calculated in this research. The authors trained their classifiers on 10,000 benign and
2,000 malware files, so it appeared that the data set was unbalanced. In Method #50, the authors
used a convolutional neural network to classify a data set of approximately 5,647 samples from
four families. The authors reported an accuracy of 98%, which was within range of the other
classifiers examined in this chapter.
In Method #51, the authors classified malware using LSTM neural networks on dynamic
analysis features from 75,000 malware samples. The authors report a false positive rate of 1%
and an improvement in the true positive rate, but it is unclear how this can be compared directly
to the data collected from Malgazer. In Method #54, the authors presented a method to classify
malware using dynamic analysis data with a reported accuracy of 99.06%. The training data set
for this method was 23,080 collected malware samples. Based upon the reported accuracy alone,
the value seemed abnormally high. Analysis of the original training data set used may have led
to conclusions as to why the reported accuracy was so high for this method.
In Method #56, the authors presented a method to classify malware using gray scale
images and convolutional neural networks. The authors reported an error of 31.34%, which
would mean the accuracy was approximately 70%. Based upon the work in this dissertation and
other literature in the review, this accuracy seemed lower than it should have been. More
analysis into this method would have to be completed in order to compare this research to the
prior method any further.
In Method #57, the authors presented a classifier built from 10,869 samples that was
95% accurate. This classifier used family names as the classification. The reported accuracy of
95% was the same as the accuracy calculated in this research. In Method #58, the authors
presented a classifier built from gray scale images and static information from malware samples.
The authors reported an accuracy of 98.862%. The authors stated that they trained their
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classifier with approximately 10,868 malware samples, which was much smaller than the data set
in this research.
In Method #59, the author presented a classifier built from the sample’s function call
graphs as features to a neural network. The author reported an accuracy 97.9%, which was in the
range of most reported accuracies. The classifier was built from approximately 10,867 malware
samples, which was approximately one sixth the size of the Malgazer data set. In Method #60,
the authors presented a classifier built from sampled byte code using convolutional and BiLSTM
neural networks. The authors reported an accuracy of 98.2%. This research, like many
discussed above, used the Microsoft Kaggle (Ronen, Radu, Feuerstein, Yom-Tov, & Ahmadi,
2018) data set of approximately 10,868 malware samples labeled with family names.
In Method #61, the authors presented a method to classify malware based on gray scale
images of the bytecode and opcode features with convolutional and LSTM neural networks. The
authors reported a classification accuracy of 99.36%. The classifier was built with
approximately 41,000 samples. Without analyzing the training and testing datasets used, it was
difficult to discern why this method had such a high accuracy score. In Method #66, the authors
presented a classifier with 99.97% accuracy that used gray scale images of the malware sample
with a convolutional neural network. The classifier was built with approximately 9,339 malware
samples, which made the reported accuracy very high for such a small training data set.
In Method #67, the authors presented a method to classify malware using gray scale
images and a convolutional neural network. The authors reported an 81.8% accuracy, which is
lower than most other image-based methods discussed in this chapter. In Method #71, the
authors presented a classifier that used dynamic analysis features to classify approximately
17,400 malware samples into sixty malware families. The authors reported an accuracy of 98%,
which was the accuracy most frequently reported throughout the literature review. The choice of
family names and the smaller data set could have contributed to the high accuracy score.
In general, classification accuracies of approximately 98% was most frequently reported.
A 98% accuracy was considerably better than the 95% accuracy calculated during this research,
especially when an organization would be classifying hundreds of thousands of samples per day
and 3% can represent thousands of samples. However, it is very important to remember that the
accuracy score was relative to the conditions of the experiments. As noted for a number of the
studies above, the choice of training data, classification scheme, implementation, measurements,
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or any number of other factors could have played a role in the overall higher classification
accuracy reported in prior literature. This observation is supported by the fact that very similar
methods in prior literature would produce very different accuracy results, such as the imagebased methods ranging from approximately 70% to 99% or more. Therefore, it was just as unfair
to blindly compare the reported accuracies between two independent malware classification
publications as it would have been to compare two studies for any other science where the exact
conditions of each experiment cannot be replicated for both studies. It was for this reason that
this author publicly released all of the source code, logs, and data sets used throughout out this
research. With the code and data publicly available, improvements can be made to Malgazer’s
algorithms and their effects can be easily measured by anyone with Python programming
knowledge.

Other Observations
During the course of this research project, additional discoveries became apparent as the
malware classifiers were developed. The results demonstrated that an RWE based classifier
improved malware functional classifications over the GIST method if the Adaboost algorithm
was used with a decision tree or random forest base classifier. The other type of classifier where
RWE outperformed GIST was with the larger neural network. Despite the benefit of improved
accuracy, there were also some potential drawbacks when using RWE that must be known for
some use cases.
Since Malgazer’s classifiers are built from RWE data, the computations are much slower
than the GIST algorithm. This research calculated the RWE data and after it also computed the
GIST data from the same samples. The RWE calculations required several days to complete,
while the GIST data only required a few hours. The penalty in computation time was a trade-off
for a higher number of features. The GIST data produced 320 features per malware sample,
while the RWE data size was dependent on the malware sample’s size and the running window
size. Then, the RWE data was down sampled to a smaller number of data points, ranging from
512 to 4,096 bytes. The result was that the GIST data was much faster to compute but contained
less data than RWE. The RWE took longer to compute, but there was much more data to use.
This tradeoff is one the user would need to make for their specific use case. For users
that already used entropy during malware analysis, the computation of RWE may simultaneously
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be valuable for that analysis and the classification problem. If RWE was computed for other
purposes than classification, the data could serve multiple purposes and be used to generate
Malgazer classifications as well. Once the running window entropy was calculated for a sample,
it will never change, so it only ever needs to be calculated and stored once. On the other hand, if
the use case required that the computations executed faster, and that entropy data would not be
used anywhere else in the malware analysis pipeline, that user may wish to compute and use the
GIST data with a KNN classifier to save time and storage space. The choice of classifier should
fit the use case for which it was selected.

Summary
This chapter presented an analysis of the results computed from the last chapter. The
chapter began with an analysis of the grid searching results to find the optimal hyper-parameters.
While finding the hyper-parameters, the grid searching also provided estimates of each
classifier’s accuracy. Next, the classifiers were cross-fold validated to find the accuracy mean
and variance. This measurement provided the grounds on which to compare the Malgazer RWE
and GIST classifiers. Once the RWE and GIST classifiers were compared, the classification
accuracy per class was explored and it helped explain a possible reason the RWE and GIST
classifiers appeared to have performed worse than the prior literature. Then, the malware
classifiers from prior literature were compared theoretically to the Malgazer RWE classifier.
This chapter concluded with additional research observations that were noteworthy. For
example, factors when choosing a malware classifier were discussed for the different types of
use cases. The next chapter will present the web application before presenting the overall
conclusions in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
DEVELOPING THE MALWARE CLASSIFICATION WEB
APPLICATION
Introduction
Until now, all interactions with any classifier developed throughout this dissertation
occurred in the Python interpreter because the classifiers were instantiated objects loaded into
memory. To use the classifiers in this state, one would have to be familiar with Python and its
interpreter, which is not a trivial requirement. Instead of requiring Python familiarity, this author
created the Malgazer web application so that users from all backgrounds can utilize this research.
This chapter will briefly discuss the web application architecture, how the application was
created, and how to utilize it in order to make full use of this research. Since this design science
artifact is an instantiation of a classifier application rather than a new method, the source code
will not be presented line by line. Users interested in such information should review the source
code in the repository directly for the most detailed implementation information.
Note that this chapter was based upon the “dissertation” git branch in the Malgazer
source code repository (Jones, 2017b). This branch was created when this dissertation was
published so that the text and the source code could be matched by future readers. It is important
to know that the source code in the repository most likely has been improved since this
dissertation was published, so interested users should read the “Readme.md” file in the “master”
git branch for the most up to date and stable information.

The Malgazer Web Application
The architecture for the web application is presented in Figure 22. At the top, a load
balancer routes requests to either the web application or the API, depending on the incoming
URL. The web application and API share data through the Postgres database backend. The
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classifier’s Python pickle/dill files are loaded by the API so that they can be used to make
classifications. The specifics of the API will be discussed in the next section.
The architecture described in Figure 22 does not have to be manually created by each
user wanting to run this application. The architecture was implemented with Docker, which is a
lightweight container system that is platform independent. That means one user can run this
Malgazer architecture on MacOS, while another can run it on Linux or Microsoft Windows,
without changing any of Malgazer’s source code on either installation. The creation of the
Docker containers is completely scripted, so this also makes it possible to easily push this
architecture to the cloud since all software library dependencies were satisfied internally within
each container.
The file defining the architecture in Figure 22 is “docker-compose.yml” in the Malgazer
source code repository. This file specifies each node in the architecture, the configuration, the
environment variables, and anything else a network requires. The Docker compose file is read
when the commands “docker-compose build” and “docker-compose up” are executed. The first
command builds the container images from the included “Dockerfile” file. The second
command runs the container images and creates the architecture in Figure 22 on a virtual
Figure 22. The web application architecture
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network. The Docker compose file then routes HTTPS traffic to the Nginx load balancer. The
Nginx load balancer decides where the traffic will head next. If the URL begins with “api” after
the host name, the traffic is routed to the API node. All other traffic is routed to the web
application node.
Environment variables are the main method to configure the microservices in Figure 22.
The Docker compose file will read the “.env” file in the local directory for the required
environment variables. This file will be specific to each user, and it must be created. A template
with the name “.env.template” is available in the repository so that users can copy it to “.env”
and use it as a guide to get started. The content of the environment variable template file
follows:
01. # DB settings...
02. POSTGRES_PASSWORD=malgazer
03.
04. # Set to 1 to use Malgazer in multi-user mode.
05. MALGAZER_MULTIUSER=0
06.
07. # Set to dev or prod
08. MALGAZER_RUN_ENV=dev
09.
10. # General settings...
11. MALGAZER_WEB_SECRET_KEY=malgazer
12. MALGAZER_WEB_SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT=malgazer
13. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_USERNAME=YOURUSERNAME
14. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_PASSWORD=PASSWORD
15. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_SERVER=YOURSERVER
16. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_PORT=YOURPORTNUMBER
17. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_USE_SSL=1
18. MALGAZER_WEB_MAIL_USE_TLS=0
19. MALGAZER_WEB_HISTORY_LENGTH=100
20. MALGAZER_ALLOW_RESET=1
21.
22. # Production values...
23. MALGAZER_API_WORKERS=2
24. MALGAZER_API_THREADS=10
25. MALGAZER_WEB_WORKERS=2
26. MALGAZER_WEB_THREADS=10
27.
28. # For docker stack...
29. MALGAZER_API_REPLICAS=2
30. MALGAZER_WEB_REPLICAS=2
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Figure 23. The Malgazer web application main screen

Figure 24. The Malgazer submission form
Line 01 is the password for the Postgres database. Users should change this variable to a
secure password. If users wish to run the Malgazer web application in multi-user mode, the
variable on line 05 must be changed from “0” to “1”. This will enable more functionality such as
account management, rate limiting, and logins. The multi-user mode will not be discussed in this
dissertation, but it is very similar to the single-user mode.
Line 08 configures the application as either development (more verbose) or production
(less verbose). The variables in lines 11-12 are security settings, and the user should change the
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values to a secure password. Lines 13-18 configure email support, which is required if the
Malgazer web application is started in multi-user mode. Line 19 configures how many lines will
be in the classification history window. Line 20, if set to “1”, will allow users to reset the
database remotely. This should be disabled (a “0”) in production. Lines 23-26 configure the
number of workers and threads for the application and can be left to the default values in most
cases. Lastly, lines 29-30 configure the number of replicas, if the user wishes to use Docker
stack to deploy this web application to a swarm.
Once the environment variables have been set, the application can be started with the
“docker-compose up” command. Navigating a web browser to https://localhost displays the
main screen, as shown in Figure 23. Note that the screen captures do not show the multi-user
portions of this application, for simplicity. Next, a user can submit a sample by clicking
“Submit” in the menu, which provides an upload form in Figure 24. Submitted samples are
saved as files named as their SHA256 value in the “samples” directory of the source code
repository.
After selecting and uploading a number of samples to the Malgazer web application, the
user can view the scan history. The scan history includes the predicted classification by the
Malgazer classifier loaded from the pickled file named “ml.dill” in the repository’s “classifier”
directory. This “ml.dill” file was created from the Malgazer source code during the final training
phase for each type of classifier studied in this research. These files are available via a link in

Figure 25. The Malgazer history window
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the Malgazer source code repository. Simply replacing this file with other classifiers trained
with the Malgazer source code will allow a user to easily interact with all of the classifiers
through a web browser. Figure 25 presents the history for several example malware samples
from the final data set, complete with their predicted classifications. “Possible Classifications” is
a value that can be used to store the human prediction of the same sample. This value can be set
when the sample is submitted, or simply ignored because it has no bearing on the predicted
classification.
The web application is a Python Flask application, and it was designed to be a thin
wrapper over the Malgazer API. This allows users to not only use the convenient web
application, but users are also able to use the backend API programmatically if they wish to
submit larger collections of samples very quickly. All of the functionality found in the web
application is also available through the API. The API is documented in the web application by
clicking “API” at the top of the menu, leading to the window presented in Figure 26. The next
Figure 26. The Malgazer API documentation
section will briefly discuss the Malgazer API.
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The Malgazer API
The Malgazer API is the engine behind the classification process for the entire web
application. There are four main API routes: submit a sample, see the history of classifications,
get the classifications for a specific SHA256 hash, and reset the database. Most of the
classification logic is in the submission route.
The submission route contains logic to read the file from the upload, load the “ml.dill”
pickled object into memory, and use that object to generate the features and classifications for
the uploaded malware samples. The submission route then saves the results to the database so it
is available in the “history” API route. The submission route uses a fixed sized process pool to
calculate the features and classifications in parallel, decreasing the overall time required to
classify multiple malware samples. Using a pool also prevents resource depletion and allows
tuning for the number of simultaneous jobs executed per Docker container.
The API returns JSON so it can be easily parsed using nearly any popular programming
language. The following two lines demonstrate the API usage. Using the command line web
browser named “curl” in line 01, the JSON classification history in line 02 was produced. Line
02 was the JSON output from the API. The API’s JSON output matched the HTML version in
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Figure 25. Line 02 could be loaded with “json.loads” function inside the Python interpreter, if
one wished, to access attributes about each scan as a dictionary.

01. $ curl -k https://localhost/api/history
02. [{"id": 8, "sha256":
"000D3C1CC07A5337E76BCEA9E3A5C20A5E8B1C12C0E9D59A8462EE6EF17
E2CA4", "time": "2018-11-13 14:03:31.743067",
"classification": "Virus", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 7, "sha256":
"000C2FC31F0FD0081FD80CA80A75A8F5B61FE04BF1413C12F15C88F1122
D7859", "time": "2018-11-13 14:03:22.796583",
"classification": "Worm", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 6, "sha256":
"000BC53D3E0B7A76BE5334089869E692CDC6549B61E7AA87C8664C82B7B
9B5E6", "time": "2018-11-13 14:03:12.183530",
"classification": "Backdoor", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 5, "sha256":
"0005B5BA8492CD4144E2E9D0C1ECC51AA147592007C695FB83F4D5ABE4E
A0A38", "time": "2018-11-13 14:03:02.735040",
"classification": "Worm", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 4, "sha256":
"0007C4BF7CB4FB1DFF2FCB27F781C2561C23905C27ED5B3E09C7080F940
66633", "time": "2018-11-13 14:02:53.466034",
"classification": "PUA", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 3, "sha256":
"0008D23B658E267FC5A03CFA715734AF915BACEBA603E661995AFCAC808
5FA59", "time": "2018-11-13 14:02:46.496942",
"classification": "Virus", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 2, "sha256":
"00050F30FF95C69F92F8C32338C4F3473B4F653FF2A1B65375AAC32596A
225B4", "time": "2018-11-13 14:02:36.410553",
"classification": "Virus", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"},
{"id": 1, "sha256":
"00018690F0A5E684190A95B911E6502658D434249B43EAD719E49405EB9
B9EE7", "time": "2018-11-13 14:02:28.892873",
"classification": "PUA", "possible_classification":
"Unknown", "ip_address": "172.30.0.5", "status": "Done"}]
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One can submit a new malware sample with the following curl command (note that the
line number is not part of the command):
01. curl -F “file=@/some/path/mysample”
https://localhost/api/submit
The command above uploads the “mysample” binary to the API so that it can be
classified. Once the results have finished processing in the API process pool, calling the
“history” route will display the predicted classification information. One can also pull
classifications for a specific SHA256 using the “classification” API route.
In multi-user mode, all of the API routes can be protected with rate-limiting, so that
single users cannot deplete all of the computing resources. The rate limiting can be applied to
each user in this manner. For users that wish to disable rate limiting, it can be turned off
completely in the source code.

Summary
This chapter briefly demonstrated the web application created to facilitate usage of the
Malgazer classifiers easily from a web browser or through an API. This chapter highlighted the
architecture, how this application works, and the commands used to create it. Example output
from the web application and the API were also included in this chapter. The Malgazer web
application was the final design science artifact created by this research. The next and final
chapter will present the conclusions for the entire dissertation.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter will explore the conclusions drawn from this research project. While
previous chapters concentrated on the details of each experiment, this chapter will present the
conclusions drawn from this research project as a whole. First, a number of conclusions can be
drawn based upon the design science artifacts initially presented in the first chapter. This chapter
will summarize the research contributions and then state the conclusions drawn for each
contribution. Then, this chapter will present some of the benefits and disadvantages observed
from using the various techniques presented throughout this dissertation. This section may be
useful to readers that are undecided as to how they will develop their classifier because it will
provide insights beyond the raw data. This chapter will conclude with several possible exciting
future research directions discovered during this research.

The Research Contributions
There were several research objectives presented in the first chapter that created design
science artifacts as contributions to science. Recall that this research began with the assertion
that a generalized malware classification model could be used to explain prior literature for
malware classification. This model also allowed for the comparison of prior literature to the
research developed in this dissertation. Recall that as part of this dissertation’s research
question, running window entropy was chosen as the input data to the classifier. However, it
was discovered that running window entropy data was very slow to compute at scale. Therefore,
this dissertation optimized the running window entropy algorithm so that it could be calculated
faster on larger data sets. After the running window entropy data was computed, the collection
and normalization of the six functional malware classifications based upon VirusTotal data was
completed.
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After obtaining the training data, the training phase was executed at scale so that one
individual was able to complete over two hundred complex training experiments in parallel in the
cloud. In order to train and evaluate the classifiers at scale, this research used Terraform to
instantiate cloud computing resources as needed. Once the classifiers were trained and the
accuracies measured, it was determined that the most accurate classifier was the Adaboost/RF
algorithm with running window entropy data as input. This classifier had an accuracy of
approximately 95%, which was approximately 0.76% greater than the measured accuracy of the
GIST model using the same Malgazer data sets. Using the accuracies measured from the GIST
and Malgazer classifiers, in addition to the accuracies reported in prior literature, a high-level
comparison of Malgazer methods to prior literature was presented.
The final design science artifact presented from this research was the web application.
The web application allowed users without Python programming familiarity to utilize the
classifiers built from this research. More importantly, the web application also encapsulated all
of the dependencies within Docker so that it could run on nearly any operating system. Each of
these contributions and their conclusions will be discussed in their own subsections that follow.
The Generalized Classification Model
The generalized machine learning based malware classification model was developed
during the literature review phase. As the literature review began, it quickly became apparent
that each article was written independently from others, and comparisons between methods
proposed in different articles were difficult, or in some cases impossible, to discern. In order to
compare two methods, a common framework was needed. This framework was expressed in this
dissertation as a generalized malware classification model. The purpose of this generalized
model was to aid in the categorization of numerous machine learning malware papers relevant to
this research topic. Based upon over one hundred articles considered, the model presented in the
first chapter was developed and refined.
The first conclusion from this generalized model was that it successfully allowed for the
comparison of prior methods not only to each other, but also to the methods presented in this
dissertation. Without this model, it would have been difficult to visualize the differences
between methods. With this model, it was possible to categorize and present the prior literature.
In some cases, the comparisons were as trivial as comparing the value of two cells in a table, but
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in other cases authors did not provide enough information for comparison. This design science
research artifact served its purposes for this dissertation, but it also gives future researchers a
powerful tool to compare their research to prior literature, as was done here.
The biggest disappointment from using the generalized model was discovering a great
number of prior papers omitting critical information that would have been useful for replication,
verification, and comparative purposes. In cases where there was enough information to
adequately replicate a prior method, the malware training data set was not available. Therefore,
replication, verification, and comparisons were cursory, at best, except for the GIST method.
Calculating the accuracies for the GIST malware classifier on the same Malgazer data set
allowed for direct comparisons between the GIST and Malgazer methodologies. Indirectly, it
also compared the GIST and Malgazer training and testing data sets. This is because the training
and testing data sets directly influence the accuracy scores. As discussed previously, a poorly
selected training or testing data set could cause the classifier to learn features of malware that
may not be representative of the real world. The data sets could also artificially inflate reported
accuracies if the testing and training data sets are too much alike. In other cases, a training data
set could reduce the accuracy if it did not contain enough features useful for classification.
Using the same data sets to compare the GIST and Malgazer methodologies removed a variable
in the comparison.
Comparing the GIST and Malgazer classifiers on the same data sets also allowed for
cursory theoretical comparisons to other prior literature. For example, the accuracies reported in
this dissertation were lower for GIST than the corresponding accuracies reported in their original
paper of approximately 98%. As discussed in the analysis chapter 7, if one were to assume that
the data set in this dissertation was not optimal, it is possible that the GIST and Malgazer
classifiers could have been more accurate if they were built from a different malware data set.
The results of the GIST papers support that assertion, as the authors had a data set that led to an
accuracy of approximately 98%. Comparing GIST and Malgazer using the same malware data
set discovered that the Malgazer classifier could outperform the GIST methodology if Adaboot
and random forests were used to classify the running window entropy data from the samples.
The accuracy improvement was approximately 0.75%, which is not large, but it is still an
improvement. At a minimum, it is fair to concluded that the Malgazer classifier is at least as
accurate as the GIST classifier.
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Using the comparison between GIST and Malgazer, a theoretical comparison to other
prior literature based solely on the reported accuracies was made. Most prior papers presented
accuracies of approximately 98%, which was also the accuracy reported by the GIST authors.
Since the Malgazer classifier outperformed the GIST classifier, and the GIST authors reported an
accuracy of approximately 98%, it is possible that Malgazer’s true accuracy could be closer to
98% if the training and testing data sets were selected to optimize this accuracy. However, the
data for this dissertation was selected from a stream of real-world current threats, and that stream
could have either matched the general trend in threats in 2018, or it could have been an outlier
and biased the classifier’s training. No matter the case, it is important to note that the extra 3%
accuracy could be gained using a different malware data set since the GIST and Malgazer
accuracies were very close for this dissertation’s data set.
The selection of the functional classification also directly influenced the accuracies. As
discussed in the analysis chapter, the “Trojan” functional classification produced the worst
accuracy every time. Previously, this dissertation explored some of the reasons that a “Trojan”
classification could have been problematic. Therefore, higher accuracy may be in reach by
removing the “Trojan” classification and associated samples.
The generalized malware classification model design science artifact satisfied this
research objective.
Running Window Entropy Optimization
The running window entropy optimization allowed for more data to be computed in less
time. Therefore, this optimization allowed for larger training and testing data sets. The
conclusions from this research objective are relatively straight forward. The optimized running
window entropy algorithm required 2% or less of the time required for the original algorithm.
Therefore, fifty times the data could be computed by the optimized algorithm over the original
algorithm. Since more data could be computed in the same amount of time, the training and
testing data sets were larger than they may have been without the optimized algorithm. Larger
training data sets typically lead to more accurate classifiers.
The design science method artifact of an optimized running window entropy algorithm
satisfied this research objective.
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Collection And Normalization of Functional Classification Information
Another pivotal decision during this research project that affected the overall accuracies
of classifiers was the selection of the six functional malware classifications. Six functional
classifications were chosen based upon the VirusTotal detections of the exploratory data sets.
Six categories were used because it focused the research question, but there are many more than
six functional categories for malware. Using a small number of categories with the selection of
categories directly impacted the classification accuracies of any such classifier. A number of
prior methods, such as GIST, used many more categories and resulted in higher accuracies.
As discussed previously, the “Trojan” classification consistently produced the worst
accuracy out of all the categories. Removing this classification would most likely increase the
classifier’s accuracy. Many possibilities were explored as to why the “Trojan” classification
may be problematic, and users interested in the details should refer back to chapter 7.
The method of collecting and normalizing functional classification information is a
design science method artifact. This design science method artifact satisfied this research
objective.
Scaling The Computations
The process of scaling the computations in the cloud made it possible to collect data from
over two hundred training sessions. The two hundred training sessions only required the
assistance of one individual, so the methodologies presented throughout this dissertation can
easily be replicated by nearly anyone if they explore the Malgazer repositories. Using cloud
resources to compute the experiments throughout this dissertation cost less than $1,000 USD
total5, so the costs were not prohibitive for most organizations. Using cloud resources allowed
for multiple simultaneous experiments to be calculated in parallel, which would have taken much
longer to compute on a single laptop and cost much more for hardware.
Furthermore, cloud resources provided hardware that may not be on the average user’s
computer. For example, the neural networks computed quickly because a cloud resource with a
GPU was selected for the experiments. The GPU reduced the computation time greatly, but in
5

This was a best guess estimate of the total cost from this author’s Azure account, this author’s AWS
account, and the committee chair’s AWS account. Several accounts were used for the training, but the overall costs
were not over $1,000 USD.
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2017-2018 the demand for GPUs greatly outpaced the available supply. The cost of a single
GPU during these years were in the thousands of dollars because of the cryptocurrency boom.
The average cost of a GPU during the boom was many times more expensive than an average
GPU before the boom. Amazon AWS provided a “spot instance” with a GPU for a much lower
cost than normal, and that instance was used for efficient neural network training. Cloud
resources made it possible to efficiently train classifiers with a GPU without the large upfront
costs of buying the hardware outright.
For the traditional machine learning algorithms, it was important to use computers with
large memory and numerous CPU cores. Microsoft Azure and Amazon AWS resources
provided computers with these specifications at a lower cost than purchasing the hardware
outright. Depending on the experiments ran at the time, cloud computers with eight or sixteen
CPUs were selected, with matching large memory allocations.
While it might not seem important that a prior science artifact was used to scale the
computations, it was very important to the success of this research project. Given that most
dissertations only last approximately one year from proposal to defense, and they are written by
one author, efficient use of time was very important. The method of scaling these computations
so that one individual could complete them within a year was directly responsible for the success
in collecting the large amounts of data for this dissertation in a timely manner. This research
objective was satisfied by this design science instantiation artifact.
The Most Accurate Classifier
The most accurate classifier based on the Malgazer training and testing data sets came
from the Adaboost and random forest algorithms using the running window entropy data as input
features. The accuracy for this classifier was approximately 95%, which means that on average
out of 100 classifications, approximately five of the classifications will be errors. The most
accurate classifier was a slight improvement over the GIST classifier, making it at least as
effective as the GIST classifier. This classifier satisfies one of the design science research
objectives described in the first chapter.
Other conclusions drawn previously in this chapter about this classifier will not be
restated here in order to save space, but the conclusions still apply nonetheless.
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The Web Application
The last design science artifact was the web application. The web application used
several systems to provide a user friendly and programmatic access to the classifiers trained
throughout this research. The web application was designed so that it runs in Docker, which
means all of the dependencies are encapsulated in the application and it can be run on nearly any
platform, such as Microsoft Windows, Apple MacOS, and Linux. Once built, the web
application can run in single user or multiple user mode. The application can also be easily
pushed to the cloud, since Docker also runs in the cloud for Azure and AWS.
The web application design science artifact satisfied the research objective described in
the first chapter.

Recommendations
Until now, this dissertation concentrated on reporting the numbers, facts, and results.
However, some users may be looking for recommendations for selecting the right malware
classifier for a specific application. This section will provide some of this author’s
recommendations based on the benefits and disadvantages learned during the duration of this
research project.
First, it was quickly obvious that running window entropy required more computation
time than GIST. Since GIST and Malgazer classifiers were nearly the same for accuracy, the
extra computation time may be onerous for some organizations and not worth the tradeoff for
higher accuracy. Other organizations may already have been using running entropy data during
their malware analysis, so the addition of the Malgazer classifier on top of that data would be
more efficient than adding a GIST classifier. In this case, adding a GIST classifier would require
extra computations and possible storage of this GIST information as well. Therefore, time
constraints will factor into which classifier a user should choose, and what type of environment
is already available to the user (i.e. is RWE data already calculated, or not?).
If a user is only interested in the highest accuracy possible, the Malgazer classifier using
the Adaboost and random forest algorithms on the running window entropy data was the most
accurate classifier created by this research. This classifier was approximately 1% more accurate
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than the GIST method on the same data sets. The tradeoff for more accuracy in this case was the
longer computation time for the running window entropy data calculations.
If a user is not interested in developing their own source code to support a malware
classifier, the user’s choices are extremely limited. Very few, if any, prior literature reviewed in
this dissertation provided working source code without first contacting the authors. On the other
hand, everything in this dissertation has been open sourced and is available to the public. Any
user comfortable with Python, the web, or APIs could make use of the source code, data, and any
of the other design science artifacts presented throughout this dissertation. Improvements will be
welcomed to the Malgazer repositories.
While the GIST data size was fixed at 320 features, the running window entropy data size
was dependent on the running window size and the malware’s size. For supervised machine
learning, the number of inputs must be constant between samples, so the running window
entropy data had to be resampled to a fixed length. This dissertation explored several resampled
lengths, from 256 bytes up to 4,096 bytes. While this research did not exhaustively search the
running window entropy window size and resampled length possibilities, it did not appear that
the accuracy would change greatly when using different lengths. Therefore, a negligible
difference in classification accuracy6 for using a smaller running window size of 256 bytes and
feature vector of 512 bytes was a good tradeoff for the faster computation time. A running
window size of 256 bytes and an RWE vector size of 512 bytes are the values this author
recommends using as a starting point.

Future Research Opportunities
Several ideas for future research opportunities are presented in this section. First,
exploring methods to curate an optimal training and testing data sets could improve an already
high classification accuracy score. As discussed previously, the classifier’s accuracy is
dependent on the input training and testing data sets, and the methodology to curate such a set for
this classifier could be studied. Another future research opportunity is study into the optimal
functional classification categories. In this dissertation, the six functional classifications were
drawn from visual observation of VirusTotal data. Perhaps research into this topic could also

6

The differences in classification accuracy were approximately 1% or less.
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improve the Malgazer classifier’s accuracy. Additional research could explore the differences in
accuracies between classification strategies. For example, the accuracies for functional
classifications could be compared to family classifications.
While this dissertation considered a large number of prior works, there are prior works
that this dissertation did not cover. In addition, there will also be many future works that could
be classified using the generalized classification model. Unless there is wide adoption of a
model such as this to describe methodologies, publications classifying the current research such
as was done in the literature review chapter could be beneficial to others.
Regarding prior literature, there is also a need to verify methods for the purposes of
comparison. This dissertation explored one such method in GIST, but there are many more
methods that should be replicated, verified, and compared to current literature so that scientists
can truly measure and understand improvements to malware classifiers.
Although discussed briefly in the last section, future research could concentrate on the
relationships between RWE window size and the resampled RWE length with respect to
accuracy. Although this research did not discover any correlation to accuracy, the anaylsis was
cursory and further study is possible in that area.
With respect to the Malgazer web application, another future research opportunity could
be to build an online malware classifier that learns as users submit samples. Online classifiers
learn with each new sample instead of every sample in the training set up front, as was discussed
throughout this dissertation.
Another future research opportunity could explore the relationships between automated
malware classification and human based malware classification. There are many factors that
could be studied, such as the differences in accuracies between a classifier and a human, and the
time savings versus the accuracy gain an organization could use to their benefit.

Summary
This chapter presented the conclusions drawn from the research project described in this
dissertation. The research objectives from the first chapter were revisited and each design
science artifact was discussed with respect to how it satisfied the objectives. Then, this chapter
presented several recommendations based upon this author’s experience working on this
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dissertation topic between 2016 and 2019. Lastly, this chapter presented future research
opportunities that could be based on the work described in this dissertation.
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DEFINITIONS
Adaboost
AI
ANN
CNN
DT
GIST
KNN
Malgazer
ML
NB
NC
OVR
RF
RWE
SVM

The Adaboost machine learning algorithm.
Artificial intelligence.
Artificial neural networks.
Convolutional neural networks.
Decision tree machine learning algorithm.
Method #14 in the literature review chapter.
K-Nearest neighbors machine learning algorithm.
A name given to the classifiers developed in this research.
Machine learning.
Naïve Bayes machine learning algorithm.
Nearest Centroid machine learning algorithm.
One v Rest machine learning algorithm.
Random forest machine learning algorithm.
Running window entropy.
Support vector machines machine learning algorithm.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: A TOUR OF MALGAZER’S SOURCE CODE
REPOSITORIES
Introduction
This appendix will present a tour of the Malgazer source code and repositories. First, a
quick tour of the Malgazer source code will be presented, since most of the source code has been
explained previously. Next, the Terraform files that were used to compute the experiments at
scale will be presented. After that, the training data and trained classifiers will be presented.
Because of the large size, the training data and trained classifiers were stored at a different
repository, but everything is linked through the Malgazer source code repository, so users can
easily locate the data. Next, the Docker files for the web application are presented before
concluding with a tour of the web application source. Please note that this appendix was written
in late 2018 and will coincide with the “dissertation” git branch. Improvements to the
repositories are likely, so users interested in the current status of this research project should read
the readme files in the git “master” branches.

Malgazer’s Python Libraries
The Malgazer Python libraries are found in the main source code repository (Jones,
2017b) under the “library” directory. There are several library files in this directory: entropy.py,
files.py, ml.py, plots.py, utils.py. These modules were previously discussed in the research
methodology chapter, so they will not be reiterated here. These libraries were used heavily by
other Malgazer scripts found in the root directory of the repository such as
“extract_gist_features.py”, “extract_rwe_features.py”, “train_classifier.py”, etc. Each of these
scripts served a purpose and will be mentioned below:
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•

extract_rwe_features.py: This script calculated the RWE features from
directories of malware. The user is able to specify the running window entropy
window size and resampled data size. This script utilized the “Utils” library
discussed previously. The RWE data is saved in HDF files, which is a common
file type in data science.

•

extract_gist_features.py: This script calculated the GIST features using the
same methodology as the RWE features script above.

•

vt_intelligence_hunting_downloader.py: This script downloaded VirusTotal
information for classifications.

•

build_classifications_from_vt_data.py: This script translated the raw
VirusTotal data into Malgazer classifications. This script was executed on the
data returned from the previous script, above.

•

train_classifier.py: This script trained the classifiers. This was the script that
was executed for over 200 experiments in this dissertation.

Terraform Files
The Terraform files that were used to scale the computations can be found in (Jones,
2018). While this dissertation will not go in depth about the usage of Terraform, the portions of
Terraform that are specific to Malgazer will be presented here. Inside the Malgazer Terraform
repository, there are two directories. One directory is “malgazer-training-aws” and the other is
“malgazer-training-azure”. The first directory built training resources in Amazon AWS, while
the second directory built a very similar cloud resource in Microsoft Azure. AWS was used for
the neural network training while Azure was used to train the traditional machine learning
algorithms. Each will be discussed in their own sections below.
Amazon AWS
This Terraform code was used to create AWS resources as needed to train the classifiers.
In 2018, AWS offered spot instances, which is a more cost-effective means of purchasing cloud
resources. Spot instances made it possible to train neural networks with GPUs without the
upfront costs of purchasing a GPU. It was possible to rent a GPU for a few hours of
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computation. There are several files in this directory, and each file will be briefly discussed
below:
•

scripts: This directory contains several useful bash scripts to setup cloud training
resources. Once the resource is up, one can execute “/tmp/build_training.sh” to
install all the required dependencies on the training computer. If the cloud
resource had a GPU installed, the script “build_gpu.sh” installed the required
dependencies for a GPU. Lastly, running the “get_training.sh” script expanded
the training data sets once they were transferred to the instance.

•

backends.tf: This file configures where the Terraform state file will be saved.

•

keys.tf: This file configures the SSH key information. The user must create their
own SSH key and name it “mykey.cert” and “mykey.cert.pub” in this directory.

•

networking.tf: This file configures the spot instance’s networking information.

•

outputs.tf: This file lists the outputs that will be generated when Terraform is
executed. This file will list the IP address of the cloud resource after it is created
so that the user can connect via SSH.

•

providers.tf: This file configures Terraform for Amazon AWS.

•

spot-requests.tf: This file describes the spot requests.

•

user-data.txt: This file executes a management script on the cloud resource that
is specific to spot requests and hibernation.

•

variables.tf: This file defines all of the variables as user must supply to
instantiate this resource.

In order to use the Terraform source code, one must create a “terraform.tfvars” file that
instantiates all of the variables listed in the “variables.tf” file. Without this file, Terraform will
not work. In addition, the SSH key needs to be created with a command line SSH utility and
saved as “mykey.cert” and “mykey.cert.pub”. Once these steps have been completed, one could
create the cloud resources with “terraform apply” or destroy them with “terraform destroy”.
Microsoft Azure
The concepts for Terraform with AWS is very similar to Azure, with some slight
differences. In 2018, Azure did not offer a comparable service to “spot instances”, so that
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concept will not apply. Most other concepts will transfer, but the names are slightly different.
Instead of “instance”, Azure denotes computers as “virtual machines”. The following files are in
the Azure portion of Malgazer’s Terraform repository:
•

scripts: This directory contains several useful bash scripts to setup cloud training
resources. Once the resource is up, one can execute “/tmp/build_training.sh” to
install all the required dependencies on the training computer. Running the
“get_training.sh” script expanded the training data sets after they were transferred
to the instance.

•

backends.tf: This file configures where the Terraform state file will be saved.

•

networking.tf: This file configures the virtual machine’s networking
configuration.

•

outputs.tf: This file lists the outputs that will be generated when Terraform is
executed. The endpoint information for the cloud resource will be returned, and
the user can use SSH to connect to it.

•

providers.tf: This file configures this repository for Microsoft Azure.

•

resource_groups.tf: This file configures the groups for Azure cloud resources.

•

variables.tf: This file defines all of the variables a user must supply to instantiate
this resource.

•

virtual_machine_1.tf: This file configures the virtual machines information.

Again, in order to use the Terraform source code, one must create a “terraform.tfvars”
file that instantiates all of the variables listed in the “variables.tf” file. Without this file,
Terraform will not work. Once these steps have been completed, one could create the cloud
resources with “terraform apply” or destroy them with “terraform destroy”.

Training Data
The training data was too large to store on GitHub, so it was saved to a DropBox account
and linked from the GitHub readme files. Please note that this dissertation was written in 2018,
so the data could have been moved to other file sharing services as appropriate. The readme file
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in the “master” git branch of the Malgazer source code will contain any of the details that may
have changed since this dissertation was printed, along with the link to the training data sets.
The training data consists of two main directories: “GIST” and “RWE”. Each directory
stores the data for its respective feature type. While the GIST data set was relatively simple to
store, several RWE files were stored for different running window size and resampled running
window entropy series length. In addition, these directories store the classification information
and SHA256 hashes of every malware sample used throughout this research.

Trained Classifiers
The trained classifiers were also too large to store directly to GitHub, so the classifiers
were saved to a DropBox account, just like the training data discussed above. The most current
link is available in the readme file of the “master” git branch of main Malgazer source code
repository. The trained classifiers can be located in the “training\final_training\classifiers”
subdirectory.
Inside this directory there are subdirectories used to categorize the classifiers by input
feature type and machine learning algorithm. The GIST and Malgazer classifiers were created
and stored as “ml.dill” Python dill pickle files. The “ml.dill” classifiers can be used with the
Python web application, which will be discussed shortly. The pickle files can also be loaded
with the “dill” library in Python, directly, for users wishing to do so.

Docker Files
To create the Malgazer web application, Docker is required. There are two Dockerfile
configuration files in the “docker” directory of the Malgazer source code repository. One is
called “Dockerfile-base” and the other is called “Dockerfile-nginx”. The first file creates the
images for the API and web portions of the Malgazer web application. The second Docker file
creates the image for the load balancer for the Malgazer web application. These files are built by
another file in the root directory named “docker-compose.yml”.
For a user to create the Malgazer web application, Docker must first be installed, then the
user can create all of the required images with the “docker-compose build” command. After the
images are built, the user can type “docker-compose up” and the web application will be created.
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Then, the user can browse the URL https://localhost to use Malgazer. Most users will need to
modify the Docker files very little, if any.

Malgazer Web Application
The last component discussed in this chapter is the Malgazer web application source
code. When the web application is started with the “docker-compose up” command, the
classifier named “ml.dill” in the “classifier” directory is loaded into the Malgazer web
application. Any malware samples uploaded to the web application will be saved in the
“samples” directory by its SHA256 hash.
The Malgazer web application source code can be found in the “docker” directory (Jones,
2017b). There are several subdirectories below the “docker” directory, and each will be briefly
explained below.
The “api” Directory
This directory holds the API script. The API is the logic of the web application, as even
the web application communicates with the API for work to be completed. Most configuration
options are set via environment variables within Docker and would not need to be modified here
for most users.
The “common” Directory
This directory contains logic that is useful for multi-user mode. The process of emailing
and creating user tokens is stored here. Users running the web application in single user mode
will not be interested in this directory.
The “db_models” Directory
This directory contains the database models. There are several tables in a Postgresql
database the web application and API use, so this file declares the structure of the tables. The
database data can be used as objects and the database communications are abstracted through the
Python SQLAlchemy module. Interested users can find the table structure for the database here.
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The “files” Directory
This directory contains the configuration files and scripts for the various components to
the Malgazer web application. The files in this directory are copied to the Docker containers
when they are created, and they contain entry point scripts or other configuration files useful to
the running system.
The “logs” Directory
This is the directory where logs are kept when the Malgazer web application is running.
The logs stored here are plain text.
The “scripts” Directory
This directory contains useful scripts. The scripts in this directory can assist with the
creation of a Docker registry, if needed, for a Docker swarm configuration.
The “web” Directory
This directory contains the web application logic. This directory also contains the
templates and other visual components for the website. Users interested in changing any of the
web application’s visual appearance or business logic can find the relevant files in this directory.
The web application was developed with Python Flask, and users that venture into this directory
may wish to be versed in Flask before modifying the logic.

Summary
This appendix provided a tour of the Malgazer repositories. There were three main
repositories explained in this appendix. The first repository was the main Malgazer source code
repository on GitHub (Jones, 2017b). All information for Malgazer can be found from this
repository in the “master” branch. If a user wishes to see the state of the source code when this
dissertation was published, the “dissertation” git branch will contain the matching information.
The second repository was a GitHub repository that contained the Malgazer Terraform
cloud infrastructure code (Jones, 2018). This repository was used to create cloud resources on
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demand for classifier training purposes. There are a number of important steps the user must
follow to use the terraform files, and those steps were presented in this appendix.
Lastly, the training data and trained classifiers are available via a DropBox link that is
listed in the Malgazer source code repository readme. The files were many gigabytes in size and
could not be stored with the source code in GitHub, so they were made available via the link
listed in the readme file.

